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Preface 
The Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Ombudsman) is an independent and impartial 
investigative agency within the legislative branch of Iowa state government.  Its powers 
and duties are defined in Iowa Code chapter 2C (2009). 
The Ombudsman has authority to investigate, in response to a complaint or on his own 
motion, any administrative action of Iowa state and local government agencies.  The 
Ombudsman can investigate to determine whether agency action is unlawful, contrary to 
policy, unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or otherwise objectionable.  The Ombudsman 
may also be concerned with strengthening procedures and practices which lessen the risk 
that objectionable administrative actions will occur. 
The Ombudsman may also decide to publish a report of his findings and conclusions, as 
well as any recommendations for improving agency law, policy, or practice.  If the report 
is critical of the agency, the agency is given the opportunity to reply to the report, and the 
reply is attached to the published report. 
This report serves two main purposes.  The first is to report the findings and conclusions 
of my office’s investigation of the Iowa Lottery’s performance in regulating fraud and 
theft by retailers and their employees. 
The second is to present my recommendations for steps the Lottery can take that would  
strengthen its enforcement procedures and practices.  The purpose of these 
recommendations is to ensure that customers’ interests are reasonably protected by 
reducing the risk of retailer fraud and theft, and increasing the likelihood that violators 
are held accountable. 
In preparing this report, we have strived not to identify a number of individuals: 
customers, retailers and their employees, as well as theft suspects.  As noted above, this 
investigation focuses on the Iowa Lottery’s regulatory performance.  In reviewing that 
performance, we examined the Lottery’s response to alleged violations by various 
retailers and store employees, a number of whom later pled guilty to Lottery-related 
crimes.  We found other individuals who have claimed significant prizes from the 
Lottery, some of whom were identified in press releases as retailers or their employees. 
While many of their identities are in fact a matter of public record, the actions of those 
customers, retailers, and store employees are not the focus of our investigation.  I am, 
therefore, exercising my authority under Iowa Code chapter 2C (2009) to not identify 
these individuals in this report. 
This investigation was borne from my review of Canadian ombudsman investigations of 
the provincial lotteries in Ontario and British Columbia.  Those reports, released in the 
first half of 2007, documented a veritable scandal with regard to retailer fraud and theft. 
After a preliminary assessment, I initiated an Ombudsman investigation of these issues 
pursuant to the authority in Iowa Code chapter 2C (2009).  My decision was 
communicated to the Lottery in an October 5, 2007, letter to then-CEO Dr. Edward 
Stanek. 
 
vi 
My letter of notice stated in part: 
This investigation will focus on, but not necessarily be 
limited to, the following issues: 
 
1. Whether the Iowa Lottery has been operating with 
integrity and dignity, as required by Iowa Code Chapter 
99G. 
 
2. Whether the Iowa Lottery has acted reasonably in 
ensuring that retailers and retailer employees don’t take 
advantage of customers who entrust them with a ticket. 
 
William P. Angrick II 
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Executive Summary 
A. IOWA LOTTERY OVERVIEW 
The general assembly finds and declares … [t]hat lottery games 
shall be operated and managed in a manner that provides 
continuing entertainment to the public, maximizes revenues, and 
ensures that the lottery is operated with integrity and dignity and 
free from political influence. 
— Iowa Code section 99G.2 (2009) 
 
Since its establishment in 1985, the Iowa Lottery has raised more than $1.1 billion for 
state government programs.  For the fiscal year which ended June 30, 2008, the Lottery 
reported profits of approximately $56.5 million.  The Lottery’s profits are deposited into 
the state’s general fund, which pays for various state programs including education, 
social services, veterans affairs and public safety. 
The Lottery depends on a network of approximately 2,500 licensed retailers to sell its 
products and to pay out most prizes worth $600 or less.  Stores paid out 83 percent of all 
prize money in fiscal year 2007, according to Lottery statistics.  In communities across 
Iowa, these retailers and their employees represent the public face of the Lottery system. 
The Lottery says that licensed retailers are required to follow its “Licensing Terms and 
Conditions.”  These terms permit the Lottery to impose license sanctions, up to and 
including revocation, “if a retailer fails to comply with any applicable law or 
administrative rule, these terms and conditions, or instructions given to the retailer.” 
B. CANADIAN LOTTERY SCANDAL 
In 2007 two Canadian ombudsmen offices published major investigative reports on 
retailer fraud involving the provincial lotteries of Ontario and British Columbia.  Those 
investigations were triggered by media reports that some retailers were claiming 
significantly more major prizes than one would expect given the odds. 
Based on their investigations, the ombudsmen in Ontario and British Columbia found that 
the lotteries’ lax approach to enforcement had enabled some retailers and clerks to 
manipulate the process to their advantage, up to and including theft of some customers’ 
winning tickets.  Both reports recommended that the lotteries implement a system of 
proactive checks and balances designed to reduce the potential for fraud and theft, and to 
increase the chances that thieves would be detected and held accountable. 
Both lotteries accepted all of the ombudsmen’s recommendations (and in several cases 
the lotteries went beyond what had been recommended).  Since then, there has been a sea 
change in how the Ontario and British Columbia lotteries view the importance of 
protecting their customers’ interests.  Investigations of other lotteries across Canada 
followed, with similar results.   
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There have been no similar investigations of lotteries in the United States.  This could 
create the impression that the threat of retailer fraud is a distinctly Canadian problem.  
But that impression is contradicted by recent media reports.  In 2008, for example, a 
Louisiana store clerk was charged with stealing a customer’s winning ticket worth 
$800,000. 
In 2008 and 2009 the California Lottery conducted undercover sting operations where 
agents posing as customers presented decoy winning tickets to clerks.  Some clerks paid 
out only a fraction of the prize money, while some said the tickets were not winners and 
went on to claim the prize money for themselves.  The stings led to the arrests of at least 
ten individuals working at lottery retail outlets. 
C. IOWA OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATION 
After reviewing the Canadian ombudsmen reports and conducting a preliminary 
assessment, we initiated an investigation of the Iowa Lottery’s oversight of alleged 
retailer fraud. 
The Lottery’s Security Division is responsible for investigating allegations of theft and 
fraud involving Lottery products.  As part of our investigation, we reviewed all of the 
Security Division’s investigative case files for calendar years 2005, 2006, and 2007.  This 
involved approximately 434 files.  No outside entity had ever before audited the Lottery’s 
investigative case files. 
We identified approximately 122 files that involved alleged impropriety by retailers or 
their employees.  Our review of those 122 files forms the basis for many of the findings 
and conclusions in this report. 
We divided the 122 files into three general categories: 
• Customers alleging impropriety by retailers: 34 cases 
These cases involved incidents where customers complained about the actions of 
a retailer or store employee.  We determined that the majority of these complaints 
were essentially substantiated by Security Division investigators.  Two files 
involved store employees who were found to have stolen a customer’s winning 
ticket.  Many involved acts of lesser significance. 
• Internal thefts prosecuted: 54 cases 
These cases generally involved store employees who were accused of, and 
subsequently prosecuted for, Lottery-related theft or fraud.  The vast majority (47) 
involved store employees who were charged with stealing instant tickets from the 
stores where they worked. 
• Internal thefts not prosecuted: 34 cases 
These cases involved incidents where store employees were alleged to have 
committed Lottery-related theft or fraud, but were not prosecuted.  Of these 34 
cases, we determined that 33 were essentially substantiated – meaning the 
employer and/or the Lottery investigator found that an internal theft had occurred.  
The vast majority (27) involved store employees who were found to have stolen 
instant tickets from the stores where they worked. 
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We surmise that there likely were additional cases of internal theft not identified as such 
within the case files.  These involved stores that made theft reports where the case files 
did not indicate whether the suspects were store employees. 
The rest of this Executive Summary highlights our findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations. 
D. RETAILER PRIZE CLAIMS 
Iowa law prohibits certain individuals from purchasing Lottery tickets and from receiving 
payment for prize winners.  This includes Lottery employees and some contractors, as 
well as immediate family members residing in the same household. 
The prohibition does not apply to licensed retailers.  In fact, the Lottery does not prohibit 
retailers or their employees from purchasing tickets and redeeming prizes at their own 
stores – even when the same individual is simultaneously “the customer” and “the clerk.” 
This means that any retailer or clerk who obtains a winning ticket worth $600 or less can 
conceivably pay himself or herself from the store cash register, with little or no oversight 
by the Lottery.  The Lottery also does not track “high-tier” prizes (worth more than $600) 
claimed by retailers. 
As part of our investigation, we compiled a partial list of prizes claimed by retailers.  We 
did this by reviewing various resources, including hundreds of Lottery press releases, 
some of which have identified winners as retailers or store employees. 
The list we compiled is undoubtedly far from complete.  Still, we were able to find that 
some retailers and store employees have been uncommonly lucky playing the Lottery.  In 
2007 alone, we found that retailers and store employees claimed at least 28 high-tier 
prizes, totaling $676,352. 
This included a store owner and a store clerk who each claimed $250,000 prizes from 
instant tickets from the stores where they worked.  In all of 2007, only seven other people 
claimed an instant-ticket prize of $250,000 or more. 
When the Lottery received those two $250,000 prize claims, it was already tracking the 
developing scandal in Canada.  But the Lottery did not investigate either prize claim 
before honoring them.   
The store owner and the store clerk, both from northwest Iowa, have also claimed other 
Lottery prizes.  The store owner (and her husband) have claimed 16 prizes since 1991 for 
a total of $263,501; 11 of their claims have occurred since 2004.  The store clerk alone 
claimed eight prizes for $266,000 in less than one year’s time. 
In all, we found nine retailers and store employees who have claimed five or more high-
tier prizes.  At least four of those nine claimed additional prizes in late 2008 or early 
2009.  This includes a northern Iowa retailer who has claimed 67 prizes over the past 
several years for a total of $100,626. 
 
 
 4
We also found: 
• Prizes claimed by retailers under circumstances that should have triggered a 
closer review.  For example, an assistant manager of a central Iowa convenience 
store claimed a $100,000 instant-ticket prize in 2006, just one day after a property 
she owned was sold to a bank in response to a foreclosure action. 
• Some store employees who pled guilty to Lottery theft had claimed big prizes in 
the past.  This included the manager of a northeastern Iowa convenience store 
who pled guilty to first-degree theft in 2008 in connection with the theft of 
$45,204 in tickets and cash from a Pull-tab vending machine.  The same manager 
had claimed a $10,000 instant-ticket prize about one year before he was arrested.  
Overall he had claimed 17 prizes totaling $33,290.  The Lottery investigator who 
handled that case first learned about those prize claims when we asked him about 
them. 
E. THE NEED FOR A PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM 
The collective good fortune of these retailers and store employees is remarkable.  The 
Lottery sold nearly 198 million tickets in fiscal year 2007.  Only 2,101 were high-tier 
prize winners. 
This means that: 
• 0.001 percent of tickets sold in fiscal year 2007 were high-tier prize winners. 
• 99.999 percent of tickets sold in fiscal year 2007 were not high-tier prize 
winners. 
Put another way, this means that a person (on average) would have needed to buy 94,216 
Lottery tickets, across all games, in order to expect one high-tier prize winner.  When you 
eliminate the two games that do not produce high-tier prizes (Pick 3 and Pull-tabs), one 
high-tier win would have been expected (on average) for every 67,450 tickets purchased. 
Moreover, among people who are inclined to steal Lottery tickets, those who sell them 
have several inherent advantages.  These advantages include direct access to unsold 
tickets, control over the process of validating tickets for customers, and payouts of most 
prizes.  Control over these procedures allows retailers and their employees to have 
temporary control of customers’ tickets.  This can enhance the ability of a scam artist to 
trick customers without their knowledge. 
These inherent advantages do not mean that a retailer who claims a major prize should be 
presumed guilty of fraud or theft.  But it does mean that there are good reasons for the 
Lottery to build a proactive system of checks and balances that will neutralize the 
inherent retailer advantages; and then it must apply those checks and balances with 
vigilant oversight.  Such a system can help ensure that customers’ interests are reasonably 
secure and that thieves are routinely held accountable, thereby promoting the Lottery’s 
integrity and dignity, as mandated by Iowa Code section 99G.2 (2009). 
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F. IOWA LOTTERY LACKS A PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM 
We identified four integral components that are necessary for a lottery enforcement 
system to effectively neutralize the inherent retailer advantages.  We then examined the 
Lottery’s performance in establishing these four components: 
 
Enforcement (what is needed)  Iowa Lottery performance (what we found) 
Proactive enforcement procedures → Weak, reactive enforcement procedures 
Effective complaint-handling practices → Significant shortfalls with complaint-handling practices 
Holding violators accountable → Violators frequently not held accountable 
Customer education and protection → Inadequate customer education and protection efforts 
1. WEAK, REACTIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
Lottery officials acknowledged that their current enforcement procedures – which largely 
depend on complaints from customers – miss virtually all incidents where customers are 
unaware that they have been tricked out of a winning ticket or prize money.  This means 
that there likely have been instances of fraud, possibly involving significant prizes, that 
have gone undetected.  The Lottery must work to correct this fundamental shortcoming. 
a. Records system inadequate 
In January 2007 the Security Division’s investigators were provided with a new 
electronic database for storing and archiving their case work.  It was the first time in a 
decade that the Lottery’s investigators had an electronic database to catalog and archive 
their work. 
While it has been an improvement, the new database is limited by the fact that it is not 
searchable.  When we asked how an investigator would know whether a theft or fraud 
suspect was a “repeat offender,” the investigative supervisor replied, “We wouldn’t 
know.” 
In addition, we found numerous inaccuracies and omissions in our review of case files 
from 2005 through 2007.  Some files were so incomplete or inaccurate that it was 
impossible to determine what actually occurred without consulting other sources.  The 
names of suspects and customer complainants were misspelled or incomplete in a number 
of files. 
Furthermore, the Security Division does not maintain any log of store employees who 
have been prosecuted for Lottery-related theft.   
We believe these problems, taken collectively, impede the Security Division’s ability to 
effectively track patterns of criminal activity involving retailers and their employees. 
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b. Limited oversight of retailer prize claims 
To find retailers who are using the inherent advantages for improper benefit, a lottery 
needs detailed, searchable data of retailer prize claims.  Analysis of such data can help 
serve as an “early warning system” of suspicious activity. 
Security Division managers agreed it would be a good idea for the Lottery to require 
retailers and their employees to identify themselves as such when they claim a high-tier 
prize.  However, the Lottery does not have such a policy. 
Several Canadian lotteries have also adopted policies requiring that major prize claims 
(i.e., $10,000 or more) by retailers and members of their immediate families be 
automatically investigated to determine whether the tickets were obtained legitimately. 
The Iowa Lottery, however, does not automatically investigate any prize claims by 
retailers or store employees.  Security Division managers agreed that such a practice 
would be a good enforcement tool.  Other Lottery managers, however, told us that they 
have been reluctant to launch investigations of retailers who claim multiple high-tier 
prizes. 
2. SIGNIFICANT SHORTFALLS WITH COMPLAINT-HANDLING PRACTICES 
Our review of the Lottery’s files revealed an investigative approach that is often 
constrained by incuriosity and, at times, an indifference to getting to the bottom of a 
given situation. 
The Security Division has no written policies on how to conduct investigations.  In the 
absence of written protocols, Lottery investigators often fall back on word-of-mouth 
advice or embedded office culture to guide them in their work. 
This was particularly evident in cases where the only potential victim was a customer.  
We found numerous customer complaints where leads went unexplored and potential 
crimes were not pursued.  Many of these were the types of cases where the Lottery 
investigator would need to “make the case.”  Most of the time they didn’t even try. 
a. No consequences for three retailers who kept hundreds of dollars 
from customers under false pretenses 
Three separate customers in northeast Iowa complained that they redeemed winning 
tickets worth $1,000, but that retailers kept several hundred dollars of the prize winnings.  
In each case, the retailer falsely claimed that several hundred dollars needed to be kept 
for withholding taxes.  The retailer later claimed the $1,000 prize from the Lottery, and in 
the process came out with a profit between $250 and $550. 
The Security Division did not report any of these incidents to law enforcement or 
prosecutors, nor did it consider imposing license sanctions against the retailers, two of 
whom were store owners. 
Two of the retailers claimed several other high-tier prizes in the months before and after 
these incidents.  These other prize claims raise the possibility that the incidents 
complained about may not have been isolated.  However, the Lottery did not investigate 
any of the other prize claims. 
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b. Inadequate responses to allegations of “pickouts” 
Of the various lottery-related scams, perhaps the most insidious is referred to as 
“pickouts.”  This is a practice where a store employee takes unsold instant tickets, 
scratches them lightly, “picks out” the winners, and then sells the non-winners to the 
public.   
This scam directly victimizes any customer who is unaware that he has purchased instant 
tickets that were already scratched.  The customer perceives that he has bought legitimate 
instant tickets, but they are in fact guaranteed losers.  Given the nature of this scam, it is 
critical that the Lottery give serious scrutiny to any allegation of pickout activity.   
The Lottery received at least ten separate allegations of possible pickout activity from 
2005 through 2007.  None of these ten complaints received serious scrutiny from the 
Lottery.  Two were effectively ignored, including one that was not forwarded to the 
Security Division.   
In four cases, Lottery investigators left the investigating to others, including store 
management.  In one of these cases, we asked the investigator why he deferred such a 
potentially significant complaint to store management.  “Because that’s the way we’ve 
always done it,” he replied. 
c. Inadequate investigation of internal theft case  
involving up to $86,000 
A northeast Iowa convenience store reported that it had a $15,000 shortage in its Lottery 
accounts.  The Lottery case file shows that the investigator worked the case for about two 
weeks and believed criminal activity had probably occurred.  The investigator provided a 
police officer with spreadsheets detailing the inventory and cashing records of numerous 
instant-ticket packs that the Lottery had provided to the store. 
The investigator did not perform any further substantive work on the investigation.  A 
police captain called the investigator three months later to seek the Lottery’s continued 
assistance, but was rebuffed.  “[The investigator] advised that as far as he was concerned, 
the Lottery Commission was out of the investigation as it was deemed a case of theft 
which required local law enforcement jurisdiction,” the captain wrote in his report. 
There are several reasons why we believe that the investigator should have continued 
with the investigation, including: 
• A professional audit found $86,472 in Lottery shortages at the store.  However, 
the investigator did not obtain or review the audit report, which the store arranged 
and paid for as a direct result of advice from the investigator himself. 
• In his notes, the investigator referred to written statements in the case file from 
two witnesses who alleged that the manager had taken tickets without paying for 
them.  There was no indication that either witness was contacted by the Lottery or 
the police department. 
• The police investigation has languished, a police captain told us, in part because 
analyzing the professional audit “is like reading Greek.” 
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• “It would be great if the Lottery Commission would go in, do their own internal 
investigation and send us a report based on their calculations,” the captain added.  
“It would be nice to be able to fall back on them, since it’s their bailiwick, and let 
them tear it up.” 
d. Prize claim histories of theft suspects rarely checked,  
other crimes potentially missed 
The Lottery paid a $10,000 Touch Play prize to a manager of a bowling alley in northeast 
Iowa.  Six weeks later, the manager was arrested after admitting he had forged two other 
Touch Play tickets and redeemed them at local stores for $296.  A few days after his 
arrest, the police chief reported the matter to the Security Division.  The information in 
the file indicates the investigator took notes of the chief’s phone call, typed the notes into 
the file, and then closed the case. 
The investigator was not aware of the $10,000 prize claim.  The failure to identify the 
manager’s $10,000 prize claim was not isolated.  Among store employees who were 
identified as suspects in Security Division case files from 2005 through 2007, we found 
that at least 16 had previously claimed high-tier prizes.  The prize claims for 12 were not 
identified in the case files.  Some of those claims had been made just a few days or weeks 
before the report was filed. 
We also found two store employees who claimed high-tier prizes shortly after being 
arrested and charged with internal theft of Lottery tickets.  Neither of these prize claims 
were noted in the case files. 
In all cases of alleged theft or fraud, we believe it is reasonable to expect Lottery 
investigators to routinely check suspects’ prize claims – both before and after the alleged 
impropriety – and to review any high-tier prize claims that are discovered. 
3. VIOLATORS OFTEN NOT HELD ACCOUNTABLE 
We found that the Lottery has never sanctioned a retailer for theft or fraud. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of store employees accused of stealing Lottery tickets 
have been allowed to keep any prize money obtained from those stolen tickets.  This is 
because the Lottery does not try to recoup prize money in stolen-ticket cases.  By 
neglecting to recover prizes obtained through theft, the Lottery has unwittingly created 
incentives to steal tickets.  The Lottery must take immediate steps to ensure that crime 
never pays. 
In addition, the Lottery rarely reports suspected violations to police and prosecutors, even 
though it is required to do so by law.  Suspected violations are often not fully investigated 
or reported to law enforcement specifically because of retailers’ wishes. 
a. Lottery more concerned with underage persons buying tickets 
than stealing them 
Complaints of underage persons illegally buying tickets have been aggressively pursued 
by the Lottery, as they should be.  A recent Lottery report shows that the agency received 
seven complaints about purchases by underage customers from fiscal year 2005 through 
fiscal year 2007.  The Lottery substantiated two of those complaints and suspended both 
stores’ licenses. 
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By contrast, we found that 29 underage store clerks were substantiated to have stolen 
Lottery tickets during the same period.  This means that the number of instances where 
Lottery investigators substantiated internal theft by an underage employee was 14 times 
higher than the number of substantiated cases of underage sales from fiscal year 2005 
through fiscal year 2007.  In addition, underage persons accounted for approximately 
one-third of the individuals prosecuted for, or suspected of, internal theft from 2005 
through 2007. 
This suggests that the Lottery should be addressing the phenomenon of underage internal 
theft at least as aggressively as its approach to underage sales.  But there was no 
indication that the Lottery was even aware of this phenomenon or its pervasiveness.  Of 
the individuals we identified as being underage at the time of the thefts, many were not 
identified as such in the Lottery’s case files.  We made those identifications through non-
Lottery records. 
b. Investigators routinely failing to determine how much  
prize money is obtained from stolen tickets 
We found a number of cases involving tickets stolen by store employees where Lottery 
investigators did not attempt to determine the total amount of prize money obtained from 
tickets that had been stolen. 
This included a part-time pharmacy employee who pled guilty to first-degree theft in 
connection with the theft of at least $107,138 worth of instant Lottery tickets.  Police 
determined that the woman redeemed 97 winning tickets over a three-week period and 
suspected that she had cashed many more stolen tickets. 
But the Lottery investigator did not attempt to learn how much prize money the woman 
had collected from the stolen tickets that she redeemed for prize money.  She also 
claimed a $1,600 prize that was paid out directly by the Lottery; this was not mentioned 
in the case file. 
This raises a critical question: How can the Lottery hold thieves accountable if 
investigators do not determine how much prize money those thieves obtained from the 
stolen tickets? 
c. Lottery does not try to recoup prize money in internal theft cases 
From 2005 through 2007, we found 45 internal theft cases where prize money was 
obtained from stolen tickets and the suspects were later prosecuted for the thefts.  Most of 
those employees were ordered to pay restitution to the stores for the retail value of the 
stolen tickets. 
But only two of the 45 employees were ordered to pay restitution to the Lottery for the 
prize money they obtained from the stolen tickets.  The prosecutors in those two cases 
told us that the Lottery initially resisted pursuing restitution.  “At first, they [Lottery staff] 
said, ‘We don’t ever ask for restitution,’” one prosecutor told us.  “They were reluctant at 
first.”  But she persisted because “it looked like they [Lottery] had been harmed by the 
theft.” 
The Lottery’s investigative supervisor confirmed that the Security Division routinely 
turns down prosecutors offering to pursue restitution for the Lottery.  The supervisor said 
he generally responds to such inquiries by saying, “I’m sorry, we’re not a victim.” 
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However, we believe that the Lottery is a victim for restitution purposes.  It is our opinion 
that the Lottery can and should seek restitution for the value of prize money paid out 
from stolen tickets.  Obtaining such restitution would serve at least two important 
purposes: 
• It would financially benefit the Lottery and the public who play and are served by 
the Lottery. 
• It would also convey the message that “crime does not pay,” thus helping to 
preserve the Lottery’s integrity and dignity, which is mandated by Iowa Code 
section 99G.2(3) (2009). 
4. INADEQUATE CUSTOMER EDUCATION AND PROTECTION EFFORTS 
At the urging of the Iowa Legislature’s Government Oversight Committee, the Lottery in 
2008 implemented two new procedures designed to help safeguard customers from 
possible fraud.   
In March 2008 the Lottery began a new program called, “Sign It. It’s Yours.”  The 
program requires retailers and the Lottery to verify that a signature appears on all tickets 
submitted for checking or for a prize payout.  The Lottery then reprogrammed its 
terminals to automatically generate a customer receipt for every instant-scratch or lotto 
ticket that is checked or cashed. 
The addition of the “Sign It” program and customer receipts in 2008 were good first 
steps.  But we found that both procedures have limitations.  As a result, customers are not 
adequately protected and additional customer-protection measures are needed. 
a. Limitations of “Sign It” program and customer receipts 
Customers who sign their tickets and ask for receipts could still be susceptible to various 
potential retailer scams.  This includes any customer who hands a ticket to a store 
employee without knowing whether it is a winning ticket, and if so, the prize amount.  
This also includes any customer who suspects something is amiss during the validation 
process but does not retrieve the ticket back from the store employee. 
The Lottery and its licensed retailers are now required to verify the presence of a 
signature on any ticket submitted for checking or validation.  However, they are not 
required to ensure that the signature on a ticket matches the identity of the person 
presenting it.  Under these rules, a thief can claim the prize for a winning ticket, even if 
the signature on that ticket is from the victim. 
We also found no indication that the Lottery is actively and routinely checking to make 
sure its licensed retailers are complying with the new signature requirement.  In late 2008 
we presented unsigned tickets to clerks at ten central Iowa stores.  When we asked them 
to check our tickets, five required us to sign our tickets, while five did not. 
When it introduced the new customer receipts, the Lottery suggested they would prevent 
fraud.  In a newspaper article about the receipts, a Lottery vice president was quoted as 
saying, “Both the retailer and the customers have receipts available showing the outcome 
of the play.  There is no question in anybody’s mind what the outcome of the play was 
because it is shown right there on that piece of paper.” 
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However, the Lottery is not requiring retailers to provide or offer receipts to customers.  
We question the effectiveness of the new receipts if the Lottery does not require retailers 
to offer them to customers.  To illustrate the problem, when we asked clerks at ten central 
Iowa stores to check our tickets in late 2008, only four offered us a receipt. 
As a state enterprise, the Lottery holds the burden of ensuring that receipts are offered to 
its customers, on whom the Lottery depends for generating tens of millions of dollars in 
profits for state government every year. 
b. The need to educate customers to know the results before 
handing tickets to retailers 
A Lottery vice president told us that the Lottery has historically stressed that customers: 
… should never be relying upon one single device or one 
single entity as the be-all end-all of the information about 
your lottery ticket.  You should have tried to figure out if 
your ticket was a winner before you got to the store and 
you should be looking at many different sources for 
information. 
That seems like excellent advice, the kind of information that Lottery customers could 
use to protect their interests.  However, we did not find any publicly disseminated 
information from the Lottery comparable to this official’s statement. 
c. The need to install self-serve “ticket checker” devices 
Many lotteries allow customers the option of checking their own tickets by offering self-
serve “ticket checker” devices at licensed retailers.  These devices allow customers to 
determine the actual results of the ticket without needing to hand the ticket over to a 
clerk. 
The Lottery has occasionally received requests from customers asking for ticket checkers 
to be installed.  The Lottery has typically responded by saying that the cost of adding 
ticket checkers would be prohibitive.   
In a written presentation to the Government Oversight Committee at its January 30, 2008, 
meeting, a Lottery vice president claimed that providing ticket checkers would cost 
“approximately $30 million annually.”  One week later, the then-Acting Lottery CEO 
received a letter from Scientific Games International, Inc. (SGI), the Lottery’s vendor for 
online games.  The February 8, 2008, letter presented three proposals for what SGI would 
offer if the Lottery agreed to exercise the last one-year option on the contract that was 
then in place. 
Under the first proposal, SGI offered three items: 
• Installation of up to 2,000 ticket checkers at no charge, an estimated $1.3 million 
proposition. 
• A 17 percent reduction in contract fee rates, an additional estimated $1.3 million 
proposition. 
• An additional $100,000 for the Lottery to purchase new computer equipment for 
sales staff. 
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The Lottery Board, at its July 17, 2008, meeting, declined SGI’s offer for ticket checkers.  
The Board instead agreed to a different SGI offer, a 34 percent reduction in contract fee 
rates which would lead to an estimated $2.6 million in savings for the Lottery, according 
to SGI’s February 8, 2008, letter. 
The Board’s decision came after the then-Acting CEO told the Board that “there was no 
need to rush forward with ticket checking technology at the present time because of the 
steps already taken to protect the Lottery’s retailers and players through the ticket signing 
requirement and the issuing of ticket receipts.” 
As explained previously, the “Sign It” program and the customer receipts have 
limitations and are not guarantees against fraud or theft.  As a result, we believe that the 
Lottery should install self-serve ticket-checker devices as soon as practical and at a 
reasonable cost. 
G. LOTTERY INDIFFERENT TO THE LESSONS OF THE CANADIAN SCANDAL 
In late 2006, Canadians learned that lottery retailers had been claiming significantly more 
major prizes than one would expect given the odds.  It would have been only natural to 
wonder if Iowa had a similar phenomenon. 
The Iowa Lottery showed no such curiosity. 
The Canadian scandal presented an opportunity for the Iowa Lottery to evaluate and 
improve its operations and security practices.  But the Iowa Lottery did not take 
meaningful advantage of that opportunity. 
When we interviewed the then-Acting CEO – nearly two years after the Canadian scandal 
first emerged – it became clear that he did not realize there have been cases of Iowa 
Lottery customers being victimized by retailers and store employees.  “You have cases 
where someone has defrauded a customer,” he at one point asked us.  He later 
acknowledged, “I’m not familiar with the cases.” 
Iowa Lottery management should have been studying the Canadian investigations and 
implementing improvements as appropriate if for no other reason than the fact that Iowa 
Code section 99G.7(2) required it: 
The chief executive officer shall conduct an ongoing study 
of the operation and administration of lottery laws similar 
to this chapter in other states or countries, of available 
literature on the subject, of federal laws and regulations 
which may affect the operation of the lottery and of the 
reaction of citizens of this state to existing or proposed 
features of lottery games with a view toward 
implementing improvements that will tend to serve the 
purposes of this chapter. [emphasis added] 
Members of the Lottery’s upper management team told us that they had read the 
Canadian investigative reports.  But those same managers had difficulty identifying and 
explaining a number of proactive enforcement policies which were discussed in those 
reports.  When we asked about the practice of requiring retailers to identify themselves 
when claiming a major prize, the Lottery’s recently retired vice president for security 
described it as “a good idea,” then added, “If I would have thought about that back then I 
could have pursued it.” 
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We responded by noting that we learned about that practice by reading the same 
Canadian investigative reports that had already been reviewed by Iowa Lottery 
management.  “Well, I must have missed it then,” the recently retired vice president for 
security told us. 
The then-Acting CEO expressed concerns about several proactive policies adopted by the 
Canadian lotteries.  But it also became clear that he had not evaluated those policies.  
When we asked whether he had conducted a cost-benefit analysis, he replied, “I’m 
waiting to see what you have to say in your report to see just exactly what you found.” 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
The Iowa Lottery and the state government it serves have a self-interest in ensuring that 
customers are reasonably protected from potential risks.  A lottery that does not 
adequately protect its customers risks losing their confidence, potentially harming the 
lottery and, in turn, the government that depends on its profits. 
When we pressed the Lottery’s top managers about taking steps designed to reduce the 
instances of fraud, some resisted.  “We may not agree with every remedy that you 
suggest as being another thing and yet another thing and yet another thing that can be 
done to make nirvana because I don’t think we can get there,” the then-Acting CEO told 
us. 
“I don’t think there’s going to be any perfect system anywhere in the world as long as 
human beings are involved,” a Lottery vice president said. 
But taking reasonable steps to establish a proactive Lottery enforcement system is not a 
pursuit of “nirvana” or “perfection.”  The purpose instead is to promote the Lottery’s 
integrity and dignity, which is mandated under Iowa Code section 99G.2(3) (2009). 
During our interview of the then-Acting CEO, it became clear that he did not realize there 
have been cases of Iowa Lottery customers being victimized by retailers and store 
employees.  After we told him about several cases of Iowa Lottery customers being 
defrauded, he proclaimed: 
You haven’t demonstrated that anybody is on any 
appreciable level – out of the millions of transactions, 
you’ve got a handful of cases that you say weren’t properly 
handled and we still haven't seen one where anybody got 
really rooked.  I haven’t seen it. 
We believe this perspective misses the point: The Lottery has a weak, reactive 
enforcement system where large-scale fraud may be occurring without customers or the 
Lottery realizing it.  The fact that we did not uncover a case of large-scale fraud in our 
review of three years of Lottery activity should not be viewed as a vindication of the 
Lottery’s deficiencies. 
Moreover, the Lottery does not meet its mandate to operate with integrity and dignity by 
waiting for customers to report large-scale fraud before establishing a proactive 
enforcement system. 
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Based on our investigation, we conclude: 
1. The Iowa Lottery has not been operating with the degree of integrity and dignity 
that it could and should, as required by Iowa Code chapter 99G. 
2. The Iowa Lottery has not acted reasonably in ensuring that retailers and retailer 
employees do not take advantage of customers who entrust them with a ticket. 
I. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This report presents 60 recommendations designed to aid the Lottery in correcting these 
shortcomings.  These recommendations are distributed throughout the various sections of 
this report and are also consolidated in a final “Recommendations” section. 
These recommendations include: 
1. The Lottery should propose amending Iowa Code chapter 99G to include the 
protection of the interests of Lottery customers as a specific objective. 
2. The Lottery should adopt a policy requiring that it will pursue restitution from any 
individual who obtains prize money from stolen tickets and who is subsequently 
prosecuted for that theft.  The Lottery should also seek restitution for prize money 
claimed by individuals who received a stolen ticket from a person who is 
subsequently prosecuted in connection with that stolen ticket. 
3. The Lottery should develop and implement a program of mandatory e-registration 
for all Iowa retailers and store employees, similar to the programs already 
developed by the lotteries in Ontario and Québec.  The program should require 
retailers and employees to electronically register their names and other pertinent 
information before they can obtain a confidential access code necessary for 
operating an Iowa Lottery terminal. 
4. The Lottery should develop and implement a program of mandatory e-training for 
all Iowa retailers and their clerks, similar to the programs already developed by 
the lotteries in Ontario and Québec.  This training should incorporate a Retailer 
Code of Conduct similar to those in Quebec and British Columbia, which require 
sellers to act in the public interest and abide by general principles of integrity.  
The successful completion of this training should be documented by the Lottery 
and kept on file for reference and investigation purposes. 
5. The Lottery should consider proposing an amendment to Iowa Code chapter 99G 
to prohibit any individual convicted of violating chapter 99G from handling 
Lottery products for any licensee. 
6. The Lottery should explore the merits of amending Iowa Code chapter 99G to 
prohibit retailers and store employees from purchasing and redeeming Lottery 
products at their place of employment.  The purpose is to offset the inherent 
retailer advantages. 
7. The Lottery should consider proposing an amendment to Iowa Code chapter 99G 
to provide that Lottery products shall not be sold by any person who has not 
reached the age of twenty-one, because the statute already provides that Lottery 
products shall not be sold to any person who has not reached the age of twenty-
one. 
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8. The Lottery’s Security Division should implement methods and procedures to 
ensure that reports of alleged “pickout” activity receive priority treatment. 
9. The Lottery’s Security Division should develop and implement a policy requiring 
its investigators to routinely check and document the prize claim history of all 
identified suspects.  The policy should encourage investigators to review previous 
high-tier prize claims when circumstances warrant. 
10. The Lottery should develop a method to flag the names of all theft or fraud 
suspects so that any subsequent prize claims they submit will be brought to the 
attention of the Security Division for possible investigation. 
11. The Lottery should develop protocols to improve coordination between the 
Security Division and law enforcement agencies (including the DCI, municipal 
police and county sheriff’s departments) to ensure that alleged violations of law 
are properly investigated.  This could include, but not be limited to, legislative 
clarification of their respective roles and improvements to Iowa Code chapter 99G 
or other areas of state law as appropriate.  This could also include the concept of 
assigning regulatory oversight to a third-party agency independent of the Iowa 
Lottery, as has occurred with the provincial lottery in Ontario, Canada. 
12. The Lottery should advise its customers, in simple, clear, and unambiguous terms 
that all sources, including the terminals, can err.  In addition, the Lottery should 
advise that it would be wise for customers to: 
 
– Rely on multiple sources before concluding a ticket is not a winner. 
 
– Never hand a ticket to a store employee without knowing whether it is a winner. 
13. The Lottery should educate its customers about the various Lottery-related scams, 
including but not limited to “palming” and “partial win payment.”  The purpose 
would be to educate customers about the scams so they can understand how to 
reduce the risk of falling victim to such scams. 
 
For an example of how this could be written, see the newspaper article sub-
headlined “Four Ways Retailers Can Steal Your Winning Ticket,” published by 
the Vancouver Sun on May 30, 2007. 
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14. The Lottery should take immediate steps to bolster the customer-education 
information on its website and in its literature, as well as ensuring that the 
improved literature is distributed to all licensed retailers.   
 
The information should clearly emphasize simple steps that all customers can 
follow to protect their interests.   Based on our review of advice on other lottery 
websites, here is an example of how the new information could be presented: 
 
SIMPLE STEPS FOR THE SMART LOTTERY CUSTOMER 
Don’t become a victim of a scam artist!  Here are three simple steps: 
 
1. Know the results of all tickets before handing them to a retailer.  Treat each 
ticket you purchase as a winning ticket until proven otherwise. 
 
2. Sign all tickets as soon as possible after purchase, and definitely before 
handing them to a retailer.  For winning tickets, it might also be a good idea to 
make a copy of both sides of the ticket, especially if you consider the prize 
amount to be significant. 
 
3. Obtain all tickets back from retailers, as well as the accompanying receipts.  
This will allow you to review the results of the transaction, especially if the 
results differed from what you had determined, or if you observe a retailer acting 
suspiciously while validating a ticket (in which case you are encouraged to report 
the matter to the Lottery immediately).   
 
You can always redeem tickets directly through the Lottery.  If you mail a 
winning ticket to Lottery offices, we suggest that you make a copy of the front 
and back of your ticket for your records. 
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Overview 
Thomas Jefferson hailed the lottery as the perfect tax … laid only 
upon the willing. 
— Website of Scientific Games Corporation,  
a major vendor for the Iowa Lottery 1 
 
When the Legislature first authorized gambling, a bargain was 
struck: Iowans could buy lottery tickets and wager at racetracks 
and casinos, but there would be zero tolerance for corruption…. 
Implicit in that bargain was complete openness, so the people of 
Iowa could see for themselves the impact of gambling and 
whether it was being properly policed. 
— March 6, 2006, editorial in The Des Moines Register 2 
 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Lotteries played an integral role in early American history.  They helped raise money for 
the Jamestown settlement, Harvard College and even the Continental Army.  But after the 
demise of the scandal-plagued Louisiana Lottery in 1894, lotteries were banned until the 
1960s. 3 
In Iowa all forms of gambling were prohibited for more than a century after statehood in 
1846.  The Des Moines Register warned in 1938, “Iowa has been caught in the swirl of a 
new get-something-for-nothing fad – and it is bingo.”4  The gambling prohibition was 
lifted in 1972 when voters repealed Article III, section 28 of the Iowa Constitution.5  The 
General Assembly in 1973 authorized games of chance such as bingo and raffles, and 
subsequently authorized: 
• Pari-mutuel wagering at horse and dog racetracks (1983). 
• A state lottery (1985). 
• Excursion boat gambling (1989). 
 
                                                 
1 Scientific Games, Lottery Museum Intro, http://www.autotote.com/SGCorp/mus_history.asp (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2009). 
2 Editorial, Open Lottery Records, or Pull Machines; Public Deserves Full Information about Gambling, 
DES MOINES REG., Mar. 6, 2006, at 8A. 
3 CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER ET AL., STATE LOTTERIES AT THE TURN OF CENTURY: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL 
GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION (1999), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/lotfinal.pdf. 
4 Mike Kilen, Fickle Iowans Gamble Billions, DES MOINES REG., Mar. 12, 2006, at 1A. 
5 LEGISLATIVE SERV. BUREAU (NOW LEGISLATIVE SERVICES AGENCY), IOWA GEN. ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE 
GUIDE TO GAMBLING IN IOWA (2000), http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Central/LSB/Guides/gaming.htm. 
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The Iowa Lottery was established in May 1985 as a division of the Department of 
Revenue (DOR).  In 2003, it was removed from the DOR and established as an 
independent authority in the executive branch, when legislation was enacted creating the 
Iowa Lottery Authority (Lottery) under Iowa Code chapter 99G. 
The enabling legislation includes Iowa Code section 99G.2 (2009), “Statement of 
purpose and intent,” which states in part: 
That lottery games shall be operated and managed in a 
manner that provides continuing entertainment to the 
public, maximizes revenues, and ensures that the lottery 
is operated with integrity and dignity and free from 
political influence. [Emphasis added]6 
The law also mandates the Lottery to develop and maintain a statewide network of lottery 
retailers that will, among other things, ensure the Lottery’s integrity: 
The general assembly recognizes that to conduct a 
successful lottery, the authority must develop and maintain 
a statewide network of lottery retailers that will serve the 
public convenience and promote the sale of tickets or 
shares and the playing of lottery games while ensuring the 
integrity of the lottery operations, games, and activities.7 
The statute criminalizes certain actions in Iowa Code section 99G.36 (2009): 
1. A person who, with intent to defraud, falsely makes, 
alters, forges, utters, passes, redeems, or counterfeits a 
lottery ticket or share or attempts to falsely make, alter, 
forge, utter, pass, redeem, or counterfeit a lottery ticket or 
share, or commits theft or attempts to commit theft of a 
lottery ticket or share, is guilty of a class “D” felony. 
 
2. Any person who influences or attempts to influence the 
winning of a prize through the use of coercion, fraud, 
deception, or tampering with lottery equipment or materials 
shall be guilty of a class ‘D’ felony. 
 
3. No person shall knowingly or intentionally make a 
material false statement in any application for a license or 
proposal to conduct lottery activities or make a material 
false entry in any book or record which is compiled or 
maintained or submitted to the board pursuant to the 
provisions of this chapter.  Any person who violates the 
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class ‘D’ 
felony. 
                                                 
6 The statute does not explicitly state a preference among the three mandates (provide continuing 
entertainment, maximize revenues, and operate with integrity and dignity).  However, it may be instructive 
to consider that the word “integrity” appears 16 times in Chapter 99G, while “entertainment” appears twice 
and “maximizes revenues” appears once.  See IOWA CODE CHAPTER 99G (2009). 
7 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.24(1) (2009). 
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II. IOWA LOTTERY OVERVIEW 
The lottery’s performance plan identifies sales, distribution and 
resource management as its core functions and measures the 
lottery’s effectiveness by the revenues it transfers to the state. 
— Mary Neubauer, Lottery Vice President for External Relations, 
in 2003 article in Public Gaming International 8 
 
In recent years, Lottery press releases and reports have commonly noted that, since its 
establishment in 1985, the agency has raised more than $1.1 billion for state government 
programs.9  The Lottery reported profits of approximately $56.5 million for the fiscal 
year which ended June 30, 2008.10  The Lottery’s profits are deposited into the state’s 
general fund11, which pays for various state programs, including education, social 
services, and public safety. 
Agency performance reports state that the Lottery has approximately 112 employees 
separated into five divisions: Security, Finance, Operations, Sales and Marketing. 
The 2004 performance report described the Lottery’s product lines: 
Instant games generally have a scratch-off covering 
removed to identify winning tickets…. 
 
Pull-tab tickets are played by opening tabs to reveal 
whether a prize has been won.  
 
Online games are “numbers” games where computerized 
tickets are generated from a terminal.  
 
Touch Play tickets are dispensed from vending machines 
that have video monitors that display the results of the 
ticket while entertaining electronic tones indicate whether 
the ticket has won a prize. [emphasis added]12 
Sales of Touch Play tickets began in May 2003 under a limited market test involving 30 
machines; Touch Play sales went statewide in April 2004.13  The General Assembly 
ended the Touch Play program in 2006 after complaints from the public.  May 3, 2006, 
was the final day of the Touch Play program.14 
                                                 
8 Mary Neubauer, The Lottery Remakes Itself into a Corporate-Model Lottery, PUBLIC GAMING INT’L, Sept. 
2003, at 8. 
9 IOWA LOTTERY AUTHORITY PERFORMANCE REPORT (2008), 
http://www.ialottery.com/AboutUs/2008PerformanceReport.pdf. 
10 Id. 
11 See IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.2 (2009). 
12 IOWA LOTTERY AUTHORITY PERFORMANCE REPORT (2004), 
http://publications.iowa.gov/3277/2/Lottery.doc. 
13 February 20, 2006, report by Vice President for External Relations Mary Neubauer to the Gaming 
Subcommittee of the House State Government Committee. 
14 IOWA LOTTERY, IOWA LOTTERY REPORT ON OPERATIONS (June 2008) (on file with author). 
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A. LICENSED RETAILERS 
The Lottery depends on a network of approximately 2,500 licensed retailers to sell its 
products and to pay out most prizes worth $600 or less.  In communities across Iowa, 
these retailers and their employees represent the public face of the Lottery system.  As of 
July 2008, most Lottery licenses were held by convenience stores (1,555), grocery stores 
(365), and bars (189).15 
Some retailers sell just one of the Lottery’s product lines, while others sell all three 
product lines.  Licensed retailers sell and validate tickets through computer terminals 
provided by the Lottery. 
The Lottery sets out rules for licensed retailers to follow, some of which originate in the 
statute, Iowa Code chapter 99G (2009), and administrative rules.  In addition, the Lottery 
says that licensed retailers are required to follow its “Licensing Terms and Conditions.”16  
This document describes numerous rules that licensees must follow, such as: 
• “Retailers shall cooperate fully with the Lottery in the investigation of any 
missing, lost, or stolen tickets.” 
• “Retailers shall immediately notify the Security Department, if tickets or Lottery 
property are stolen, lost, or damaged or if the retailer, an owner of the retailer’s 
business, an officer or employee of the business, the business, or an agent of the 
business is convicted of a felony or gambling related offense.” 
• “The retailer is responsible for the conduct of its employees and members, which 
is within the scope of the retailer’s lottery license.” 
The Licensing Terms and Conditions also permit the Lottery to impose license sanctions, 
up to and including revocation, “if a retailer fails to comply with any applicable law or 
administrative rule, these terms and conditions, or instructions given to the retailer.” 
Asked whether the Licensing Terms and Conditions is the “contract” between the Lottery 
and licensed retailers, then-Acting CEO Ken Brickman responded, “We don’t have any 
separate document that constitutes a contract….  [T]he licensing agreement and terms 
and conditions are the instruments by which we do business and enforce the requirements 
and obligations of a retailer.”17 
B. EXTREMELY SMALL ODDS OF WINNING A MAJOR PRIZE 
The Lottery sold nearly 198 million tickets in fiscal year 2007.  Only 2,101 were “high-
tier”18  prize winners.19 
 
                                                 
15 Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, to Ombudsman investigator (Aug. 6, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
16 See Appendix A. 
17 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
18 The Lottery defines a high-tier prize as any that is more than $600. 
19 Attachment, Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, to Ombudsman (May 19, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
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This means that: 
• 0.001 percent of tickets sold in fiscal year 2007 were high-tier prize winners. 
• 99.999 percent of tickets sold in fiscal year 2007 were not high-tier prize 
winners. 
Put another way, this means that a person (on average) would have needed to buy 94,216 
Lottery tickets, across all games, in order to expect one high-tier prize winner.  When you 
eliminate the two games that do not produce high-tier prizes (Pick 3 and Pull-tabs), one 
high-tier win would have been expected (on average) for every 67,450 tickets 
purchased.20 
Moreover, high-tier prizes are significantly outnumbered by lesser prizes.  Among all 
prizes claimed for each game in fiscal year 2007, here are the percentages that were high-
tier prizes:21 
• Instant tickets: 0.012 percent 
• Powerball: 0.008 percent 
• Hot Lotto: 0.003 percent 
• $100,000 Cash Game: 0.003 percent 
• Pick 4: 6.42 percent 
• For Pick 3 and Pull-tabs: 0 percent (these two games do not have high-tier prizes) 
C. RETAILERS CONTROL PAYOUT PROCESS FOR MOST PRIZE-WINNING TICKETS 
The Lottery allows retailers to pay out prizes for all winning tickets worth $600 or less.22  
In fiscal year 2007, retailers paid out 83 percent of all prize money, according to Lottery 
statistics.23 
Retailers who pay out prizes on winning tickets generally receive a credit for those 
payouts from the Lottery.24  The prize-credit process occurs automatically – with little or 
no oversight by the Lottery – when stores’ electronic terminals signal the Lottery 
computer system that a prize has been paid by a retailer. 
                                                 
20 We obtained these odds through our own calculations of Lottery data; we confirmed their accuracy with 
statisticians at Iowa State University. 
21 Attachment, Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, to Ombudsman (May 19, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
22 Conversely, the Lottery’s Licensing Terms and Conditions prohibits retailers from paying out any high-
tier prize, i.e., more than $600.  This prohibition is based on Internal Revenue Service reporting 
requirements.  Sworn Interview of Steve King at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008.) 
23 Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, Iowa Lottery, to Ombudsman investigator (Nov. 6, 2008) 
(on file with author). 
24 There is one exception: The Lottery does not credit retailers for prizes paid out on winning Pull-tab 
tickets, as the cost of those prizes is included in the pre-retail-sale transaction between the Lottery and 
retailers who sell Pull-tab tickets. 
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D. RESTRICTIONS DO NOT APPLY TO RETAILERS 
Iowa’s lottery statute prohibits certain individuals from purchasing Iowa Lottery tickets 
and from receiving payment for prize winners.25  This includes Lottery employees and 
some contractors, as well as immediate family members residing in the same household. 
The prohibition does not apply to retailers.  In fact, Lottery rules do not prohibit retailers 
or their employees from purchasing tickets and redeeming prizes at their own stores – 
even when the same individual is simultaneously “the customer” and “the clerk.” 
This means that any retailer or clerk who obtains a winning ticket worth $600 or less can 
conceivably pay himself or herself from the store cash register, with little or no oversight 
by the Lottery.  This raises the question of how many retailers and clerks have been 
claiming untracked and unscrutinized prizes of $600 or less. 
E. SECURITY DIVISION 
The Lottery described the Security Division’s duties in an attachment to the Lottery’s 
December 2007 report to the Iowa Legislature’s Government Oversight Committee: 
The Security Division designs and implements security 
policies and procedures affecting computer systems, 
facilities, Lottery and vendor personnel, and product 
control to insure the total and complete honesty and 
integrity of the Lottery.  Protects the Lottery’s premises 
from intrusion or harm, and recommends unusual 
circumstances for investigation.  Coordinates all licensing 
matters pertaining to the Lottery.26  Interprets license rules 
and recommends appropriate action.  Reviews and 
recommends the selection of all equipment used for Lottery 
drawings and events.  Maintains all equipment to insure 
randomization of drawings and jackpot events.27 
While Security Division investigators are on the front lines of safeguarding the Lottery’s 
integrity, they are not peace officers.  This primarily means they do not have the power of 
arrest.  “It was kind of a strange job, you know, you’re law enforcement but you’re not 
law enforcement,” recently retired Investigator Larry Steele told us.28 
                                                 
25 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.31(g) and (h) (2009). 
26 The Security Division is also responsible for investigating allegations of theft and fraud involving 
Lottery products. 
27 See ATTACHMENT C, KEN BRICKMAN & MARY NEUBAUER, IOWA LOTTERY, IOWA LOTTERY REPORT ON 
OPERATIONS (Dec. 2007) (on file with author). 
28 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
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III. CANADIAN INVESTIGATIONS INTO RETAILER FRAUD 
[L]otteries are a game of trust and without trust, players will simply 
take their marbles and go home, depriving the province of 
important revenue…. 
 
When that underlying trust is shaken, the government funding 
structure based on lottery revenue is placed at risk. That affects 
not only lottery participants, but everyone. 
— “A Game of Trust,” 2007 report by  
the Ombudsman of Ontario (Canada) 
 
In 2007 two Canadian ombudsman offices published major investigative reports on 
retailer fraud involving the provincial lotteries of Ontario and British Columbia.  Those 
investigations were triggered by media reports that some retailers, and some of their 
employees, were claiming significantly more major prizes than mere chance would 
suggest. 
According to the Ontario Ombudsman’s report, a professor of statistics concluded that 
the rate of Ontario retailers and employees claiming major prizes for instant-ticket games 
was about 15 times more than expected; while the rate of retailers and employees 
claiming major prizes for online games was about 3.5 times more than expected.29 
The British Columbia Ombudsman’s report found at least 21 retailers and store 
employees had claimed multiple major prizes between 1999 and 2007, including: 
• One who had claimed 13 prizes, each over $3,000, in one year. 
• A second who had claimed 11 prizes in five years for a total of more than 
$300,000. 
• Another who had claimed more than $10,000 every year for three years, and more 
than $100,000 overall.30 
Canadian media reports said some store clerks were able to fool customers into thinking 
they had won a minor prize, when in fact they had won a large prize (and then the clerks 
would keep the difference for themselves).  The most infamous case involved an Ontario 
retailer who cheated an elderly man out of a winning ticket worth $250,000 (in Canadian 
dollars), by falsely telling him that he had merely won a free ticket. 
                                                 
29 OMBUDSMAN ONTARIO, A GAME OF TRUST (2007), 
http://www.ombudsman.on.ca/media/3268/a_game_of_trust_20070326.pdf. 
30 OMBUDSMAN BRITISH COLUMBIA, WINNING FAIR AND SQUARE: A REPORT ON THE BRITISH COLUMBIA 
LOTTERY CORPORATION’S PRIZE PAYOUT PROCESS (2007), 
http://www.ombud.gov.bc.ca/resources/reports/Special_Reports/Special%20Report%20No%20-
%2031.pdf. 
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The British Columbia report quoted a retailer as follows: 
If the player doesn’t understand how to play the ticket, it’s quite easy 
for the retailer to look at the ticket and tell them it’s not a winner, throw 
it into their garbage or recycling, and retrieve it later and validate it. 
Based on their investigations, the ombudsmen in Ontario and British Columbia found that 
their lotteries’ lax approach to enforcement had enabled some retailers and clerks to 
manipulate the process to their advantage, up to and including theft of some customers’ 
winning tickets. 
Both reports recommended that the lotteries implement a system of proactive checks and 
balances designed to reduce the potential for fraud and theft, and to increase the chances 
that thieves would be detected and held accountable. 
They found that two integral components of such a system would be: 
• To track, monitor, and analyze prizes claimed by retailers and their employees. 
• To automatically review all significant prize claims, with even greater scrutiny 
placed on prizes claimed by retailers, their employees, and members of their 
immediate families. 
The most significant change was triggered by the Ontario Ombudsman.  He found that an 
inherent conflict exists when a lottery “dependent on retailers for its profits is expected to 
take on a disciplinary role as well.”  As a result, he recommended taking regulatory 
oversight responsibilities away from the Ontario lottery and assigning them to a third-
party government agency, independent of the lottery.31 
In response to the ombudsmen reports, the chief executives of both lotteries were fired, 
and both lotteries accepted all of the ombudsmen’s recommendations (and in several 
cases the lotteries went beyond what had been recommended).32  Since then, there has 
been a sea change in how the Ontario and British Columbia lotteries view the importance 
of protecting their customers’ interests.  “The Ombudsman’s report released last March 
provided a clear road map for change,” an Ontario lottery official stated.  “Improved 
levels of customer service and protection of lottery products creates a healthy and 
sustainable organization.”33 
 
 
                                                 
31 Regulatory oversight of the Ontario lottery is now handled by the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of 
Ontario. 
32 The Ontario lottery also implemented a number of improvements in response to recommendations by 
KPMG, an international auditing firm that the lottery hired as a consultant shortly after the scandal first 
emerged in October 2006. 
33 Press Release, Ontario Lottery & Gaming Corp., OLG Delivers First Quarterly Status Report to Ontario 
Ombudsman (June 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.olg.ca/about/media/news_release.jsp?contentID=news_release_070628_01 (quoting Board 
Chairman Michael Gough). 
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Investigations of other lotteries across Canada followed, with similar results.  “An audit 
in Nova Scotia found retailers and their employees pocketed 85 winning tickets – each 
more than $25,000 – for a total of $14 million,” one newspaper reported.34  The same 
audit found that retailers and their employees “won major prizes ($25,000 and greater) 19 
times more than statistically expected.”35 
REPORTS AROUND THE UNITED STATES 
There have been no similar investigations of lotteries in the United States.  This could 
create the impression that the threat of retailer fraud is a distinctly Canadian problem.  
But that impression is contradicted by recent media reports: 
• A customer’s winning ticket worth $1.4 million was stolen by an Arizona store 
clerk in 2005.36 
• In 2007 a 7-Eleven clerk in California was charged with grand theft in connection 
with a winning ticket worth $555,000.  “The female clerk told the customer he 
won $4 on his Mega Millions picks, and then pocketed his winning ticket worth 
$555,000,” the newspaper article reported. 37 
• In 2008 a store clerk in Louisiana was charged with stealing a customer’s ticket 
that was an $800,000 prize winner.38  Media reports said she scanned the ticket 
and told him it was not a winner. 
• In 2008 and 2009 the California Lottery conducted undercover sting operations 
where agents posing as customers presented decoy winning tickets to clerks.  
Some clerks paid out only a fraction of the prize money, while some said the 
tickets were not winners and went on to claim the prize money for themselves.  
The stings led to the arrests of at least ten individuals working at lottery retail 
outlets.39 
 
                                                 
34 Chinta Puxley, Lotteries Seek to Polish Image, CAN. PRESS, Dec. 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.conveniencestores.ca/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=83. 
35 MINISTERIAL PANEL ON TICKET LOTTERY CONTROLS, CONTROLS AND REGULATIONS OF ATLANTIC 
LOTTERY CORPORATION TICKET LOTTERIES IN NOVA SCOTIA (2007), 
http://www.gov.ns.ca/lwd/agd/docs/MinAdvisoryPanelTicketLotteryReport.pdf. 
36 David Pittman, Clerk Accused of Stealing $1M Lottery Ticket, TUCSON CITIZEN, Aug. 19, 2005, at 1A. 
37 Art Campos, Big Winner is Nearly Huge Loser; Store Clerk is Accused of Stealing Customer's $555,000 
Lottery Ticket, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 24, 2007, at A1. 
38 Leslie Williams, Store Clerk Stole Winning Lottery Ticket, Police Say, TIME-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), 
Sept. 24, 2008, at 4. 
39 Press Release, California Lottery, Lottery Consumer Protection Operation Stings Retailer Rip-offs (June 
26, 2008), available at http://www.calottery.com/Media/CurrentQuarter/20082ndQtr/MediaAdvisory_06-
26.htm; Press Release, California Lottery, Lottery Stings Retailer Rip-offs in Northern California (Feb. 18, 
2009), available at http://www.calottery.com/Media/CurrentQuarter/MediaAdvisory_02-18.htm. 
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A 2001 incident in Kansas prompted the following newspaper editorial40: 
[A] store clerk in Topeka tried to cheat a ticket buyer out of – gulp! – a 
quarter-million-dollar jackpot. 
 
The clerk … told the Kansas Cash ticket-holder that he had won $100 
when, in fact, the ticket was worth $255,626.... 
 
Yet, the lottery needs to guard its credibility jealously. This is not 
someone else's problem – in other words, just some rogue clerk. To 
think that would be missing the point. Certainly buyers need to beware. 
But any system that would nearly let a clerk rob a customer of a 
quarter-million is questionable. 
The lottery has various levels of security procedures in place, but they 
need to be rethought. Officials can’t sit back and chalk this up to just 
another criminal in their midst. They need to do everything possible to 
prevent this kind of thing from happening again. 
 
It’s more than the customer’s money that's at stake; it’s also the 
lottery’s credibility.  
 
How much is that worth? 
These media reports highlight instances where clerks were caught and prosecuted.  It 
stands to reason that there have been other such incidents that have been going 
undetected. 
                                                 
40 Editorial, The Kansas Lottery, TOPEKA CAP.-J., Jan. 2, 2002. 
 27
IV. DECISION TO CONDUCT SIMILAR REVIEW 
A. OUR PREVIOUS LOTTERY INVESTIGATION 
Our office raised the possibility of retailer fraud with the Iowa Lottery in the mid-1990s.  
We were investigating a complaint about a lottery terminal that had misidentified a 
winning ticket as a non-winner.  In response, then-CEO Dr. Ed Stanek confirmed that 
terminals can malfunction.  But he cited a lack of customer complaints in support of his 
contention that it was an extremely rare occurrence.41 
Dr. Stanek objected to our suggestion that he tell Lottery customers what he knew about 
risks such as terminals malfunctioning.  By January 1998 Dr. Stanek accepted my 
recommendation to improve the language in Lottery literature with the goal of helping 
customers better understand how to “play the game” (without mentioning that terminals 
can make mistakes or the risk of retailer fraud, which we had noted during our 
investigation). 
The highlight of our 1998 agreement was that the Lottery agreed to: 
• Put the new language on informational stickers “to be placed on or near all lottery 
terminals, playstations and vending machines.”   
• Advise retailers to place the stickers in a position unobstructed from the general 
public and to immediately contact Lottery officials in the event stickers are 
removed or altered. 
B. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
In 2007, in the wake of the Canadian reports, we conducted a preliminary assessment of 
whether the Iowa Lottery had sufficient safeguards to ensure that prize monies were 
going to the rightful owners of winning tickets. 
We approached the assessment (and this investigation) with the presumption that the vast 
majority of Iowa retailers and clerks are honest, reputable and do not engage in fraud or 
theft.  At the same time, life experience suggests it would be naïve to assume that no 
retailers or clerks have been engaging in fraud or theft. 
Our preliminary assessment found that even before the scandal emerged, the Canadian 
lotteries had proactive mechanisms to identify, investigate and respond to suspicious 
activity by retailers.  The ombudsmen found those safeguards were inadequate and were 
poorly executed by lottery staff.  From our preliminary assessment, it was unclear 
whether the Iowa Lottery had any proactive mechanisms to identify, investigate and 
respond to suspicious activity by retailers. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Regarding the frequency of terminal malfunctions, we did not disagree with Dr. Stanek.  But we have 
come to the conclusion that the term “rare” is somewhat meaningless in the context of an enterprise with 
annual sales in the tens of millions. 
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In addition, even before the Canadian scandal emerged, prize claimants in Ontario had to 
satisfy the lottery that they were in fact the owner of the ticket.42  Ontario lottery 
management had considered moving to a “pay the bearer” policy, which has been the 
policy of the Iowa Lottery.  But according to the Ontario Ombudsman’s report, one 
Ontario lottery manager argued against such a change in an e-mail to other managers: 
If we move to a pay-the-bearer policy, Prize Office staff will no longer make 
efforts to determine if a ticket is being presented [for] payment by the proper 
parties. If we don’t ask basic questions to determine ownership at the time of 
redemption it will have implications with respect to stolen tickets … insider 
wins…. Our ability to deal with these issues will be eroded.43 
He was expressing concerns about a policy that the Iowa Lottery has had for years.44 
In response to the Canadian scandal, the lotteries in Ontario and British Columbia began 
implementing dozens of improvements.  We found that the vast majority of those 
improvements had not been adopted by the Iowa Lottery. 
As part of our preliminary assessment, we also conducted a “spot check” of licensed 
retailers to check the Lottery’s compliance with our 1998 agreement.  We visited 15 
stores that sell Lottery tickets in the Des Moines area, and found only one that had a 
sticker on or near the terminal in an unobstructed position. 
We also reviewed information on the Lottery’s website and found that the Lottery had 
issued two press releases in January 2007 that identified a convenience store clerk as the 
winner of two significant prizes – $10,000 and then $250,000.  Both prizes came from 
instant-scratch tickets from the store where she works; and both occurred at a time when 
the Lottery was already tracking news reports from Canada about the issue of retailer 
fraud and theft. 
C. NOTICE OF INVESTIGATION 
Based on our preliminary assessment, and under the authority of Iowa Code chapter 2C 
(2009), I initiated an investigation of the Lottery’s oversight of alleged retailer fraud.  My 
decision was communicated to the Lottery in an October 5, 2007, letter to then-CEO Dr. 
Edward Stanek.45 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 OMBUDSMAN ONTARIO, A GAME OF TRUST (2007), 
http://www.ombudsman.on.ca/media/3268/a_game_of_trust_20070326.pdf. 
43 OMBUDSMAN ONTARIO, A GAME OF TRUST (2007), 
http://www.ombudsman.on.ca/media/3268/a_game_of_trust_20070326.pdf (quoting Apr. 21, 2006, internal 
e-mail). 
44 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.31(1) (2009) states, “The chief executive officer shall award the designated 
prize to the holder of the ticket or share upon presentation of the winning ticket or confirmation of a 
winning share.” 
45 See Appendix B. 
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My letter stated in part: 
This investigation will focus on, but not necessarily be 
limited to, the following issues: 
 
1. Whether the Iowa Lottery has been operating with 
integrity and dignity, as required by Iowa Code Chapter 
99G. 
2. Whether the Iowa Lottery has acted reasonably in 
ensuring that retailers and retailer employees don’t take 
advantage of customers who entrust them with a ticket. 
Our 31-page preliminary assessment was attached.  My letter included this request: 
Please make available, for our review, all of your agency’s 
investigative files and/or records for calendar years 2006 
and 2007 concerning reviews (whether triggered by a 
customer complaint or not) involving the actions of 
retailers, retailer employees and Lottery terminals.  This 
would include, but not be limited to, logs and/or notes of a 
customer’s initial attempt to express a concern to the 
Lottery. 
No outside entity had ever before audited the Lottery’s investigative case files. 
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V. LOTTERY RESPONSE 
Since there is no complaint, could it be that the motive of the 
ombudsman is to get lottery security secrets that most lottery 
employees do not have access to and use them to compromise 
the lottery? 
— October 26, 2007, e-mail by then-CEO Stanek  
to Vice President for External Relations Neubauer 
 
Soon after the Lottery received my October 5, 2007, notice of investigation, internal 
Lottery communications show its staff began taking several steps to address some of the 
issues identified in our preliminary assessment: 
1. October 10, 2007: The Lottery surveyed 15 stores in the Des Moines 
metropolitan area and found only two had an “Ombudsman sticker”46 on or near 
its terminal in an unobstructed position (as required in the 1998 agreement).47 
2. October 10, 2007: The Lottery placed a “super rush” order for 15,000 new 
stickers for immediate distribution to all licensed retailers.  The e-mail placing the 
order stated that the Lottery needed the stickers “as soon as possible (super rush) 
to satisfy the State Ombudsman Office.  We hope to have these labels within a 
week if possible.”48 
3. October 11, 2007: The Lottery began conducting, for the first time in its history, 
regular reviews of individuals claiming multiple high-tier prizes.49 
4. Sometime in October 2007 (date unclear): The Lottery started making plans to 
review and discuss the issue of retailer fraud at the next public meeting of the 
Lottery Board on November 1.  Though management had been monitoring 
developments in Canada since late 2006, this would mark the first time that the 
Iowa Lottery would discuss the issue of retailer fraud at a Board meeting.50 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Internal Lottery communications refer to the labels as “Ombudsman stickers.” 
47 E-mail from Tom Warner, Iowa Lottery, to Larry Loss, V.P. for Sales, Iowa Lottery (Oct. 10, 2007) (on 
file with author). 
48 E-mail from Tammy Cooper, employee, Iowa Lottery, to private vendor (Oct. 10, 2007) (on file with 
author). 
49 E-mail from Therese Spaulding, Validations Manager, Iowa Lottery, to Steve King, V.P. for Finance, 
Iowa Lottery (Oct. 11, 2007) (on file with author); Sworn Interview of Therese Spaulding at the Office of 
Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008); Sworn Interview of Steve King at the Office of Citizens’ 
Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
50 IOWA LOTTERY, DEPARTMENT MONTHLY PLAN (undated) (on file with author). 
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On October 15, 2007, then-Executive Vice President Ken Brickman51 submitted a 
preliminary response letter to me.52  His letter gave no hint that the Lottery was taking 
behind-the-scenes steps in response to the concerns identified in our preliminary 
assessment. 
Brickman’s letter also: 
• Suggested that our investigation would be an unnecessary waste of time and 
resources. 
• Accused our lead investigator of being biased against the Lottery and demanded 
that he be removed from the investigation. 
• Implied that the Lottery might be beyond our agency’s jurisdiction. 
On November 1, 2007, Neubauer presented a memo53 to the Lottery Board54 at its 
regularly scheduled meeting.  The primary theme of Neubauer’s memo was to assert that 
the Iowa Lottery took its watchdog role much more seriously than the Canadian lotteries. 
Then-Acting CEO Brickman formally responded to my notice of investigation through a 
November 5, 2007, letter.55  On the central issue of retailer fraud, Brickman wrote: 
We believe there are individuals who will commit fraud.  
We doubt that they will exclude the lottery from the list of 
possible opportunities.  However, with the extensive 
record-keeping associated with lottery products, it is much 
more likely they will be caught and prosecuted when 
compared to other types of fraud, such as a retail employee 
giving change for a $10 bill when he or she actually had 
been given a $20 bill. 
LOTTERY DENIES REQUEST TO REVIEW ITS INVESTIGATIVE FILES 
The November 5, 2007, letter by then-Acting CEO Brickman also stated: 
The lottery’s investigative files are confidential under Iowa 
Code Chapters 99G and 22.  Instead, we are providing for 
your review summaries of investigations by the Iowa 
Lottery Security staff concerning retailers, retailer 
employees or lottery terminals during calendar years 2006 
and 2007. 
 
                                                 
51 Brickman was subsequently appointed Acting CEO, following the October 31, 2007, retirement of Dr. 
Edward Stanek.  On February 4, 2009, Governor Chet Culver appointed Terry Rich as the Lottery’s new 
CEO.  The appointment was confirmed by the Iowa Senate on March 5, 2009. 
52 See Appendix C. 
53 See Appendix D. 
54 The members of the Lottery Board at the time were: Tim Clausen of Sioux City (chairperson), Elaine 
Baxter of Burlington, Mary Junge of Cedar Rapids, Mike Klappholz of Cedar Rapids, Tom Rial of Des 
Moines, and State Treasurer Michael Fitzgerald of Des Moines (ex-officio member). 
55 See Appendix E. 
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Attached was a four-page report containing generic one- or two-sentence summaries of 
26 cases from 2006 and 54 cases from 2007. 
By early December 2007 I began receiving inquiries from the co-chairs of the 
Government Oversight Committee (Committee).  I had previously apprised them that I 
intended to investigate the issue of potential Lottery retailer fraud.  As a result, when the 
Committee co-chairs became aware of Neubauer’s November 1, 2007, memo to the 
Board, they asked me whether it was related to an investigation by my office. 
The Committee subsequently requested appearances from my office and the Lottery at its 
January 23, 2008, meeting.  At that meeting, the Lottery reiterated its position that its 
investigative files needed to be kept confidential.  A newspaper article published the next 
day reported: 
Neubauer, in addressing the Legislature's Government 
Oversight Committee on Wednesday, suggested the records 
couldn’t be shared without giving the ombudsman access to 
security codes and other information that would enable 
Angrick or someone in his office to rig a Lottery game in 
their favor. 
 
Angrick told lawmakers he doesn’t want any security codes 
and is only interested in the investigations into citizens’ 
complaints of wrongdoing.56 
A January 25 article in the same newspaper quoted Brickman as follows: 
Some of those files would have exhibits, pieces of 
information, that would disclose how we catch crooks, how 
we protect our system, how our system operates internally.  
That information we can’t disclose.57 
However, within a week Brickman allowed my investigators to have full access to the 
Security Division’s complaint files.  My investigators did not find any files containing 
“security codes.” 
We later asked Security Division officials about upper management’s stated concerns 
regarding “security codes.”  Included was the following exchange with Harry Braafhart, 
the recently retired Vice President for Security: 
Braafhart: Nothing was removed or redacted that I am 
aware of. At all. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: Can you fathom then why people 
who were not in [the] Security Division were telling us that 
there were things in those files that needed to be protected 
from our eyes? 
 
Braafhart: No.58 
                                                 
56 Clark Kauffman, Investigation Looks at Lottery Security, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 24, 2008, at 1A. 
57 Clark Kauffman, Official Seeks Leads on Lottery Problems, DES MOINES, REG., Jan. 25, 2008, at 1B. 
58 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
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Asked what input he made on the issue, Braafhart told us: 
I said that I am proud of the job that my investigators have 
done over the years and I said as far as I’m concerned 
anybody can look at those files. 
And later in the same interview: 
Ombudsman investigator: Had you communicated up to 
that point that indeed you didn’t see any security codes or 
Social Security Numbers or anything that needed 
protection? 
 
Braafhart: Yes. I made that statement. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: To the other VPs [vice 
presidents] and CEO? 
 
Braafhart: Yes. 
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VI. OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATION 
A. SECURITY DIVISION CASE FILES 
Beginning on February 6, 2008, we spent several days at Lottery headquarters reviewing 
all of the Security Division’s investigative case files for calendar years 2005, 2006, and 
2007.  This involved approximately 434 files. 
We subsequently identified approximately 122 files that involved alleged impropriety by 
retailers or their employees.  Our review of those 122 files forms the basis for many of 
the findings and conclusions in this report. 
We divided the 122 files into three general categories: 
1. CUSTOMERS ALLEGING IMPROPRIETY BY RETAILERS: 34 CASES 
These cases involved incidents where customers complained about the actions of a 
retailer or store employee.59  We determined that the majority of these complaints were 
essentially substantiated by Security Division investigators. 
These complaints of retailer impropriety involved a variety of issues with differing levels 
of significance.  One customer reported that a clerk mistakenly ripped up his $2,500 
winning instant ticket; he was able to redeem it at a regional office.60  Another customer 
said she picked her own Powerball numbers on a “play slip”61 and handed it to a clerk, 
only to later realize that the clerk had given her a ticket with the wrong numbers.  She 
contacted the Lottery because she said the clerk was “very nasty” when she went back to 
explain the problem.62 
Two files involved store employees who were found to have stolen a customer’s winning 
ticket.  Each case involved a customer who reported accidentally dropping a winning 
ticket at a store, and a store employee who later found the ticket and cashed it for herself. 
In the first case, a customer reported that he lost a $1,000 winning Touch Play ticket at a 
store.  A store employee later found the ticket and cashed it.  She eventually gave the 
prize money to the customer after police threatened to charge her with Lottery theft.63 
The other case involved a customer who reported that he had lost a $50 winning ticket at 
a store.  The investigation revealed that the clerk later found the ticket and redeemed it, 
even though she knew it belonged to the customer.  The clerk was prosecuted for theft.  
Out of the three years of case files that we examined, this was the only case where a 
retailer or store employee was prosecuted for victimizing a customer.64 
                                                 
59 Of these 34 files, two were from 2005, four were from 2006, and 28 were from 2007. 
60 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-057 (2007). 
61 Then-Acting CEO Brickman explained that a “play slip” is “a piece of paper stock that has boxes on it 
where a player who chooses to pick their own numbers and doesn’t want the clerk to enter those numbers 
manually into the terminal … that player can then fill out the boxes on their own and hand it to the clerk.” 
62 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-010 (2007). 
63 The case file [Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-085 (2006)] noted that the same 
clerk also had a $1,000 Touch Play prize claim from two months prior.  But the Lottery investigator did not 
review that prior prize claim to see whether it involved similar circumstances. 
64 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-095 (2006). 
 35
At least six customers alleged that a store shortchanged them during transactions.  This 
included three who were still owed a dollar or two from relatively complicated 
transactions involving Lottery tickets and purchases of gas or merchandise.65 
Three other customers complained that they redeemed winning tickets worth $1,000, but 
that retailers kept several hundred dollars of the prize winnings.66  In each case, the 
retailer falsely claimed that several hundred dollars needed to be kept for withholding 
taxes.  The retailer later claimed the prize money from the Lottery.  The Security 
Division did not report any of these incidents to law enforcement or prosecutors, nor did 
it consider whether to impose license sanctions against the stores, even though two of the 
cases involved store owners.67 
2. INTERNAL THEFTS PROSECUTED: 54 CASES 
These cases generally involved store employees who were accused of, and subsequently 
prosecuted for, Lottery-related theft or fraud.68  The vast majority (47) involved store 
employees who were charged with stealing instant tickets from the stores where they 
worked.  One case involved a bowling alley manager who was prosecuted for redeeming 
counterfeit Touch Play tickets at other stores.69  Another case involved a clerk who tried 
to redeem an altered Pull-tab ticket at another store.70  Five cases involved theft of other 
items, such as Pull-tab tickets, online tickets, and even cash from Lottery machines.71 
To provide a glimpse into what occurs in cases of internal theft, we have compiled some 
representative segments from actual cases.72 
The 54 cases which led to prosecutions involved 61 separate defendants who were 
employees.  Four cases involved multiple defendants.  One case involved a mother and 
her teen-age daughter.73 
 
 
                                                 
65 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-051 (2007); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 07-092 (2007);  Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-143 (2007). 
66 The mere act of a retailer redeeming a $1,000 prize-winning ticket (or any prize winner of more than 
$600) is a violation of the Lottery’s Licensing Terms and Conditions, as previously noted. 
67 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-072 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-092 (2005), Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-053 (2006).  
These cases will be discussed in greater detail in the “Findings and Analysis” section of this report. 
68 Only one of these 54 cases did not involve a store employee.  The lone exception involved a woman who 
was prosecuted for stealing $167 worth of tickets from the Lottery’s regional office in Mason City.  She 
was able to access the tickets while cleaning the offices as an employee of a contractor. Iowa Lottery 
Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-062 (2007). 
69 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-101 (2006). 
70 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-076 (2007). 
71 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-105 (2005), Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-108 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-046 (2006); Iowa 
Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-059; Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case 
No. 07-114 (2007). 
72 See Appendix F. 
73 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-051 (2006). 
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3. INTERNAL THEFTS NOT PROSECUTED: 34 CASES 
These cases involved incidents where store employees were alleged to have committed 
Lottery-related theft or fraud, but were not prosecuted.  Of these 34 cases, we determined 
that 33 were essentially substantiated – meaning the employer and/or the Lottery 
investigator found that an internal theft had occurred.  Of the 33 cases that were 
substantiated, more than half (20) were not reported to law enforcement or to 
prosecutors.74 
Of the 33 cases that were substantiated, 27 involved store employees who were found to 
have stolen instant tickets from the stores where they worked.  The other six cases 
involved theft of Pull-tab tickets, online tickets, or cash from Lottery machines.75 
Those 33 substantiated cases involved 41 suspects.  Five cases involved multiple 
suspects.  One case involved a mother, her two daughters, and her boyfriend.76 
4. ADDITIONAL CASES OF INTERNAL THEFT 
We also found approximately 154 other case files identified by the Lottery as involving 
theft that was not internal (thefts that did not involve a store employee).  A cursory check 
revealed that some of these cases were unresolved, with no suspect being identified, and 
could have involved store employees. 
Here are three examples: 
1. A store owner reported a pack of instant tickets had been stolen.  He said the pack 
was delivered while he was away on vacation and said “the last time anyone saw 
this pack of tickets they were on his desk.”  The file noted that the owner was 
filing a report with local law enforcement.77 
2. A store reported that a pack of instant tickets was stolen from the ticket dispenser.  
“Unknown how or when or who,” the investigator wrote.  He encouraged the 
manager to report the incident to local law enforcement.78 
3. One of the Lottery’s regional offices reported that nine packs of instant tickets 
(with a retail value of $2,700) were missing from a store.  An investigator called 
the store and left a message for the manager to call back.  “No one ever called 
back,” the investigator wrote.  He then closed the case.79 
                                                 
74 This is noteworthy in light of IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.35(1) (2009) (“The lottery security office shall 
perform all of the following activities in support of the authority mission….  Report any suspected 
violations of this chapter to the appropriate county attorney or the attorney general and to any law 
enforcement agencies having jurisdiction over the violation.”) (Emphasis added). 
75 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-004 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-046 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-050 (2005); Iowa 
Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-002 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, 
Case No. 06-110 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-077 (2007). 
76 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-122 (2006). 
77 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-069 (2007). 
78 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-027 (2005). 
79 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-098 (2005).  It is worth noting that the Licensing 
Terms and Conditions requires retailers to report any instances of tickets being stolen and to cooperate with 
the Security Division’s attempts to investigate such matters.  Neither of these requirements was noted in 
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Internal theft should not be ruled out simply because the suspect(s) was not identified.  
This means that an unknown number of these 154 other files may have involved internal 
theft, which in turn means that there likely were more cases of internal theft than the 88 
previously referenced in this section. 
B. OTHER INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES 
For many of the Security Division’s case files, in order to understand what actually 
occurred, it was necessary to obtain additional information from other sources, especially 
police reports and court files.  Towards this end, we identified and contacted: 
• Investigating law enforcement agencies to obtain incident and supplemental 
reports. 
• Appropriate clerks of court and prosecutors to obtain court-related documents and 
information. 
• Various store officials and customers who filed complaints. 
We also obtained and reviewed the following relevant information: 
• Lottery records from 2006 and 2007 that involved customer complaints which 
were not forwarded to the Security Division. 
• The Lottery’s database of prize claimants to determine the full history of high-tier 
prizes claimed by suspect retailers and store employees, as well as other 
individuals who claimed multiple major prizes.80 
• Suspects’ criminal backgrounds on Iowa Courts Online.81 
• Restitution orders. 
• Hundreds of Lottery press releases over the past several years, which allowed us 
to identify dozens of retailers and store employees who have claimed major 
prizes.82 
• Various online sources to confirm the identity of various suspects (from the 
Security Division’s case files) and/or winners of major prizes. 
• The two Canadian ombudsman investigative reports regarding their provincial 
lotteries. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
this case file. 
80 The database we reviewed is comprised of 213,100 prize claims paid out by the Lottery (including its 
five regional offices) from May 10, 1986, through February 15, 2008.  The database does not include any 
prize claims paid by retailers, which includes the vast majority of prize claims for $600 and less. 
81 Iowa Courts Online Search, http://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us/ESAWebApp?SelectFrame (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2009). 
82 Internet Archives, Wayback Machine, http://www.archive.org/web/web.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2009); 
Iowa Lottery, Press Room, http://www.ialottery.com/PressRoom/PressRoom_WinnerNews.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
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• Relevant information from the websites of several lotteries, including status 
reports by the Ontario, British Columbia and Québec lotteries regarding progress 
towards implementing dozens of recommendations for improvement. 
• Media reports from Iowa, other states and Canada. 
• Responses to dozens of written questions and information requests that we made 
to the Lottery during this investigation. 
• Sworn interviews of 12 Lottery employees and two recent Lottery retirees.83 
C. CONTACTS FROM PUBLIC 
In January 2008 the media reported my request encouraging the public to contact my 
office with concerns about the Lottery.  In response, we received several dozen contacts 
from the public. 
Here are some representative samples of comments made by these individuals: 
• “I know a lot of people who work in c-stores [convenience stores] and they all say 
co-workers have pulled this scam at some point.” 
• “I have been told (heard) that others are aware of ticket ‘sellers’ holding 
‘dead/loser’ tickets near a machine and running those thru instead of running the 
ones you give them. I have not seen this myself, but because of the many articles I 
have been reading, I am watching the vendors more closely when turning in my 
tickets.” 
• “I have had two occasions over the years where I knew I had a small winner and 
the clerk told me I did not have a winner. I had them check again and they then 
found their ‘error.’  I believe it was a mistake both times on their part or I would 
have reported it to lottery headquarters.” 
                                                 
83 The sworn interviews were transcribed; verbatim quotes from those transcripts are included throughout 
this report.  The two recent retirees were Vice President for Security Harry Braafhart and Lottery 
Investigator Larry Steele.  In addition, we interviewed Vice President for Finance Steve King the day 
before his retirement from the Lottery.  We did not interview former Lottery CEO Dr. Edward Stanek, who 
retired on October 31, 2007. 
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Findings and Analysis 
I. SOME RETAILERS HAVE BEEN UNCOMMONLY LUCKY 
In 2007 a northwest Iowa store owner claimed a $250,000 prize from an instant ticket 
that came from her store.  Her big win was announced in a press release issued by the 
Iowa Lottery: 
[The retailer] was spending the day with her girlfriend … 
when they decided to stop by the store to see her 
husband…. [They] own the store. 
 
“On my way to give [her friend] a ride to her house, we just 
drove through the drive through [of the store] and [my 
husband] said, ‘Here, why don't you just scratch some 
lottery tickets?’” 
 
[The retailer] scratched the tickets on the spot and revealed 
the big winner!84 
A. REPEAT RETAILER WINNERS 
One out of 67,000.  Those are the approximate chances of buying an Iowa Lottery ticket 
and having it win a high-tier prize (more than $600).85 
Iowa retailers and their employees have claimed dozens of high-tier prizes.  In 2007 
alone, we found that retailers and store employees claimed at least 28 high-tier prizes, 
totaling $676,352.  Those prize winners included a store owner (mentioned above) and a 
store clerk, both from northwest Iowa, who each claimed $250,000 prizes from instant 
tickets from the stores where they worked.86  In all of 2007, only seven other people 
claimed an instant-ticket prize for $250,000 or more.  We could not establish whether any 
of the other seven involved retailers or store employees. 
The Iowa Lottery was already tracking the developing scandal in Canada when it 
received those two $250,000 prize claims in early 2007.  The Iowa Lottery did not 
investigate either prize claim before honoring them.  Through our investigation, we found 
that the Iowa Lottery generally does not investigate prize claims by anyone unless it has 
received a complaint. 
We found that the store owner and the store clerk have also claimed other big prizes.  The 
store owner (and her husband) have claimed 16 prizes since 1991 for a total of $263,501; 
11 of their claims have occurred since 2004.  The store clerk alone claimed eight prizes 
for $266,000 in less than one year’s time.87 
                                                 
84 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, Sibley Woman Wins $250,000 (Apr. 9, 2007) (on file with author). 
85 We obtained these odds through our own calculations of Lottery data; we confirmed their accuracy with 
statisticians at Iowa State University. 
86 Lucky Lake Park Woman Wins Second Big Prize, LOTTERY ACTION (Iowa Lottery, Des Moines, Iowa), 
Feb. 19-Mar. 4, 2007 at 2. 
87 These prize claim histories are based on our review of the Lottery’s database of prize claimants, and also 
our review of the Lottery’s online “Big Winners List.”  Iowa Lottery, Recently Claimed Big Prizes, 
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In all, we found nine retailers and store employees who have claimed five or more high-
tier prizes – the odds for winning one of which are about one in 67,000.  At least four of 
those nine claimed additional prizes in late 2008 or early 2009.  This includes a northern 
Iowa retailer who has claimed 67 prizes over the past several years (March 2005 through 
March 2009) for a total of $100,626.88 
B. LIST OF RETAILER PRIZE CLAIMS NOT COMPLETE 
The Lottery does not track prizes claimed by retailers and their employees.  As a result, 
we compiled a partial list by reviewing various resources, including hundreds of Lottery 
press releases, some of which have identified winners as retailers or store employees. 
But our list of prizes claimed by retailers and their employees is undoubtedly far from 
complete.  The resources we relied upon allowed us to review many of the Lottery’s press 
releases for the past several years, but some were not available.  In addition, the Lottery 
does not require retailers or their employees to identify themselves as such when 
claiming a prize.  This means there likely have been other retailers and store employees 
who claimed major prizes but were not identified as such in the Lottery’s press releases. 
This in turn means that the number and value of Iowa Lottery prizes claimed by retailers 
and their employees is unknown. 
C. RETAILER PRIZE CLAIMS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVIEWED 
We found prizes claimed by retailers and store employees under circumstances that 
should have triggered a closer review.  The tickets that led to these prizes all came from 
the stores where the prize claimants were employed.  For example: 
• A clerk from a northwest Iowa convenience store claimed a $30,000 instant-ticket 
prize in July 2006, just one month after the Security Division was informed that 
another employee of the same store was being prosecuted for lightly scratching 
instant tickets, selling the losing tickets, and redeeming the winners.89 
• An assistant manager of a central Iowa convenience store claimed a $100,000 
instant-ticket prize in February 2006, just one day after a property she owned was 
sold to a bank in response to a foreclosure action.90 
• A clerk from a southeastern Iowa liquor store claimed a truck valued at $28,000 
through an instant scratch ticket in November 2003.  Earlier that year, he had lost 
a $26,057 judgment to an auto finance company, court records show.  He had also 
lost possession of a motor vehicle in 2002 after being sued by the finance 
company.91 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.ialottery.com/WinnersCircle/WinnersCircle_claimedprizes.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). 
88 Id. 
89 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, Fort Dodge Store Clerk Wins $30,000 (July 12, 2006) (on file with author); 
Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-100 (2006). 
90 Des Moines Woman Gets $100,000 Birthday Present, LOTTERY ACTION (Iowa Lottery, Des Moines, 
Iowa), Feb. 20-Mar. 5, 2006, at 3; and court records reviewed through Iowa Courts Online Search, 
http://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us/ESAWebApp?SelectFrame (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
91 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, Sigourney Man Wins New Chevy Truck (Nov. 4, 2003) (on file with 
author) and court records reviewed through Iowa Courts Online Search, 
http://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us/ESAWebApp?SelectFrame (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
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We also found that some store employees who pled guilty to Lottery theft had claimed 
big prizes in the past.  This includes: 
• The manager of a northeastern Iowa convenience store who pled guilty to first-
degree theft in 2008 in connection with the theft of $45,204 in tickets and cash 
from a Pull-tab vending machine.  The same manager had claimed a $10,000 
instant-ticket prize in September 2006; and overall, he had claimed 17 prizes 
totaling $33,290.92 
• The manager of a northeastern Iowa bowling alley who admitted that he redeemed 
counterfeit Touch Play tickets in May 2006.  Six weeks before, he claimed a 
$10,000 Touch Play prize.93 
Given the evidence it had gathered against those two managers, it would be reasonable to 
expect that the Lottery would have retroactively investigated their prior prize claims.  
However, the investigator who handled both cases first learned about those prize claims 
when we asked him about them.94 
We found one similar prize claim that was retroactively investigated.  It involved the gift 
shop manager from an eastern Iowa riverboat casino.  She was accused of stealing 
hundreds of instant tickets from the gift shop in 2007. 
The Lottery case file95 includes a Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) file, which 
shows that the manager’s employer suspected that she may have also stolen a $50,000 
winning instant ticket in 2006, as it also originated from the gift shop. 
Because of the employer’s suspicions, the DCI investigator interviewed the gift shop 
manager about the origins of the $50,000 winning ticket from 2006.  The Lottery’s 2006 
press release about that prize claim had quoted her as saying: 
The one who takes my place at work came in and [as I was 
leaving] I said, “Two Lucky 7’s.  I’ll see you later.  I’m 
going home to relax for the night.”  Then I got home and 
I’m like, “Oh my gosh!  Honey, we won!”96 
However, the gift shop manager told the DCI investigator that her 2006 press-release 
statement was not true, according to the DCI file.  The manager said she had actually 
“played” the $50,000 winning ticket during her shift at the gift shop.  She also said that 
she had purchased that ticket before “playing” it. 
Because there was no evidence to the contrary, no charges were filed related to the 
$50,000 prize claim from 2006.  The gift shop manager eventually pled guilty to second-
degree theft in connection with the theft of hundreds of tickets in 2007. 
                                                 
92 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-114 (2007) and our review of the Lottery’s 
database of prize claimants. 
93 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-101 (2006) and our review of the Lottery’s 
database of prize claimants. 
94 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
95 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-140 (2007). 
96 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, Bride-To-Be Wins $50,000 Playing Iowa Lottery (Oct. 24, 2006) (on file 
with author). 
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We found that the gift shop manager had also claimed three other high-tier prizes totaling 
$8,000 in the months before she was accused of stealing instant tickets.97 
D. OTHERS WITH SIGNIFICANT PRIZE CLAIM HISTORIES 
We found that approximately 173 people have claimed at least five high-tier prizes over 
the history of the Lottery, when Touch Play prizes are excluded.  When Touch Play is 
included, about 791 people have claimed at least 10 high-tier prizes.98 
For the vast majority of these individuals, we were unable to determine whether they 
have worked for stores that sell Lottery tickets.  It is therefore possible that some of these 
individuals were also retailers or store employees.99 
                                                 
97 Based on our analysis of the Lottery’s database of prize claimants. 
98 All of these prize claim histories are based on our review of the Lottery’s database of prize claimants. 
99 For more information and analysis regarding individuals with significant prize claim histories, see 
Appendix G, “Major Winners.” 
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II. INHERENT RETAILER ADVANTAGES 
Ombudsman investigator: So if clerks have greater access to 
lottery tickets, if they act as a change agent for the lottery in 
paying out prizes and accepting money in, by virtue of that 
additional access should they be held to a higher standard than a 
player from the general public? 
 
Larry Steele: Well, they’re actually an agent for the state by 
selling that. Yes, they should have a little higher standard. 
— Exchange during October 8, 2008, interview  
of recently retired Investigator Larry Steele 
 
Several Canadian lotteries consider retailers and their employees to be “insiders” who 
should be subjected to additional scrutiny when they claim major prizes. 
In her November 1, 2007, memo to the Lottery Board, Vice President for External 
Relations Neubauer noted that Iowa law does not consider retailers or their employees as 
“insiders.”  She wrote that retailers “don’t have access to confidential information 
associated with the lottery and they can’t affect the outcome of drawings.” 
We grant that retailers and their employees do not have access to confidential information 
and cannot affect the winning numbers that are drawn for online games like Powerball.  
However, among people who are inclined to steal Lottery tickets, those who sell them 
have several inherent advantages. 
In interviews with our investigators, employees of the Security Division generally 
acknowledged that retailers and their employees have inherent advantages and, in turn, 
should be held to a higher standard than customers.100 
Our analysis has revealed that retailers and their employees have at least four distinct, 
inherent advantages: 
1. Direct access to unsold tickets.  From 2005 through 2007, the Lottery received 
an average of about 25 reports annually of store employees stealing unsold tickets 
from the stores where they were employed. 
2. Control over validation procedures.  Retailers and their employees control the 
process of validating customers’ tickets (i.e., scanning them through the terminal 
to see if they are winners).  During this process, retailers and clerks have 
temporary control of customers’ tickets.  This can enhance the ability of a scam 
artist to trick customers without their realization. 
                                                 
100 Sworn Interview of recently retired Vice President for Security Harry Braafhart at the Office of 
Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008); Sworn Interview of Investigator Supervisor John Ellison at the 
Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008); Sworn Interview of recently retired Investigator 
Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008); Sworn Interview of Investigator 
Ken Moon at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
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As for how this can yield an advantage, consider “palming,” a technique found by 
the Canadian investigations.  With palming, a dishonest retailer would keep a few 
losing tickets near the terminal.  When any unsuspecting customer would hand 
over a ticket to see if it was a winner, the retailer would use his palm to discretely 
swap that ticket with one of the known losing tickets.  The retailer then entered 
the non-winning ticket into the terminal scanner, which produced a “Not a 
Winner” receipt to be handed to the customer.  Unless the customer was on top of 
the situation, they would leave the store and the retailer could later check the 
customer’s original ticket and claim any prize for himself.101 
 
A slightly different scam was described in “Lottery Action,” a periodic newsletter 
that the Iowa Lottery publishes for licensed retailers.  A customer tried to redeem 
what she thought was a winning ticket but the clerk said the ticket was a non-
winner.  “The clerk then threw the ticket in the wastebasket behind the counter,” 
the article said.  “The player asked for the ticket back and the clerk gave her a 
ticket, but she did not believe it was the same one she had just scratched.  The 
next day, the player said she was shopping at another store and witnessed the 
clerk from the day before cashing a $250-winning ticket at that store.”102 
 
The clerk was eventually charged with felony theft of the customer’s ticket.  
While that clerk was caught, it was only because of an unlikely occurrence – the 
customer happened to see the clerk cashing the ticket the next day at another 
store. 
 
This shows how temporary control over a customer’s ticket can create an 
advantage for a thief – even in situations where a customer already knows that the 
ticket is a winner before handing it to a clerk. 
3. Control over prize payout procedures.  Retailers and their employees also can 
control the payment of prizes worth $600 or less. (Stores paid out 83 percent of all 
prize money in fiscal year 2007, according to Lottery statistics.103)  The Canadian 
investigations described a technique which illustrates how this can yield an 
advantage (referred to as “partial win payment”).  In this scenario, a clerk tells 
customers that they’ve won a smaller amount than the actual prize, i.e., telling a 
customer he has won $50 when it was actually $250, and then pockets the 
difference. 
 
In addition, retailers and their employees can pay themselves for the vast majority 
of winning tickets with no review by the Lottery.  This means that for any 
winning tickets gained illicitly, a retailer scam artist can pay himself or herself the 
prize money for the vast majority of those winning tickets, with no record of who 
claimed those prizes. 
                                                 
101 In his public comments, then-Acting CEO Brickman has acknowledged that palming has probably 
occurred in the context of the Iowa Lottery.  See Clark Kauffman, Official Seeks Leads on Lottery 
Problems, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 25, 2008, at 1B (“I would say that, far and away, the vast majority of all 
the retail clerks in Iowa are honest, good people.  Could you find a foul ball occasionally that would palm a 
lottery ticket?  Sure.”). 
102 Player Helps Security Catch Theft Suspect, LOTTERY ACTION (Iowa Lottery, Des Moines, Iowa), Oct. 
22-Nov. 4, 2001, at 3. 
103 Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, Iowa Lottery, to Ombudsman investigator (Nov. 6, 2008) 
(on file with author). 
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4. Heightened awareness of how to play and how to win.  This advantage is best 
explained by a statement from the Ontario Ombudsman’s report, “A Game of 
Trust.”  It stated in part, “[R]etailers, as a number of statistical experts suggested, 
have a natural advantage over other players through their exposure to the lottery 
system.  Retailers are privy to a great deal of information regarding the precise 
odds of winning particular games, and the number of unclaimed prizes.” 
 
As for how this could work in practice, consider the following comment that was 
submitted anonymously to The Des Moines Register website, in connection with 
an article about our investigation: “Another trick I heard from an old friend years 
ago was that while he sold tickets he would ask customers if they had won 
anything.  Knowing that about every fifth or sixth ticket was a winner for certain 
games it was like shooting fish in a barrel for him.  Near the end of the day they 
had purchased several tickets with 75% of them being winners.  They just sat all 
day keeping track of the ticket count an(d) increasing their odds of winning.”104 
                                                 
104 Anonymous online commenter to article by Clark Kauffman, Investigation Looks at Lottery Security, 
DES MOINES REG., Jan. 24, 2008, at 1A. 
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III. THE NEED TO REDUCE THE INHERENT RETAILER ADVANTAGES 
Many other jurisdictions recognize that although the vast majority 
of retailers are honest and law-abiding, the obligation to ensure 
public trust and confidence as well as the integrity of the lottery 
system requires proper checks and balances to guard against 
theft or fraud or other insider advantages. 
— “A Game of Trust,” 2007 report by  
the Ombudsman of Ontario (Canada) 
 
When lotteries were introduced, determining if you had a winning 
ticket was a manual process carried out by the ticket holders. 
Changes to the control systems were not adequately considered 
as lotteries grew in popularity and technology was introduced. 
— “Controls and Regulation of Atlantic Lottery Corporation  
Ticket Lotteries in Nova Scotia,” report issued  
in October 2007 by the Nova Scotia  
Ministerial Panel on Ticket Lottery Controls 
 
In the United States, lotteries were generally successful until the late 19th century.  But by 
1894, major scandals brought down the Louisiana Lottery, which had operated nationally.  
This triggered a backlash and lotteries were outlawed for the next seven decades. 
It is probably not a coincidence that most modern lotteries openly acknowledge their 
need to maintain integrity.  In Iowa, the Lottery’s need to operate with “integrity and 
dignity” is mandated in the law that established the agency. 
How can the Lottery ensure that it is operating with integrity, particularly in light of the 
inherent retailer advantages?  The Canadian investigations revealed that to maintain 
integrity, a lottery needs to establish a proactive system of checks and balances that will 
reduce the inherent retailer advantages; and then it must apply those checks and balances 
with vigorous oversight.  Such efforts can help ensure that customers’ interests are 
reasonably secure, and that thieves are routinely held accountable. 
We identified four integral components that are necessary for a lottery enforcement 
system to effectively neutralize the inherent retailer advantages: 
A. Proactive enforcement procedures 
B. Effective complaint-handling practices 
C. Holding violators accountable 
D. Educating and protecting customers 
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The remainder of this section will describe these components.  Subsequent sections of 
this report will analyze the Lottery’s performance in achieving a meaningful enforcement 
system. 
A. PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
In a perfect world, any customer cheated out of a ticket or prize money would realize it 
and report it for investigation.  Operating on a “complaint only” basis might be sufficient. 
But that is not how things work in the real world.  The primary goal of a scam artist is to 
victimize people without their knowledge.  When they succeed, their crime will be 
invisible to a “complaint only” model, because victims do not file complaints about 
crimes they’re not aware of.  The Canadian investigations found that if a lottery is not 
proactively looking for incidents involving fraud and/or theft, it will miss a good share of 
such activity. 
There are numerous policies that a lottery can adopt and implement under an umbrella of 
proactive enforcement.  Here are several examples that have been adopted by the 
Canadian lotteries: 
1. Automatic prize-payout interviews of all winners at or above a certain threshold 
2. Tracking and analyzing prize claims by retailers and their employees 
3. Automatic investigations of all prize claims by retailers and their employees at or 
above a certain threshold 
4. Regular integrity testing, which allows a lottery to proactively monitor retailers’ 
compliance with the lottery’s rules and regulations 
B. EFFECTIVE COMPLAINT-HANDLING PRACTICES 
“We take these complaints very seriously.”  That was one of the first things Iowa Lottery 
Investigator Roger Mott told the manager of a central Iowa grocery store after driving 
there from Iowa Lottery headquarters in Des Moines in July 2007.105 
Mott’s drive was triggered by a phone call from a woman who reported seeing teen-agers 
buying Pull-tab tickets at the grocery store.  If true, those purchases were illegal, since 
Iowa law bans anyone under the age of 21 from buying Lottery products. 
Mott was unable to determine the identities of the teen-agers.  But in response to his 
suggestion, store management moved the machine that dispenses Pull-tab tickets so it 
would be easier for store employees to monitor who was buying tickets.  In short, Mott 
took an active interest in the matter, and his actions resulted in an improved situation. 
We found other examples of similar efforts by the Iowa Lottery’s Security Division: 
• Investigators worked with DCI agents and local law enforcement on undercover 
projects regarding illegal gambling devices.106 
                                                 
105 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-075 (2007). 
106 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-088 (2005);  Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 06-096 (2006). 
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• A woman reported that a $3,050 winning ticket was missing from her purse after 
she had “passed out” at another individual’s apartment and awoke the next 
afternoon.  About a week later, a man presented the ticket and a prize claim form 
to the Lottery.  Because the ticket had been flagged as stolen, a Lottery 
investigator questioned the man, who said he had found the ticket in a parking lot. 
 
The investigation found that the man was telling the truth.  However, the Lottery 
gave the prize money to the woman.107 
• A store in Black Hawk County was reportedly using illegal advertising for Touch 
Play.  The investigator assigned to the case did not bother trying to call the store.  
Instead, he made the two-hour drive to the store, helped the owner remove the 
word “slot” from the sign, and then drove back to Des Moines.108 
• In a similar case, a Lottery sales representative spoke with the owner of a Clinton 
store early one morning about his sign stating, “New Video Slots Here.”  After the 
sales representative was unable to persuade the owner to change the sign, a 
Lottery investigator made the three-hour drive to Clinton.  He arrived at 5:30 p.m. 
and told the owner that the sign was in violation and must be changed 
immediately. 
 
The owner said he would review the rules that night and decide the next morning 
whether to change the sign.  To the Lottery, that was not an acceptable answer; it 
deactivated the store’s Touch Play machines that evening.  A memo in the case 
file described the matter as a “protracted refusal to remove the sign.”  In this case, 
“protracted refusal” referred to events lasting about 10 hours.109 
These cases show that the Lottery’s investigators are capable of conducting effective and 
proactive investigations.  Here are four common features of such cases: 
• Taking it seriously: In the above-mentioned case, the investigator told a store 
manager that the Lottery takes underage complaints “very seriously.”110  In a 
separate case which involved a sign with the phrase “slot machine,” then-CEO Ed 
Stanek wrote that “the Lottery takes misrepresentation of its name, trademarks 
and games very seriously.”111 
• Physically going to the store (sometimes undercover) 
• Good recordkeeping and documentation 
• Proactive: Above all else, the one common thread in these cases was that the 
investigator took ownership of the case and worked toward an appropriate 
resolution. 
                                                 
107 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-066 (2006). 
108 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-089 (2005). 
109 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-052 (2005). 
110 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-075 (2007). 
111 Letter from Dr. Stanek, then-CEO, to eastern Iowa retailer (Mar. 9, 2005) (on file with author). 
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C. HOLDING VIOLATORS ACCOUNTABLE 
Proactive enforcement procedures and effective complaint-handling practices are a good 
start, but are not enough to ensure that customers are reasonably protected.  A lottery also 
needs to ensure that violators are held accountable. 
This can be accomplished by making sure that: 
• Thieves are routinely apprehended and prosecuted. 
• Thieves are routinely required to give up the “fruits” of their crimes.  A retailer or 
store employee who obtains prize money from stolen tickets should not be able to 
keep that prize money. 
• Licensed retailers who violate a lottery’s rules are held accountable, with license 
suspensions and revocations when appropriate. 
• Lottery investigators have reliable, accurate, and readily searchable records that 
allow them to identify possible patterns of theft and fraud among suspects and 
stores. 
D. EDUCATING AND PROTECTING CUSTOMERS 
Lotteries can further help customers by providing a variety of tools at the retail level.  
These include: 
• Ticket checkers: Many lotteries allow customers the option of checking their 
own tickets by offering self-serve “ticket checker” devices at licensed retailers.  
These devices allow customers to determine the actual results of the ticket without 
needing to hand the ticket over to a clerk.  The value of these devices was 
explained in the Nova Scotia lottery report, which stated, “The ultimate control is 
allowing the player to control the validation process without surrendering the 
ticket.”112 
• Customer display units: These are electronic screens, placed next to terminals, 
that show the results of the ticket validation process.  This allows customers to 
immediately see the results of a particular transaction.113 
• Musical jingles: Many lotteries have programmed their terminals to play a 
musical tune or “jingle” whenever a winning ticket is scanned through.  This acts 
as a cue to customers that their ticket is a winner. 
 
 
                                                 
112 MINISTERIAL PANEL ON TICKET LOTTERY CONTROLS, CONTROLS AND REGULATIONS OF ATLANTIC 
LOTTERY CORPORATION TICKET LOTTERIES IN NOVA SCOTIA (2007), 
http://www.gov.ns.ca/lwd/agd/docs/MinAdvisoryPanelTicketLotteryReport.pdf. 
113 The Canadian ombudsman investigations recommended that these units be redesigned so that they can 
be locked in place by the lottery.  This was because it was discovered that some retailers would turn the 
screen away from customers, effectively negating the benefit of having the device. 
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• Receipts: Terminals can be programmed to generate a receipt whenever a ticket is 
scanned through.  The receipt would show whether the ticket was a winner, and if 
so, the amount of the prize.  Retailers and clerks would be required to offer the 
receipts to customers, to ensure accurate results. 
• “Big Win” terminal freeze: Programming terminals to “freeze” automatically 
whenever a significant winning ticket is validated. 
The key with these consumer protection tools is to create a system of checks and 
balances.  As Vice President for External Relations Mary Neubauer told us, “No device, 
no one solution is going to be a perfect panacea.”114 
But simply offering these tools to customers is not enough.  Lotteries also need to educate 
their customers about the underlying purpose behind each tool, and how to best use them 
so as to maximize their benefit. 
                                                 
114 Sworn Interview of Mary Neubauer at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
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IV. WEAK, REACTIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
Whether illegal activities did occur or the extent of their 
occurrence does not reduce the urgency and importance of 
ensuring that the controls over ticket lotteries are designed, 
implemented and operate consistently to ensure prizes are paid to 
legitimate prize winners. 
— “Controls and Regulation of Atlantic Lottery Corporation  
Ticket Lotteries in Nova Scotia,” report issued  
in October 2007 by the Nova Scotia  
Ministerial Panel on Ticket Lottery Controls 
 
BCLC [British Columbia Lottery Corporation] takes a reactive 
approach, a customer complaint driven approach. In other words, 
BCLC relies on customers to determine that there may be a 
problem and then to report it to BCLC. Of course, the problem 
with this approach is that customers are the ones being duped – if 
they do not know they are being taken advantage of, why would 
they complain? 
— “Winning Fair and Square: A Report on the  
British Columbia Lottery Corporation’s  
Prize Payout Process,” by the  
British Columbia Ombudsman 
 
The previous section of this report explained the need to establish a proactive 
enforcement system to increase the likelihood of detecting scam artists and holding them 
accountable. 
Has the Iowa Lottery established proactive enforcement procedures?  That question is 
examined in this section. 
A. RECORDS SYSTEM INADEQUATE 
1. INVESTIGATORS’ DATABASE IS NOT SEARCHABLE 
In January 2007 the Security Division’s investigators were provided with a new 
electronic database for storing and archiving their case work.  It was the first time in a 
decade that the Lottery’s investigators had an electronic database to catalog and archive 
their work. 
While it has been an improvement, the new database is limited by the fact that it is not 
searchable, according to Investigator Supervisor John Ellison.  We asked if a 
“searchability function” is something that investigators could use.  “And we’re working 
on it,” Ellison replied.  “We’re actually in the process of doing that now.  Our IT 
department is developing a database right now with that criteria.”115 
                                                 
115 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
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Ellison said the unit installed a searchable database around 1990 or 1991.  “It tracked 
everything,” Ellison recalled.  “If we had a retailer call in and say, ‘Hey, I just had a 
burglary or whatever and we've contacted the police department and this is our suspect,’ I 
put that information in and boom, ‘Hey, we had this guy before.’ And I look up that case, 
almost the same MO [modus operandi] and everything.  So it gives you a better feel that 
you're on the right track.” 
Computers became more advanced, however, and Ellison said the program that drove the 
database became obsolete in the mid 1990s.  Without any kind of electronic database, 
Ellison said investigators were left to search their files by hand and memory, a practice 
that continues to this day. 
The lack of a searchable database leaves a gap in the unit’s ability to track patterns.  
When we asked how an investigator would know whether a theft or fraud suspect was a 
“repeat offender,” Ellison replied, “We wouldn’t know.” 
We put the question to recently retired Investigator Larry Steele this way: 
Ombudsman investigator: So essentially all you got is your 
memory and your case files? 
 
Steele: Yeah.116 
But memories have limitations.  In June 2006 Steele himself opened a case file about a 
store clerk who was being prosecuted for stealing tickets from a northwest Iowa 
convenience store.  In doing so, Steele did not realize that he had already opened (and 
closed) another case file in late 2005 regarding the same clerk and the same incident.117 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
1. The Lottery should take whatever action is necessary to enable the Security 
Division to implement, as soon as practically possible, a searchable database for 
the purpose of recording information related to investigations.  The database 
should include a mechanism for storing and searching the names and methods of 
individuals suspected of violating Iowa Code chapter 99G. 
2. INADEQUATE RECORDKEEPING PRACTICES 
One Security Division case involved an employee who was suspected of engaging in 
stealing tickets from an eastern Iowa gas station.  The last note added to the file by the 
Lottery investigator stated: 
I, have been advised that [the] former clerk … has worked 
out a plea bargain arrangement with the … County 
Attorney’s Office.  Terms of the plea bargain, were not 
made public.118 
                                                 
116 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
117 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-100 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-109 (2005). 
118 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-085 (2007). 
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Iowa Courts Online, however, does not list any Lottery-related cases involving the 
suspect clerk.  We spoke with an assistant county attorney, who said she was unable to 
find any documentation verifying that the case was referred to her office.119 
In other words, the clerk was not prosecuted, even though the Lottery file says she was.  
The same phenomenon occurred with at least two other cases.120 
In our review of approximately 122 Security Division case files from 2005 through 2007, 
we found numerous inaccuracies and omissions.  Some files were so incomplete or 
inaccurate that it was impossible to determine what actually occurred without consulting 
other sources. 
The names of suspects and customer complainants were misspelled or incomplete in a 
number of files.  In one case file we found that a phone number, street address, and street 
spelling of a complainant were all incorrect.121 
Handwritten notes of Lottery investigators were usually not included in the files.  We 
learned that two Lottery investigators have routinely shredded their own handwritten 
notes.122  This is despite the fact that both of the Security Division’s managers told us that 
they expect investigators to include their handwritten notes in the files.123 
These practices run counter to standard operating procedures of modern police 
departments.  In addition: 
1. In the 88 files involving alleged internal theft, the suspect was not identified in 
approximately 28.  Two of those 28 suspects were prosecuted but were not 
identified in the case file.124 
2. In at least 17 files there was no indication whether criminal charges were filed 
against the suspect employee. 
3. Only a handful of files involving internal theft included information regarding the 
number of tickets stolen, the retail value of tickets stolen, the number of stolen 
tickets redeemed, and the total amount in cash prizes obtained from the stolen 
tickets. 
We also found no indication that the Security Division maintains a log of store employees 
who have been prosecuted for Lottery-related theft or fraud.  Without such a list, 
institutional memory is perhaps the only way for investigators to know whether a suspect 
clerk has engaged in prior criminal activity, or whether a store has had previous incidents 
involving theft or fraud. 
                                                 
119 Telephone Interview of assistant county attorney by an Ombudsman investigator (Apr. 7, 2008). 
120 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-034 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 07-055 (2007). 
121 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-109 (2007). 
122 Sworn Interview of Ken Moon at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008); Sworn 
Interview of Roger Mott at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
123 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008); Sworn 
Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
124 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-055 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 07-095 (2007). 
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We believe these problems, taken collectively, impede the Security Division’s ability to 
effectively track patterns of criminal activity involving retailers and their employees. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
2. The Lottery’s Security Division should devise and implement a standardized case-
file report for its investigators to log information pertaining to suspects, victims, 
stores and store employees.   
3. The Lottery’s Security Division should devise and implement specific 
investigative documentation standards and guidelines.  A more disciplined 
approach to investigative recordkeeping would improve the integrity of the 
Lottery’s investigations.  Lottery investigators should also receive instructions on: 
 
▪ Retaining any handwritten notes in their case files.   
 
▪ Using a word-processing program for narratives in order to alert them to 
spelling, punctuation and grammar mistakes. 
 
▪ What information must be included and in what specific format.   
B. NO PRIZE PAYOUT INTERVIEWS 
The lotteries in Ontario and British Columbia require prize payout interviews for all prize 
claims of $10,000 or more.  Such interviews enable a lottery investigator to inquire about 
the origins of the winning ticket and to ask whether the prize claimant is a retailer or 
associated with a retailer.  When an interview causes the investigator to find that the 
claim is suspicious, the matter is then referred to police for a full investigation. 
The Iowa Lottery does not conduct prize payout interviews. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
4. The Lottery should adopt and implement a policy requiring prize-payout 
interviews by Security Division investigators of all significant prize claims above 
an appropriate threshold.  The interview should focus on the origins of the 
winning ticket, how the customer validated it, and whether the prize claimant is a 
retailer, or associated with any retailer or retailer employee. 
C. LIMITED OVERSIGHT OF RETAILER PRIZE CLAIMS 
To find retailers and store employees who are using the inherent advantages for improper 
benefit, a lottery needs detailed, searchable data of retailer prize claims.  This includes 
the number of claims, the size of the claims, the frequency of the claims, and how those 
claims compare with specific game odds.  Analysis of such data can help serve as an 
“early warning system” of suspicious activity. 
On this point, the Ontario Ombudsman wrote, “It seems logical that the more accurate 
information the Corporation has at its disposal regarding the incidence of retailer lottery 
wins … the better it will be equipped to assess whether there are security issues relating 
to its various lottery products.”125 
                                                 
125 OMBUDSMAN ONTARIO, A GAME OF TRUST (2007), 
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Towards this end, several Canadian lotteries now require retailers and store employees to 
identify themselves when claiming a major prize.  Since some retailers and employees 
might try to avoid making such an identification when claiming a prize, the lotteries in 
Ontario and Québec have devised a rather simple yet effective way to close that loophole. 
A recent report by the Québec lottery, for example, explained that the lottery has made 
“e-learning training mandatory for retailers and their employees in order to obtain a 
confidential access code for operating the terminal.”126  In order to complete the 
mandatory e-training, retailers and employees must enter their names into an electronic 
register managed by the lottery. 
This allows the lottery to compare the names on the electronic register with the names of 
all prize claimants.  The Québec lottery report said that more than 13,000 retailers and 
store employees had registered their names as of November 2008. 
1. IOWA RETAILERS NOT REQUIRED TO SELF-IDENTIFY WHEN CLAIMING 
A PRIZE 
During interviews, both Braafhart and Ellison agreed that it would be a good idea for the 
Lottery to require retailers and their employees to identify themselves as such when they 
claim a high-tier prize.  “In this day and age and since the Canadian scandal up there, it 
would be a pretty simple way to check to see if we've got a clerk winning multiple 
times,” Braafhart told us.127 
Managers in other divisions were less enthusiastic about the idea of requiring retailers 
and employees to identify themselves as such when claiming a high-tier prize. When we 
said that we did not see the harm of requiring retailers to self-identify when claiming a 
high-tier prize, Vice President for External Relations Neubauer responded, “You don’t 
see the harm.  I don’t see the advantage.”128 
2. “QUARTERLY DUPLICATE WINNERS” REPORTS 
Within a week of receiving the October 5, 2007, letter of notice for this investigation, the 
Lottery began conducting a formal review of individuals who claim multiple high-tier 
prizes in any given quarter.129 
Under this initiative, Lottery staff generate quarterly reports that identify individuals who 
have claimed more than one high-tier prize during a particular three-month period.  The 
list does not differentiate between retailers and non-retailers.  Upper management then 
discusses the contents of each quarterly report.  One participant told us that these 
quarterly discussions typically last five to ten minutes.130 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.ombudsman.on.ca/media/3268/a_game_of_trust_20070326.pdf. 
126 LOTO-QUEBEC, ACTION PLAN FURTHER TO KPMG RECOMMENDATIONS- REVIEW OF PRIZE PAYMENT 
PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES (2008), www.loto-
quebec.com/corporatif/pdf/documentsinterets/tableau_suivi_KPMG_ang.pdf. 
127 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
128 Sworn Interview of Mary Neubauer on at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sep. 15, 2008). 
129 Sworn Interview of Therese Spaulding at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008); 
Sworn Interview of Steve King at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
130 Sworn Interview of Steve King at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
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The effort is intended to identify prize claims that appear to be suspicious, which could 
then be referred to the Security Division for a formal investigation.  Several participants 
told us that they were not aware of any formal investigations triggered by the quarterly 
reviews.131  Investigator Supervisor John Ellison said he thought there had been one 
formal investigation, but he could not recall the specifics.132 
While this initiative shows promise, we believe it is not being utilized in a way that 
would yield meaningful results. 
a. Report parameters are too restrictive 
The Lottery’s quarterly reports exclude any prizes claimed before April 2006.  The 
reports also exclude many prizes claimed between April 2006 and the quarter under 
review.  We found that the only time that an individual’s previous prize claims are 
included is when the individual had a previous quarter with multiple high-tier prize 
claims. 
As a result: 
• If Lottery Player “A” claimed three $1,000 prizes in one quarter and a $100,000 
prize in a prior quarter, the report would only include the three $1,000 prize 
claims. 
• If Lottery Player “B” claimed a $25,000 prize in one quarter and a $250,000 prize 
in another quarter, the report would not include either claim. 
• If Lottery Player “C” was a store clerk who claimed a $250,000 prize in one 
quarter and had claimed seven other high-tier prizes totaling $16,000 before April 
2006, the report would not include any of those prize claims. 
If we had used these same parameters for our investigation, we would have missed many 
of the prize claims identified in Section I and Appendix G of this report. 
b. Review parameters are too restrictive 
Lottery officials who participate in these reviews told us that investigations are generally 
deemed unnecessary for prize claims involving games that have better odds of winning 
than other games. 
“I’d say almost all of them in our opinion do not come across as suspicious,” explained 
Validations Manager Spaulding, who produces the quarterly reports.133 
Vice President for External Relations Mary Neubauer explained, “In general people who 
are claiming multiple prizes are loyal players who play our games quite frequently, and 
when you do that it increases your chances of winning.”134 
                                                 
131 Sworn Interview of Therese Spaulding at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008); 
Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008); Sworn 
Interview of Steve King at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
132 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
133 Sworn Interview of Therese Spaulding at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
134 Sworn Interview of Mary Neubauer at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept.15, 2008). 
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If management decides that more information is needed about a particular repeat winner, 
sales staff in that area are contacted.  “I did call two regional managers at one point just 
to gather a little more information,” said Vice President for Marketing Joe Hrdlicka.  
“Because these were retailers.  ‘Tell me about these retailers.’  ‘They’re regular players, 
they do win.’  But nothing I learned from those conversations constituted anything 
irregular or inappropriate.”135 
It is true that some games have better odds, and this in turn may cause some people to 
buy tickets for those games at a higher rate.  But this does not mean that prize claims 
involving those games cannot involve fraud or theft, especially since the Lottery’s 
consideration of these prize claims does not include a detailed analysis comparing the 
game odds, the number of wins, or the number of tickets reportedly purchased by the 
repeat winners. 
c. Lottery concerned about offending retailers 
Several Canadian lotteries have adopted policies requiring that major prize claims (i.e., 
$10,000 or more) by retailers, store employees, and members of their immediate families 
be automatically investigated to determine whether the tickets were obtained legitimately. 
The Iowa Lottery does not automatically investigate any prize claims by retailers or store 
employees, though Security Division managers agreed that such a practice would be a 
good enforcement tool.136 
In fact, Lottery management expressed reluctance to launch investigations of high-tier 
winners, which they said includes retailers and store employees.137  We found that this 
reluctance greatly limits the usefulness of the “quarterly duplicate winner” reviews. 
Validations Manager Spaulding cited the example of the northern Iowa retailer who has 
claimed at least 67 prizes over the past several years for a total of $100,626.  “He takes 
offense to anyone, you know, questioning how much he's spending on his lottery 
products,” Spaulding explained.  She added, “That's why you hate to send in an 
investigator right away to start interviewing the claimant because we don't want to offend 
our players either.” 
Spaulding said that this retailer has specifically requested no publicity about any of his 
prize claims.  “He expressed a real hesitation with any publicity or inquiry into his 
playing habits,” Spaulding said. 
d. Conclusion 
Vice President for Finance Steve King told us that the goal of the “quarterly duplicate 
winners” reports was to take what the Canadians have been doing and “go one step 
further.”138  That is a laudable goal, but in reality this initiative pales in comparison to 
what the Canadian lotteries have been doing. 
 
                                                 
135 Sworn Interview of Joe Hrdlicka at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 7, 2008). 
136 Sworn Interviews of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008); Sworn 
Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
137 Sworn Interview of Therese Spaulding at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
138 Sworn Interview of Steve King at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
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3. PROHIBITING RETAILERS FROM PERSONAL USE OF LOTTERY 
PRODUCTS WHERE THEY WORK 
In British Columbia, lottery retailers and employees are restricted from purchasing, 
playing, or validating personal lottery tickets at their location of employment.139 
We found that several Iowa retailers already have instituted similar restrictions on their 
own employees.140 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
5. The Lottery should explore the merits of amending Iowa Code chapter 99G to 
prohibit retailers and store employees from purchasing and redeeming Lottery 
products at their place of employment.  The purpose is to offset the inherent 
retailer advantages. 
6. The Lottery should develop and implement a program of mandatory e-registration 
for all Iowa retailers and store employees, similar to the programs already 
developed by the lotteries in Ontario and Québec.  The program should require 
retailers and employees to electronically register their names and other pertinent 
information before they can obtain a confidential access code necessary for 
operating an Iowa Lottery terminal. 
7. The Lottery should modify its administrative rules to adopt the following terms, 
definitions and insider win procedures: 
 
A ‘‘related party’’ is someone with a connection to an Iowa Lottery retailer. 
‘‘Related parties’’ include any directors, officers, partners, owners, and 
employees of licensed retailers, and their immediate family members, including 
spouse (whether married or common law relationship), children, parents, siblings 
and any other relatives who reside with them. 
 
‘‘Insiders’’ are a subset of ‘‘related parties’’ and include, among others, lottery 
retailers, their employees who sell and redeem lottery products, and their 
immediate families. 
 
Individuals falling into either of these two classifications and who claim a prize 
will be subject to insider win procedures to be defined by the Iowa Lottery.  It is 
the responsibility of the related party/insider to advise the Iowa Lottery of their 
relationship to a licensed retailer upon claiming their prize. 
 
A “suspicious claim” is defined as a prize claim whereby the Iowa Lottery is not 
satisfied that the claimant is a legitimate winner and there exists a perceived or 
apparent criminal activity. All suspicious claims will be referred to law 
enforcement for investigation. 
                                                 
139 British Columbia Lottery Corp., Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.bclc.com/app/Footer/FAQ.asp?category=Lotteries (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). 
140 These prohibitions were referenced in the following case files: Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-133 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-008 (2007); Iowa 
Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-045 (2007); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, 
Case No. 07-077 (2007). 
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8. The Lottery should modify its “Winner Claim Form” to include a question about 
whether the claimant is a “related party.”141  The “Winner Claim Form” already 
requires claimants to declare, under penalty of perjury, that the information 
supplied is true and correct. 
9. The Lottery’s Security Division should begin tracking and analyzing high-tier 
prize claims by “related parties.”  This includes the number of claims, the size of 
the claims, the frequency of the claims, and how those claims compare with 
specific game odds. 
10. The Lottery’s Security Division should investigate any prize claim above an 
appropriate threshold when the claimant is identified as a “related party.”  The 
primary purpose would be to determine whether the ticket was obtained 
legitimately. 
D. POTENTIAL LAUNDERING OF STOLEN TICKETS 
One store clerk who was prosecuted for internal theft submitted a voluntary statement to 
police which stated: 
It started off small; only scratching a few tickets off at 
work and redeeming them elsewhere.  After a while it 
started getting worse.  I would take about twenty tickets or 
so home per shift.  After a while with them not finding out, 
I started taking tickets from the back of the packs.  This 
was around the end of my tenure there.  I did take a few 
packs that were unopened.  I know it was wrong and I 
deeply wish that I hadn't done it.  I gave the tickets to [a 
friend] and he would cash them in Iowa City….  I am 
very sorry about the whole thing and would like to 
apologize to everybody I stole from. [emphasis added]142 
That clerk and his friend both pled guilty to Lottery theft, and each was ordered to pay 
$3,828 in restitution to the store for the retail value of the stolen tickets.  This was an 
unsuccessful attempt at laundering, where a retailer or store employee steals tickets, then 
gives them to a third party to cash the winners. 
Laundering has also been used by some retailers and store employees to try to conceal 
prize winnings gained through tickets stolen from customers.  A Louisiana store clerk 
who stole a customer’s winning ticket worth $800,000 in 2008 gave the ticket to her 
mother, who claimed the prize winnings.  Both the clerk and her mother were arrested 
and charged.143 
 
 
                                                 
141 A copy of the Lottery’s current “Winner Claim Form” is attached as Appendix H. 
142 Voluntary statement to police by clerk who was the subject of Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-011 (2005). 
143 Leslie Williams, Store Clerk Stole Winning Lottery Ticket, Police Say, TIME-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), 
Sept. 24, 2008, at 4. 
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A $1.4 million ticket stolen by an Arizona retailer in 2005 was also laundered.  The 
retailer gave the ticket to her sister, who claimed the prize winnings.144  These cases show 
the need to review not just prizes claimed by retailers and their employees, but also 
individuals with a close connection to retailers. 
We found several high-tier Iowa Lottery prizes claimed by relatives of store employees 
who were suspected of stealing tickets, none of which appear to have been detected by 
Lottery investigators.  For example, one store clerk was discovered in November 2005 by 
her employer to have been stealing instant tickets.145  Our investigation revealed that six 
months prior, the clerk’s boyfriend had claimed a $25,000 instant-ticket prize.146 
We also found major prizes claimed by relatives of store employees who were not 
suspected of stealing tickets.  In March 2006, for example, the Lottery issued a press 
release about a man who claimed a $30,000 instant ticket prize.  The press release said 
his wife was the manager of the convenience store where he had purchased the ticket.147 
Similarly, in April 2001, the Lottery issued a press release about a woman who claimed a 
$25,000 instant ticket prize.  The press release said she bought the ticket at the gas station 
where her husband was the manager, and that he even redeemed the ticket for her.148 
There is certainly not enough information to conclude that such claims involved fraud or 
theft.  But at the same time, it would be naïve to rule out impropriety without a proper 
investigation.  The phenomenon of laundering could be extremely difficult to track, and 
would, therefore, allow a retailer or store employee to hide potentially criminal conduct 
and make money in the process. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
11. The Lottery should explore procedures and practices to improve its ability to 
detect laundering of tickets obtained by theft or fraud. 
E. INADEQUATE PUBLICITY PROCEDURES 
1. NO PRESS RELEASES FOR SOME SIGNIFICANT PRIZE CLAIMS 
The Lottery has an administrative rule which states: 
By submitting a claim, the player agrees that the prize 
winner’s name may be used for publicity purposes by the 
lottery.149 
 
                                                 
144 David Pittman, Clerk Accused of Stealing $1M Lottery Ticket, TUCSON CITIZEN, Aug. 19, 2005, at 1A. 
145 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-109 (2005). 
146 Based on our review of the Lottery’s database of prize claimants and court records through Iowa Courts 
Online Search, http://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us/ESAWebApp?SelectFrame (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
147 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, Alden Man Cheers up with $30,000 Win (Mar. 8, 2006) (on file with 
author). 
148 Multi-Dollar Scratch Games Pay Off, VIP CONNECTION NEWSLETTER (Iowa Lottery, Des Moines, 
Iowa), Aug. 2001, at 3. 
149 IOWA ADMIN. CODE 531-11.1(2) (2009). 
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The Lottery typically transmits a press release to announce prize claims of $10,000 or 
more.  However, we found a number of major prize claims for which there were no press 
releases.  Here are some examples:150 
1. An Ottumwa man won $100,000 on January 21, 2005. 
2. A Des Moines man won $100,000 on December 2, 2005. 
3. A Sibley man won $200,000 on February 21, 2006. 
4. A Lenox man won $100,000 on June 12, 2006. 
5. A Davenport woman won $200,000 on September 22, 2006. 
6. A Des Moines woman won $100,000 on October 30, 2006. 
We asked the Lottery why it did not transmit press releases for certain major prize claims.  
In response, Lottery officials said they do not issue a press release when the claimant 
requests no publicity.151  While this may seem reasonable, it also creates an opportunity 
for retailers and store employees to claim major prizes without the general public 
learning about it. 
In addition, the Lottery said it occasionally does not issue a press release, even when the 
claimant does not object to a press release.  A recent situation in Ontario shows what can 
happen when there is no publicity of a retailer’s major prize claim.  A store owner 
claimed a $5.7 million lottery jackpot in 2005.  Two years later, the store owner was 
arrested and charged with stealing the winning ticket from a customer. 
A newspaper report about the charges, which were announced in December 2007, said 
that “a search of newspaper databases and news releases did not uncover any public 
report about the lottery jackpot” when it was claimed, even though the Ontario lottery 
claimed that it had issued a news release about the retailer’s prize claim.152 
2. LOTTERY EMPLOYEES DISCOURAGED FROM IDENTIFYING PRIZE 
WINNERS AS RETAILERS 
We found at least 43 Lottery press releases over the past several years which identified 
prize winners as retailers or store employees.  This included at least six such press 
releases in 2007. 
In mid-2008 we noticed that none of the Lottery’s press releases up to that point in the 
year had identified any of the prize winners as retailers or employees. 
When we interviewed Lottery officials in mid-September, we asked why no press 
releases issued to that point in 2008 had identified a prize winner as a retailer or 
employee.  Then-Public Affairs Manager Tina Potthoff said that her unit had been 
discouraged from identifying retailers in press releases about major prize winners.153 
                                                 
150 Based on our review of the Lottery’s database of prize claimants. 
151 Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, to Ombudsman investigator (Aug. 6, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
152 Shannon Kari, Jackpot Awarded Without Insider Probe, NAT’L PROBE (Toronto), Dec. 21, 2007, at A6. 
153 Sworn Interview of Tina Potthoff at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
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Asked where the discouragement came from, Potthoff told us, “It’s kind of been a 
collective decision” which had “been talked about at senior staff meetings.” 
Potthoff later added: 
[I]f I were to write a press release about a retailer that I 
hesitate to put the fact that she’s a retail clerk in the release 
is also for his or her protection too as a retailer….   
 
[T]o have that in the headline and sometimes local small 
town newspapers will take that exact thing and throw it in 
their newspaper, it also just doesn’t seem right, I guess. 
When we asked then-Acting CEO Brickman about this, he responded, “I’m not aware of 
any reason why there should have been any change.”  He added that “there was no 
attempt to hide it. That I’m aware of.”154 
About three weeks after these exchanges, the Lottery issued a press release which 
identified a $50,000 prize winner as a store employee – the first such press release in all 
of 2008.155 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
12. The Lottery should devise and implement a new policy requiring that press 
releases will be issued for all prize claims of $10,000 or more, except in 
extenuating circumstances.  The policy should require that prize claimants who 
are retailers or employees must be identified as such in the press release. 
13. The Lottery should establish a new administrative rule declaring that, except in 
extenuating circumstances, claimants of prizes $10,000 or more must consent to 
the Iowa Lottery publishing the claimant’s name and a current photograph. 
F. INADEQUATE INTEGRITY TESTING 
Integrity testing involves having individuals go to stores posing as lottery customers to  
engineer situations which test whether store employees will engage in impropriety.  The 
British Columbia Ombudsman referred to integrity testers as “mystery shoppers.” 
“The mystery shoppers should also be educated in the different ways that an 
unscrupulous retailer may attempt to defraud a player and be asked to test these,” the 
British Columbia Ombudsman wrote.  “Finally, mystery shoppers should be specifically 
directed to those retailers that have been suspected of engaging in retailer fraud.” 156 
 
                                                 
154 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
155 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, Monona County Woman Wins $50,000 Lottery Prize (Oct. 8, 2008) (on 
file with author). 
156 OMBUDSMAN BRITISH COLUMBIA, WINNING FAIR AND SQUARE: A REPORT ON THE BRITISH COLUMBIA 
LOTTERY CORPORATION’S PRIZE PAYOUT PROCESS (2007), 
http://www.ombud.gov.bc.ca/resources/reports/Special_Reports/Special%20Report%20No%20-
%2031.pdf. 
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“The mere knowledge that retailers might be visited by one of these undercover agents 
would serve as an excellent means of deterrence and publication of the results of visits 
would provide a constant reminder of the importance of respecting the rules,” the Ontario 
Ombudsman wrote. 157 
Until February 2009, it had been a number of years since the Iowa Lottery’s Security 
Division proactively tested stores to see if they were trying to cheat customers.  “We 
would go out undercover, not only us but sometimes we’d get a DCI agent to go in and 
purchase tickets and then check those tickets to see if there was anything wrong,” retired 
Investigator Larry Steele told us.158  Steele said investigators would document their 
findings on a checklist that had been developed for these store checks. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
14. The Lottery’s Security Division should consider adopting a formal integrity 
testing or “mystery shoppers” program. 
15. The Lottery should develop an incentive program for retailers and store 
employees to make suggestions to the Lottery for improving security procedures 
and policies. 
G. WEAK SYSTEM OF SECURITY COMPLIANCE AUDITS 
Some lotteries conduct security compliance audits to proactively audit retailers’ 
compliance with the lottery’s rules and regulations.  This can include checking whether 
retailers: 
• Require customers to sign their tickets before accepting them for validation. 
• Provide customers with a receipt after validating tickets. 
• Point the “customer display unit” toward customers. 
Iowa Code section 99G.35(1) (2009) states in part: 
The lottery security office shall perform all of the following 
activities in support of the authority mission: 
 
b.  Inspect at times determined solely by the authority the 
facilities of any vendor or lottery retailer in order to 
determine the integrity of the vendor’s product or the 
operations of the retailer in order to determine whether the 
vendor or the retailer is in compliance with its contract. 
We found that Iowa Lottery staff from various departments conduct unannounced spot 
checks of licensed retailers on an occasional basis.  But the focus is not generally on 
customer security matters.  We found that management views the spot checks 
predominantly as a marketing or sales tool.   
                                                 
157 OMBUDSMAN ONTARIO, A GAME OF TRUST (2007), 
http://www.ombudsman.on.ca/media/3268/a_game_of_trust_20070326.pdf. 
158 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
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Vice President for External Relations Mary Neubauer explained: 
The people involved in those checks include some 
members of our sales staff, they also include members of 
our security staff and members of our marketing and 
accounting staffs.  Those folks will go out at different times 
throughout the year and do unannounced spot-checks of a 
retail location to ensure, for example, that the correct 
signage is up in the store, that retailers are handling the 
products appropriately. They check for a variety of 
different items depending upon which department of the 
lottery is involved.159 
In fact, the spot checks conducted by sales and marketing staff do not monitor retailer 
compliance with the Licensing Terms and Conditions, according to Vice President for 
Marketing Joe Hrdlicka.160  We found that staff from sales and marketing departments 
conduct at least as many of these spot checks as Security Division investigators. 
Moreover, in recent years, the Security Division has used a generic sheet which provided 
no indication of what specifically was checked, what was ordered to be fixed, or what 
was considered to be a violation of Licensing Terms and Conditions.  As a result, these 
checksheets did not allow Lottery management to know what their investigators actually 
observed when they conducted their spot checks of stores that sell Lottery tickets. 
Regardless of what problems might have been remedied during investigators’ spot 
checks, without a written record of those checks, no Lottery official would be able to 
track retailers that exhibit a pattern of non-compliance. 
As of fall 2008, in response to our investigation, a revised checklist for these spot checks 
was drawn up by managers from the sales and marketing departments, according to then-
Acting CEO Brickman.161  Asked why the new lists were not drawn up by Security 
Division staff, Brickman replied, “Because they really aren’t Security issues.” 
While the new, more detailed checklists are an improvement, they omit some items we 
would like to see checked, and they take on some marketing functions we believe are best 
checked by others at the Lottery. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
16. The Lottery’s Security Division should conduct random and comprehensive 
security compliance audits of retail outlets to ensure compliance with the 
Lottery’s rules and impose sanctions for any violations, as appropriate. 
 
 
 
                                                 
159 Sworn Interview of Mary Neubauer at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
160 Sworn Interview of Joe Hrdlicka at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 7, 2008). 
161 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
 65
17. Security compliance audits should be confined to security-related issues and 
should include checks for proper positioning of the Customer Display Units 
(CDUs), Ombudsman stickers, and evidence of “pickouts” and other fraud or 
theft.  All items to be checked should be included on a single form and 
investigators should document problems observed.  Any noncompliance with 
Licensing Terms and Conditions should be communicated to management for 
consideration of appropriate license sanctions. 
H. RETAILER BACKGROUND CHECKS 
A lottery can require that license applicants undergo a background check.  This allows a 
lottery to screen out applicants with relevant criminal convictions (such as theft, fraud, or 
illegal gambling activity) and/or applicants who cannot demonstrate financial 
responsibility sufficient to adequately meet the requirements of being a licensed lottery 
retailer (such as someone with a history of bankruptcy or major credit problems). 
1. IOWA LOTTERY CONDUCTS RETAILER BACKGROUND CHECKS 
This is one proactive enforcement procedure that the Iowa Lottery has been using for 
many years.  In his November 5, 2007, letter of response, then-Acting CEO Brickman 
wrote: 
All applicants for lottery retail licenses undergo 
background checks by the Iowa Division of Criminal 
Investigation and anyone who has been convicted of fraud, 
a felony or a gambling violation is not licensed as a lottery 
retailer in Iowa. 162 
2. STORE EMPLOYEES NOT CHECKED 
As noted above, people with certain types of criminal convictions are automatically 
disqualified, by law, from being licensed as an Iowa Lottery retailer. 
But those same individuals face no such barrier if they want to sell Lottery tickets as a 
retail employee because the Lottery does not require a licensed retailer’s employees to 
undergo any kind of a background check.  They can sell Lottery tickets and check tickets 
for customers.  They also can control the redemption process at the retail level, and can 
conceivably pay themselves for any winning ticket of $600 or less (which make up the 
vast majority of all winning tickets). 
This means that the Lottery’s requirement for background checks does not apply to the 
majority of Lottery ticket sellers.  To put this into perspective, among the 88 internal theft 
cases we reviewed, the Lottery’s files referenced at least 103 suspects.  None of those 
103 suspects was a store owner.  This means that the suspects in all internal theft cases 
from 2005 through 2007 were individuals who had not been subjected to a criminal 
background check by the Lottery before being allowed to sell and handle Lottery tickets. 
 
 
                                                 
162 These background checks are required by IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.24(7) (2009). 
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Based on our review of court records, if background checks had been done on those 103 
individuals, nine would have come back with “hits” (prior convictions for fraud, a felony, 
or a gambling violation, the same criteria for disqualifying a license applicant). And if 
theft convictions were also included, the number of “hits” would have grown to 21.163 
Here are three examples of internal theft suspects who had prior criminal convictions: 
1. A northwest Iowa convenience store clerk was suspected of stealing tickets and 
cash worth $64.75 from a Pull-tab vending machine.  He was not prosecuted.  The 
investigator’s notes said the clerk was “an unregistered sex offender, and illegal 
alien, also wanted for terrorism in his native country of Nicaragua and has been 
turned over to Federal authorities.”164 
2. A central Iowa store clerk pled guilty to stealing 13 instant tickets with a retail 
value of $130.  She had previously been convicted of felony-level forgery (two 
counts); felony-level burglary; and fourth-degree theft, according to court 
records.165 
3. An employee of a contractor hired to clean the Lottery’s Mason City regional 
office was prosecuted for stealing $167 worth of instant tickets from the office.  
She had a previous conviction for felony-level fraud.  There was no indication in 
the Lottery’s case file that staff was aware of her prior fraud conviction, either 
before or after she stole the tickets.  She also had a prior conviction for fifth-
degree theft.166 
 
In response to that incident, recently retired Vice President for Security Harry 
Braafhart told us that the Lottery implemented a policy which “required any 
contractor to provide information on any employee … that works at the Iowa 
Lottery or for any of the regional offices.”167 
If the Lottery had been requiring background checks of store employees, and had it also 
included theft convictions as an automatic disqualifier, there could have been up to 21 
fewer incidents of internal theft from 2005 through 2007.  We believe this might justify a 
recommendation that the Lottery should conduct criminal background checks of all 
individuals who routinely sell Lottery products to the public.168 
However, in discussing this idea with Lottery officials, they expressed significant 
reservations about conducting background checks on all such individuals.  Then-Acting 
CEO Brickman questioned whether such an effort would be cost-effective.  He also 
estimated that there are tens of thousands of employees at the Lottery’s licensed retailers, 
and that turnover rates are likely relatively high.169 
                                                 
163 The actual number of suspects with prior records may be higher, because the suspect was not identified 
in a number of case files which did not lead to prosecution. 
164 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-050 (2005). 
165 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-078 (2005).  Court records show that the woman 
also had previously filed for bankruptcy. 
166 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-062 (2007). 
167 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
168 The final report of the Governor’s Touch Play Task Force, issued March 6, 2006, included a 
“nonconsensus” recommendation to require background checks and licensing of all employees who would 
monitor Touch Play machines. 
169 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
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Most lotteries do not screen individual employees, although the New Jersey lottery 
conducts background checks on both retailers and any employees who handle lottery 
products.170 
Based on this information, we are not recommending that the Lottery require background 
checks on all retail employees.  However, without such checks, it is vital that the Lottery 
give serious consideration to our other recommendations in order to establish and 
promote a strong enforcement system. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
18. The Lottery should propose amending Iowa Code section 99G.24(7)(b) to add 
convictions for theft to the list of disqualifying criteria for retail license 
applicants, allowing for appropriate exceptions. 
I. SUSPECTS GOING TO WORK FOR OTHER LICENSED RETAILERS 
In fall 2007 a grocery store suspected a long-time employee had stolen seven instant 
scratch tickets.  According to the file, the store fired her and did not want to file a police 
report.171  We found that the woman was working for another licensed retailer by the 
following spring.172 
This shows that any theft suspect could obtain employment at other licensed retailers, as 
there is no law or rule to prohibit such activity, even for individuals who have pled guilty 
or otherwise been convicted of stealing Lottery tickets. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
19. The Lottery should consider proposing an amendment to Iowa Code chapter 99G 
to prohibit any individual convicted of violating chapter 99G from handling 
Lottery products for any licensee. 
J. TWO PROCEDURES DESIGNED TO ALERT LOTTERY TO SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY 
Security Division management told us about two additional procedures that were 
designed to proactively alert investigators to suspicious activity at stores.  However, 
management also acknowledged that neither has produced meaningful results. 
1. SUSPICIOUS VALIDATIONS REPORTS 
When a retailer swipes the same non-winning ticket through a terminal numerous times, 
that can be a possible indicator of criminal activity.  With that in mind, the Security 
Division developed a procedure about ten years ago that was designed to alert 
investigators to suspicious validation activity. 
 
                                                 
170 E-mail from New Jersey Lottery Public Information Office to Ombudsman investigator (Jan. 8, 2009) 
(on file with author); New Jersey Lottery, Information for Retailers, 
http://www.state.nj.us/lottery/general/6-5-1_retailer.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
171 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-107 (2007). 
172 Based on our review of court and police records. 
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Recently retired Vice President for Security Braafhart explained: 
If there was what we called suspicious validations, if there 
were several nonwinning tickets in a row that were scanned 
or if there was a ticket number that was scanned several 
times with a different validation code, usually it was Larry 
[Steele] that would contact this retailer and say, ‘Hey, I 
think we've got something maybe you want to take a look 
at.’  And that doesn't address the fact that it could be the 
retailer, I understand that.173 
Investigator Supervisor Ellison, however, told us that this procedure has not been 
particularly useful, and is instead most commonly used to supplement investigations that 
are already open. 
2. ACTIVITY CONCERNS REPORTS 
These reports compare a store’s sales activity for the month with sales activity at the 
same store for previous months.  Investigator Supervisor Ellison explained: 
And let's say this is a retailer, we’ve got a 2000 percent 
increase in sales.  Okay, do we have a promotion going on, 
what's going on here, are we giving away tickets at that 
store or whatever or do we have a theft problem.  So it will 
catch – at least alert us, give us a red flag anyway on 
something like this happening.174 
When this procedure was introduced several years ago, Ellison said the goal was to be 
more proactive.  But that goal, he added, has not been realized, in part because most large 
increases in sales have been due to non-criminal factors such as special Lottery 
promotions.  As a result, instead of being used proactively, Ellison said the reports have 
been used to supplement investigations that are already open. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
20. The Lottery’s Security Division should review its “activity concerns” and 
“suspicious validations” procedures to determine the feasibility of improvements 
that would enable these procedures to proactively and reliably alert the Division 
to possible criminal activity. 
                                                 
173 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
174 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
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K. CONCLUSION 
Iowa Lottery officials agree that victims of a retailer scam artist will not complain if they 
do not realize they were scammed.  But when we asked how the Lottery detects such 
incidents, then-Acting CEO Brickman responded: 
Unless someone knows themselves that they've been 
scammed or somehow it comes to their attention that they 
should have taken care of the situation better and been 
more knowledgeable and somehow bring it to the attention 
of the lottery, we have no way of knowing.175 
Because many Lottery scams can go undetected, Lottery investigators agree that retailers 
and their employees should be held to a higher standard.  But when asked how they are 
held to a higher standard, Lottery investigators responded: 
•  “You know, I don't know.  I mean I agree that they should be held to a higher 
standard somehow and I don't know how that could be done.” 
 
— Retired Vice President for Security Braafhart176 
• “Well, they're not.” 
 
— Investigator Supervisor Ellison177 
• “How does the lottery hold them to a higher standard. I guess I can't answer that. I 
don't – I don't know how they could or would.” 
 
— Retired Investigator Steele178 
In conclusion, it is clear that the Iowa Lottery has not established effective enforcement 
procedures. 
                                                 
175 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
176 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
177 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
178 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
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V. SIGNIFICANT SHORTFALLS WITH COMPLAINT-HANDLING PRACTICES 
Ombudsman investigator: How did you know whether a complaint 
was best responded to by marketing, security, sales, whatever? 
 
Deana Connelly: I don't. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: So it was a judgment call by you 
individually. 
 
Deana Connelly: Correct. 
— Exchange during September 15, 2008,  
interview of Deana Connelly 179 
 
In addition to its failure to develop a system of proactive enforcement, we found 
significant shortfalls in the Lottery’s handling of the complaints it does receive. 
A. SECURITY-RELATED COMPLAINTS NOT FORWARDED TO SECURITY DIVISION 
In response to our notice of investigation, then-Acting CEO Brickman wrote, “Any issues 
relating to security or matters of impropriety are referred to the lottery’s security 
department.”180 
We can confidently say that this statement was not supported by the Lottery’s own 
records. 
1. SELLING A MONTH-OLD, LOSING TICKET 
While getting gas in April 2006, a man bought a Powerball ticket at a store in eastern 
Iowa.  After getting back to his home in Illinois, he realized the ticket was for a drawing 
that had been held a month before.  It was not a winner. 
He e-mailed the Lottery to complain about the incident.  His e-mail described what had 
happened, expressed his displeasure, and included his phone number.  “I never got a 
response on that,” the man said when we contacted him.  “I never knew if they checked 
into it or not.  I would have recalled, because I’m pretty thorough in reading my e-
mails.”181 
There is no indication that his complaint was forwarded to the Security Division.  Our 
review of the case files for 2006 found no file was opened relating to this matter.182 
 
                                                 
179 Connelly has been employed as the Lottery’s Licensing Secretary for nine years.  As the primary backup 
to the receptionist, Connelly has routinely fielded telephone calls from customers and retailers.  Sworn 
Interview of Deana Connelly at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
180 See Appendix E. 
181 Asked about this, the Lottery told us that “the electronic record for his inquiry indicates that a reply was 
sent, but we do not have a copy of the response today.” 
182 E-mail from an Illinois customer to Iowa Lottery (Apr. 12, 2006) (on file with author). 
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2. CHARGING A FEE TO REDEEM PRIZES 
A woman called the Lottery in October 2007 to complain about a Des Moines grocery 
store.  She alleged that a clerk had charged a fee when the woman tried to redeem a 
winning ticket. 
The call was received by Linda Young, a secretary in the Marketing Division.  A memo183 
indicated the complaint then went through several employees, none of whom work for the 
Security Division: 
1. Young forwarded the complaint to her boss, Vice President for Marketing Joe 
Hrdlicka. 
2. Hrdlicka assigned the matter to a regional sales manager, Mark Ryan. 
3. Ryan asked Lottery Recruiter Bill Kehoe to contact the store.184 
Kehoe spoke with the store’s customer service manager, who in turn spoke with her 
employees.  The manager said the store’s employees denied charging a fee to redeem a 
winning ticket, and the Lottery effectively closed the complaint as unfounded. 
We find four core problems with how the Lottery handled this complaint: 
1. The complaint was not directly investigated.  The important task of speaking with 
the employees who may have interacted with this customer was deferred to store 
management.  This is not an effective way to get to the bottom of a matter, as 
store management has business interests that will not always coincide with the 
Lottery’s security-related interests. 
2. There is no indication that anyone attempted to follow up with the woman who 
filed the complaint. 
3. When we asked about this incident five months later in 2008, the Lottery said it 
did not have any contemporaneous documentation about the complaint. 
4. The complaint was assigned to sales staff instead of the Security Division.185  
Hrdlicka told us that the caller did not provide “very much specific information” 
and that was why he assigned it to sales staff.  By contrast, a nearly identical 
complaint received by Young later that same month did get forwarded to the 
Security Division for investigation.186   
                                                 
183 The memo was written March 21, 2008, and only in response to our inquiry. 
184 Sworn Interview of Joe Hrdlicka at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 7, 2008) (A recruiter 
works to set up new retailer accounts). 
185 It is worth noting that we contacted the Lottery about a separate complaint in 2002.  In discussing that 
complaint, a Lottery employee explained that the agency received “lots of calls on complaints” and 
volunteered that, “Complaints are commonly handled by DSRs (district sales representatives).”  During the 
current investigation, recently retired Lottery Investigator Larry Steele told us that it “was not uncommon 
to have a regional manager check something.” 
186 That case (Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-130) (2007) was not handled much 
better. The complaint alleged that two stores in a chain were charging a fee to redeem winning tickets.  The 
complaint was closed after a regional sales manager – not a Security Division investigator – spoke with one 
of the store managers, who denied charging such a fee.  The second store was not contacted at all.  John 
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Hrdlicka told us these two complaints were the only two that he is aware of which 
alleged that a retailer had charged a fee to redeem a winning ticket. 
 
Asked if he would handle the first complaint any differently now, Hrdlicka 
replied, “Oh, I would probably refer it to Security.” 
3. TERMINAL SAYS WINNING TICKET ALREADY PAID OUT, BUT 
CUSTOMER NOT YET PAID 
A Waterloo customer had an instant ticket that won $10.  “I took it to cashier and she ran 
it threw [sic],” he wrote in his December 24, 2006, e-mail to the Lottery.  “She said the 
ticket went threw [sic] but did not print nothing out….  She gave me the ticket and said 
try it some other time.”  He tried to redeem the ticket at another store, “but they said it 
was already paid out.” 
The Lottery Web Master187 responded by encouraging the man to take his ticket to the 
Lottery’s regional office in Cedar Rapids or to mail it to Lottery headquarters in Des 
Moines. 
Terminals can occasionally malfunction, a fact that the Lottery has acknowledged to us.  
But retailer fraud is an equally plausible explanation for these incidents.  The Canadian 
investigations found a scam in which store clerks swiped tickets through the terminal 
twice.  If it was a winning ticket, the second try produced a receipt indicating that the 
prize had already been paid out.  In some cases, the clerk gave the winning ticket back to 
the customer, but took and kept the prize money from the cash register after the customer 
left.188 
It is almost impossible to distinguish between a terminal malfunction and retailer fraud 
without investigating the incident in question.  This means that whenever a customer 
alleges that a terminal (or retailer) reported their winning ticket was already paid, or was 
not a winner, that complaint needs to be forwarded to the Security Division for 
investigation.189  As explained above, it would be a better practice not to treat it as a case 
of a malfunctioning terminal without a proper investigation. 
However, we found two customer complaints on this topic that were not forwarded to the 
Security Division.190  Diane McCool, the employee who commonly works as the Web 
Master, confirmed to us that she usually does not forward such cases to the Security 
Division.191 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ellison, Investigator Supervisor, told us that the decision to involve a regional sales manager “was done 
without our knowledge.  And we were not happy.  Because we had plans for that case.” 
187 The Lottery Web Master is the person responsible for fielding e-mail contacts from the public. 
188 Palming could produce similar results, especially if the ticket that is swiped is a small-value prize 
winner that was previously paid out. 
189 We found at least two similar cases which were forwarded to the Security Division: Iowa Lottery 
Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-030 (2007) and Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case 
No. 07-109 (2007). 
190 E-mail from a Waterloo customer to Iowa Lottery (Dec. 24, 2006) (on file with author); E-mail from a 
Sioux City customer to Iowa Lottery (Feb. 7, 2007) (on file with author). 
191 Sworn Interview of Diane McCool at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
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In addition, two other employees192 whose job duties include receiving occasional calls 
from customers told us that they usually forward such calls to the Validations Unit.193 
4. APPROXIMATELY 15 COMPLAINTS NOT FORWARDED 
In reviewing customer e-mails and letters to the Lottery from 2006 and 2007, we found 
approximately 15 security-related complaints that were not forwarded to the Security 
Division. 
There is reason to believe there have been other such examples the Lottery cannot 
account for.  This is because before early 2008, the Lottery did not log phone calls from 
customers who wanted to report a problem or file a complaint.  This means there is no 
way to quantify or track the security-related contacts that should have been forwarded to 
the Security Division but were not. 
5. DELAY 
We also found an example of a delay in forwarding a customer’s complaint to the 
Security Division.  On September 4, 2007, a district sales representative (DSR) working 
out of the Mason City Regional Office documented a conversation with a customer who 
alleged that a grocery store “tried to fool her and her boyfriend into thinking winning 
tickets were actually losers.”194  The customer had already filed a report with local police, 
the sales representative noted. 
One month later (October 5), the same sales representative documented that he was “still 
getting complaints” about the same grocery store trying to convince customers that a 
winning ticket was a non-winner. 
Both reports were forwarded to the Security Division on October 10, more than a month 
after the Regional Office received the initial report.  The DSR apparently did not record 
the customer’s name or how to contact her. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
21. The Lottery should adopt a policy requiring that any customer contacts 
concerning potential retailer fraud or theft must be immediately forwarded to the 
Security Division. 
22. In order to impress upon staff the scope of fraud and theft that can occur, the 
Lottery should provide training for all relevant employees concerning the various 
means and methods of known Lottery crimes. 
23. The Lottery should adopt a policy requiring that the Lottery’s investigative 
actions involving theft or fraud must be performed by Security Division 
investigators. 
                                                 
192 Sworn Interview of Deana Connelly at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008); 
Sworn Interview of Linda Young at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
193 The Validations Unit is responsible for “validating” the authenticity of a winning ticket before a prize is 
paid to the customer who redeems it.  The unit also ensures that the customer has signed the ticket and has 
completed a claim form that helps the Lottery determine whether the customer owes debts to the state. 
194 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-117 (2007). 
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B. INADEQUATE RESPONSES TO ALLEGATIONS OF RETAILERS CHEATING 
CUSTOMERS OUT OF PRIZE MONEY 
From 2005 through 2007, the Security Division opened approximately 34 files that can be 
described as complaints from customers alleging retailer impropriety.195  We found that 
most were not investigated effectively. 
Here are some examples: 
1. INVESTIGATOR DEFERS KEY QUESTION TO STORE MANAGER, THEN 
FOCUSES ON WRONG GAME 
A customer alleged that a convenience store clerk paid him $5 for a ticket that won $100 
in the $100,000 Cash Game.  The investigator reviewed the complaint and closed it as 
“invalid” for two reasons. 
First, at the investigator’s request, the store manager reviewed the store’s security 
videotape.  The manager reported finding nothing suspicious on the tape.  As previously 
noted, relying on store management is not an effective way to get to the bottom of a fraud 
or theft allegation. 
Second, the investigator reviewed records of prize payouts at the store on the day in 
question.  “The only POWERBALL CASHING was for $3.00,” he wrote in the case file.  
It is unclear why the investigator was focusing on Powerball prizes, since the customer 
said the incident involved a ticket for the $100,000 Cash Game.196 
2. CLERK CLAIMS $100 WINNING TICKET IS NOT A WINNER 
After a Powerball drawing, a customer checked the numbers and learned that her ticket 
had won $100.  She took the ticket to a convenience store in Council Bluffs.  As the store 
clerk swiped the ticket through the terminal, the woman saw “$100” flash on the 
customer display unit. 
The clerk, however, claimed the ticket was not a winner.  The woman responded by 
noting that she had seen “$100” flash on the display.  The clerk then scanned the ticket a 
second time; this time the clerk confirmed it was a $100 winner, and paid the woman her 
prize.  The clerk told her that the terminal occasionally does not read tickets correctly. 
Even though she got her $100, the woman called the Lottery the next day.  She explained 
that she “felt the store clerk was trying to cheat her” out of the $100, the investigator 
wrote.197 
                                                 
195 As noted previously, these are the cases where the customer realized something was amiss and decided 
to report it to the Lottery.  In the absence of a proactive enforcement system, there is reason to believe there 
have been other such incidents that went unreported. 
196 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-058 (2007). 
197 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-040 (2007). 
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According to the investigator’s report, Lottery records showed: 
• The ticket was initially scanned at 3:40 p.m. and the clerk pushed “no” when the 
terminal asked whether to cash the ticket.198 
• The ticket was scanned through a second time, at 3:41 p.m., and the prize was 
then paid. 
Under the circumstances, it would have been reasonable to expect that the investigator 
would ask the clerk to explain why she pushed “no” to cashing the ticket, while at the 
same time telling the customer that it was not a winner.  However, the investigator told us 
that he did not contact the clerk.199 
Based on this information, the investigator inexplicably closed the investigation, with a 
note that he “cannot prove intent” to defraud the customer.  When we asked the 
investigator about his rationale for closing the case in that manner, he responded, “The 
customer got paid, as far as I’m concerned the complaint was taken care of, and probably 
her boss talking to her was going to do more good than me.” 
3. NO CONSEQUENCES FOR THREE RETAILERS WHO KEPT HUNDREDS 
OF DOLLARS FROM CUSTOMERS UNDER FALSE PRETENSES 
In a five-month period from late 2005 to early 2006, the Security Division received three 
nearly identical complaints from within a 40-mile radius in northeastern Iowa.200 
The first two complaints, received a month apart, involved owners of gas stations a half 
mile apart in a city in northeast Iowa.  The third complaint involved an employee at a 
small-town convenience store 40 miles away. 
In each case: 
• The retailer redeemed a customer’s $1,000 winning Touch Play ticket (despite the 
fact that Lottery rules prohibit stores from redeeming prizes of more than $600). 
• The retailer paid the customer anywhere from $400 to $800, falsely claiming the 
rest was needed for withholding taxes (even though withholding taxes on a $1,000 
prize would amount to only $50).201 
• The retailer then claimed the $1,000 prize for himself from the Lottery, and in the 
process came out with a profit between $250 and $550.202 
                                                 
198 When a terminal identifies a scanned ticket as a winner, the monitor displays a question, asking whether 
to cash the ticket.  The clerk can press “yes” or “no” to this prompt.  The primary purpose is for situations 
where a store does not have enough cash on hand to pay a prize – but that was not the case in this incident. 
199 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
200 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-072 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-092 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-053 (2006). 
201 Iowa Lottery, Claiming Prizes FAQ, http://www.ialottery.com/faqs/ClaimingPrizes.html (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2009)  (“By law, prizes of more than $600 and less than $5,000 will face a 5 percent state 
withholding tax.”). 
202 One of the gas station owners redeemed two $1,000 winners in this manner.  Both tickets were from the 
same customer.  The owner paid the customer $800 on the first and $700 on the second.  After claiming the 
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• The Security Division did not report any of these incidents to law enforcement or 
prosecutors, and Lottery investigators did not consider whether the retailers’ 
actions were a criminal act under state law.203  When we discussed these three 
cases with recently retired Vice President for Security Braafhart, he agreed that 
the retailers probably did steal money from the customers and that their actions 
were potentially criminal.204 
• The Lottery did not consider imposing license sanctions against the retailers, even 
though two of the cases involved store owners.205  Asked what should have been 
done to those retailers’ licenses, Braafhart told us, “Probably would have at least 
been a suspended license, unless it was a felony charge and then it would have 
had to have been revoked.” 
• The retailer received no sanctions or other consequences for violating the 
Lottery’s redemption rule or for keeping hundreds of dollars from customers 
under false pretenses. 
Two of the retailers in question claimed several other high-tier Touch Play prizes in the 
months before and after these incidents.  These other prize claims raise the possibility 
that the incidents complained about may not have been isolated.  However, the Lottery 
did not investigate any of those other prize claims.206 
The gas station owner in case file 05-072 made five Touch Play prize claims over an 
eight-month period for a total of $4,751.  The convenience store employee in case file 06-
053 made six Touch Play prize claims over a four-month period for a total of $6,787.   
The file shows that the investigator was aware of the first three of those prize claims.207 
In the same two cases (05-072 and 06-053), the investigators wrote that the store agreed 
to pay the customer what she was still owed.  Both investigators told us that they later 
verified with the customers that the store had paid them the proper amount, but neither 
investigator memorialized this important contact in their case notes.  In the third case (05-
092), the investigator did not even attempt to persuade the store owner to make any 
additional payments to the customer.208 
The proximity of these three complaints, in terms of when and where they occurred, 
should have suggested a need to explore the possibilities of a larger pattern of 
impropriety.  But instead, the Lottery worked each case separately, did nothing to hold 
the retailers accountable, and did not explore the possibility of a larger pattern. 
                                                                                                                                                 
$2,000 in prize money for himself, minus the $100 deduction for withholding taxes, he came out with a 
$400 profit. 
203 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.36 (2009) states in part, “Any person who influences or attempts to influence 
the winning of a prize through the use of coercion, fraud, deception, or tampering with lottery equipment or 
materials shall be guilty of a class ‘D’ felony.” 
204 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
205 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-072 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-092 (2005). 
206 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008); Sworn 
Interview of Ken Moon at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
207 In addition, the owners of the convenience store claimed four Touch Play prizes during the same period 
for a total of $4,001, based on our review of the Lottery’s database of prize claimants. 
208 Sworn Interview of Ken Moon at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
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Asked about these cases and their similarities, Investigator Supervisor John Ellison told 
us, “It was a surprise to us that it was even happening. I mean it was. It threw us – I'll tell 
you the truth, didn’t know how to handle it.”209 
We asked recently retired Investigator Larry Steele why he did not pursue the complaint 
any further in case file 06-053.  The interview included this exchange: 
Ombudsman investigator: All we know is that allegedly 
this customer goes in with a $1,000 winner, store only 
gives her 400, keeps the other portion. 
 
Steele: And that was her fault, that was her mistake for not 
collecting the money on the spot. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: That's her fault? 
 
Steele: Yeah. "Give me my money." 
 
Ombudsman investigator: How was she going to compel 
him? Does she have more authority than you? 
 
Steele: She could have called the local authorities or 
whatever. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: But she called you guys. 
 
Steele: Her daughter called.210 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
24. The Lottery should amend its Licensing Terms and Conditions to specifically 
prohibit licensed retailers from charging a fee, withholding a portion of the prize 
payout, or making any kind of a profit, in the process of validating and redeeming 
tickets for customers. 
4. NO CALL TO CUSTOMER TO RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF THEFT OR 
FRAUD 
We found an additional case of concern, although it did not originate as a customer 
complaint.211  A bar owner went to the regional office in Council Bluffs to try to redeem a 
$750 Touch Play ticket.  He said that an employee had cashed out the ticket for a 
customer, whose signature was on the back of the ticket.212 
                                                 
209 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
210 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
211 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-083 (2005). 
212 The Licensing Terms and Conditions prohibits retailers from redeeming winning tickets of more than 
$600. (See Appendix A.)  However, this file gives no indication that this violation was even discussed with 
the bar owner. 
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Staff at the regional office called the Security Division to ask whether they should allow 
the bar owner to redeem the ticket by signing his name under the customer’s name.  The 
investigator’s notes state that he contacted an employee in the accounting division: 
… and told her I was not comfortable have [sic] the bar 
owner sign the slip without some sort of documentation 
relieving the lottery of any liability. 
 
I was sure the employee paid the customer, but just in case 
this did not occur we needed to make the bar owner liable. 
Because the customer’s signature was on the back of the ticket, presumably the 
investigator could have tried to contact the customer to confirm that he or she had already 
received their rightful prize money from the bar.  But the file gives no indication that any 
such attempts were made.  We asked Investigator Roger Mott whether he tried to contact 
the customer in this matter, “I don’t remember if I tried to reach the customer,” Mott 
replied.213  Based on this information, we find that Mott did not attempt to contact the 
customer. 
Instead, Mott prepared an affidavit for the bar owner to sign, relieving the Lottery of any 
liability – “just in case” bar staff had obtained the ticket through fraud and/or theft.  If 
this had been a case of fraud or theft, and if the customer was unaware, the investigator’s 
failure to make contact with the customer virtually guaranteed it would never be detected. 
C. INADEQUATE RESPONSES TO ALLEGATIONS OF “PICKOUTS” 
Of the various lottery-related scams, perhaps the most insidious is referred to as 
“pickouts.”  This is a practice where a store employee takes unsold instant tickets, 
scratches them lightly, “picks out” the winners, and then sells the non-winners to the 
public. 
This scam directly victimizes any customer who is unaware that he has purchased instant 
tickets that were already scratched.  The customer perceives that he has bought legitimate 
instant tickets, but they are in fact guaranteed losers. 
Given the nature of this scam, it is critical that Lottery investigators give serious scrutiny 
to any allegation of pickout activity.  If a customer says he bought instant tickets but later 
discovered they were already scratched, it should signal that there may be other 
customers who were also victimized but did not notice the light scratch marks. 
We found that the Lottery received at least ten separate allegations of pickout activity, or 
possible pickout activity, from 2005 through 2007.214  None received serious scrutiny 
from the Lottery, whose handling of these ten complaints can be broken down as follows: 
• Effectively ignored: Two were effectively ignored, including one that was not 
forwarded to the Security Division. 
                                                 
213 Sworn Interview of Roger Mott at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
214 For analysis of how the Lottery handled these complaints, see Appendix I, “Pickouts case studies.” 
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• Deferred: Four were not investigated by the Security Division, and instead were 
left to others to check into.  Two were deferred to store management.  One was 
deferred to a regional manager in the Lottery’s Marketing Division.  One was 
handled by encouraging the store to file a police report. 
 
In one of these cases, we asked the investigator why he deferred such a potentially 
significant complaint to store management.  “Because that’s the way we’ve 
always done it,” Investigator Mott replied. 
 
As explained previously, this is not an effective way to get to the bottom of a 
matter, as store management may have a private business interest in ensuring that 
no problems are found when a complaint is made. 
• Inadequate investigations: Two were investigated in a manner that we found to 
be inadequate. 
• Suspect prosecuted, Lottery played no meaningful role: Two cases fell in this 
category.  In one case, the Lottery investigator deferred the complaint to store 
management and asked Lottery sales staff, who were not trained investigators, to 
monitor the store.  Within a few hours of taking those steps, the investigator 
received a call from a local police officer, who reported that he had investigated 
the report and was arresting one of the store’s employees. 
Of these ten complaints, none received serious scrutiny by the Lottery.  In addition: 
1. The suspect was not identified in seven of the ten cases.  As a result, if any of 
those individuals became the subject of a subsequent complaint involving 
pickouts, it is not likely that the Lottery would have a way of realizing that it was 
dealing with a repeat offender. 
2. Among the cases where the complaint was substantiated, there is no indication 
that the investigators considered the interests of other customers who may have 
been sold “pickouts” – instant tickets that were actually guaranteed losers – 
without realizing it. 
3. Among the cases that were not substantiated, the investigators did not consider 
using a possible tool – consulting the store’s surveillance video tape to see 
whether it documented the activity that was alleged.  When we asked investigator 
Roger Mott why he did not consult the surveillance tape in one of his “pickout” 
cases, he replied, “Probably should have used it.  Probably dropped the ball on it.” 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
25. The Lottery’s Security Division should implement methods and procedures to 
ensure that reports of alleged “pickout” activity receive priority treatment. 
26. The Lottery should amend its administrative rules to require licensed retailers to 
have functional surveillance video cameras and to grant the Lottery access to 
video recordings upon request. 
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D. INADEQUATE INVESTIGATION OF INTERNAL THEFT CASE INVOLVING UP TO 
$86,000 
We want our retailers to know we’re available to assist them with 
any type of situation they see as suspicious.  That’s why we’re 
here. 
— Lottery Investigator Larry Steele,  
as quoted in the May 4, 1998, edition  
of “Lottery Action” newsletter 
 
Steele advised that as far as he was concerned, the Lottery 
Commission was out of the investigation as it was deemed a case 
of theft which required local law enforcement jurisdiction. 
— December 2006 supplemental entry 
to police investigative file 
 
On August 29, 2006, an eastern Iowa convenience store reported that it had a $15,000 
shortage in its Lottery accounts over a seven-month period. 
The Lottery case file shows that Investigator Larry Steele worked the case for about two 
weeks and believed criminal activity had probably occurred.215  His work culminated in a 
meeting with the store owner and a police officer.  Steele provided the officer with 
spreadsheets detailing the inventory and cashing records of numerous instant-ticket packs 
that the Lottery had provided to the store. 
We also reviewed the police investigative report.  The Lottery file and the police report 
both indicate that the meeting focused on the need for the store to determine its actual 
shortages.  Officials discussed preparing a criminal case against the four employees 
suspected – particularly the store’s manager, who two years before had admitted 
embezzling $37,180 from the same store.216  The other suspects were identified as the 
manager’s boyfriend and her two daughters.217 
 
 
 
                                                 
215 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-122 (2006). 
216 Notarized Statement from store manager to store owner (Nov. 2, 2004), Iowa Lottery Security Report, 
Case No. 06-122 (2006).  While the store manager’s 2004 statement acknowledged that her actions had 
been criminal, the owner did not press charges against the store manager for those actions. 
217 We found that the manager had claimed a $10,000 instant-ticket prize in 1998; and her boyfriend 
subsequently claimed three $9,750 Pick 4 prizes (two in 2007 and one in 2009).  Based on our review of 
the Lottery’s database of prize claimants, and also our review of the Lottery’s online “Big Winners List.” 
Iowa Lottery, Recently Claimed Big Prizes, 
http://www.ialottery.com/WinnersCircle/WinnersCircle_claimedprizes.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). 
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During the meeting with police and the store owner, Steele “stated that the theft of lottery 
tickets … are handled by local law enforcement,” the police officer wrote in her report 
about the meeting.  Steele confirmed to us that he told police and the store owner that he 
could not continue with the investigation.  “I assume when we turn the records over to the 
investigating agency our role ends,” Steele explained.  “Other than maybe testimony at a 
later date for prosecution.”218 
The day after the meeting, Steele typed a one-page report summarizing what had been 
discussed.  We found that Steele did not perform any further substantive work on the 
investigation. 
However, we found five reasons why Steele should have continued with the 
investigation: 
1. SUPERVISOR DISPUTES LIMITED LOTTERY ROLE 
When we asked Steele, “Is your closing out of the investigation simply a matter that your 
hands are tied and that’s all you can do,” he replied, “That’s right.  That’s true.” 
But when we asked Investigator Supervisor John Ellison whether Lottery investigations 
are always local matters, he responded, “No.  That’s an incorrect statement.”219 
Ellison clarified, “If a police department tells us that they’re taking it over and with us 
not having police powers, it’s their baby.”  That was not the situation with this 
investigation, however. 
2. PROFESSIONAL AUDIT FOUND $86,472 IN LOTTERY SHORTAGES AT 
STORE 
In direct response to Steele’s advice, the store owner hired a professional accounting firm 
to audit the store’s records.220  The audit found the shortage involving Lottery instant 
ticket sales went back to 2005 and totaled $86,472221 – much larger than previously 
suspected.222 
The police file shows that the store owner informed a police captain on December 1, 
2006, that the audit had just been completed.  The store owner suggested that Lottery 
Investigator Steele should be notified so that a meeting could be arranged to review the 
findings, according to the captain’s report. 
But when the captain called Steele three days later to seek the Lottery’s continued 
assistance, he was rebuffed.  “Steele advised that as far as he was concerned, the Lottery 
Commission was out of the investigation as it was deemed a case of theft which required 
local law enforcement jurisdiction,” the captain wrote in his report. 
                                                 
218 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
219 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
220 Telephone Interview of store owner by an Ombudsman investigator (Apr. 10, 2008). 
221 Cover Letter and Attachments from RSM McGladrey, Inc. to the store (Nov. 30, 2006) (on file with 
author). 
222 In our review of Lottery files from 2005 through 2007, we only found one case where a store reported a 
larger Lottery-related shortage.  It involved a pharmacy where a part-time employee pled guilty to first-
degree theft and was ordered to pay restitution of $107,137 to the store.  Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 06-140 (2006). 
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The captain documented that Steele also said he “was not sure of what loss the [store] 
could directly attribute to the theft of lottery tickets.”  When we interviewed Steele, he 
explained that he did not believe the store’s Lottery shortages were anywhere near the 
level reported by the store.  “I could not see – personally even come close to what he was 
claiming,” Steele told us. 
However, we found that Steele did not obtain or review the audit report by the 
professional accounting firm – an audit which the store arranged and paid for as a direct 
result of advice from Steele himself.223 
3. TWO WITNESSES NOT CONTACTED 
In his case notes, Steele wrote, “Enclosed and attached is [sic] statements from two 
employees … stating how [the store manager] is taking money and LOTTERY 
SCRACTH [sic] TICKETS, without paying for them.” 
One witness wrote, “I know a lot more information than what is contained in this 
letter.”224  But we found that this witness was not contacted by either the Lottery or the 
police department about this matter.225 
The other witness statement alleged that the suspects kept “stacks” of instant tickets in a 
private vehicle.  We found no indication that this witness was contacted either. 
4. INVESTIGATOR BELIEVED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY PROBABLY OCCURRED 
While Steele expressed doubts about the size of the store’s Lottery-related shortages, he 
had little doubt that crimes had occurred.  Referring to the store manager, Steele told us, 
“I’m sure that she was probably taking tickets and they were cashing them.” 
This was in part based on Steele’s knowledge that the store manager had previously 
admitted to embezzling $37,180 from the same store.  In his case file notes, Steele wrote, 
“Now it appears that [the store manager] is embezzling again.”  He also wrote that the 
store manager “is very well versed at manipulating store recorders [sic] and 
bookkeeping.” 
In addition, a Lottery spreadsheet created at Steele’s request showed sizable increases in 
Lottery activity at the store between 2005 and 2006.  While Steele did not perform his 
own calculations of the data on the spreadsheet, he told us that he knew the increases 
were “fairly large.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
223 We obtained a copy of the professional audit from the store owner, as there is no copy of the audit in the 
Lottery case file. 
224 Witness statement, Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-122 (2006). 
225 Telephone Interview of witness by an Ombudsman investigator (Aug. 13, 2008). 
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Our calculations of the data on the spreadsheet showed:226 
• Net sales: A 54 percent increase in net sales (from $135,142 to $208,654, an 
increase of $73,512). 
• Prize payouts: A 72 percent increase in prize payouts (from $45,776 to $78,646, 
an increase of $32,870).  This was money ultimately paid out by the Lottery.227 
We found no indication that Steele determined the amount of those prize payouts for 
tickets that may have been stolen. 
5. POLICE INVESTIGATION HAS LANGUISHED 
Local police obtained the audit report from the store owner and the department’s 
investigation remains open.  But the police captain told us “it’s languished” in part 
because analyzing the professional audit “is like reading Greek.”228 
“It would be great if the Lottery Commission would go in, do their own internal 
investigation and send us a report based on their calculations,” the captain added.  “It 
would be nice to be able to fall back on them, since it’s their bailiwick, and let them tear 
it up.” 
6. CONCLUSION 
This is a major theft case.  The investigation has stagnated for two years.  Charges have 
not been filed and are not seriously contemplated. 
By contrast, internal-theft suspects in other cases have been prosecuted for stealing as 
little as $36 worth of tickets and even $26 worth of tickets.229  We also found a case file 
involving a customer who was prosecuted for stealing ten instant tickets that had little or 
no value.  He tried to redeem them at another store, but the terminal reported that the 
tickets had already been redeemed.230 
This case, which involved up to $86,000 in stolen tickets, “was definitely prosecutable,” 
the store owner told us. 
Lottery Investigator Steele saw this case a bit differently.  He referred to the fact that the 
store owner had continued to employ the manager after her previous admission of 
criminal activity.  “Let's just say you get bit once, too bad,” Steele told us. “You get bit 
the second time, shame on you, and that’s what happened here.” 
 
                                                 
226 Using figures on the Lottery spreadsheet, we compared the store’s Lottery-related activity for the first 
eight months of 2005 and the first eight months of 2006.  The Lottery’s spreadsheet was created on or 
about August 30, 2006, and therefore did not reflect activity for the final four months of 2006. 
227 The Lottery automatically credits stores for such prize payouts.  This issue will be examined in greater 
detail in Section VI of this report. 
228 Telephone Interview of police captain by an Ombudsman investigator (Apr. 10, 2008). 
229 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-106 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-085 (2005). 
230 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-080 (2005) and the police incident report. 
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E. PRIZE CLAIM HISTORIES OF THEFT SUSPECTS RARELY CHECKED, OTHER 
CRIMES POTENTIALLY MISSED 
In March 2006 the Lottery honored a $10,000 Touch Play prize claim from a manager of 
a bowling alley in northeast Iowa, agency records show.  Six weeks later, the manager 
was arrested after admitting he had forged two other Touch Play tickets and redeemed 
them at local stores for $296.  A few days after his arrest, the police chief reported the 
matter to the Security Division.  The information in the file indicates the investigator took 
notes of the chief’s phone call, typed the notes into the file, and then closed the case.231 
We found that the investigator was not aware of the $10,000 prize claim.232  If he had 
checked the Lottery’s database of winners, he would have discovered the manager’s 
$10,000 prize claim from just more than a month earlier.  This would have enabled the 
investigator to review the man’s $10,000 prize claim to see whether it might have also 
involved a forged Touch Play ticket. 
With the manager admitting that he forged two Touch Play tickets, the failure to identify 
and review his much larger Touch Play prize claim was significant.  There certainly is not 
enough information to conclude that the $10,000 prize claim was fraudulent.  But at the 
same time, it would be naïve to rule out fraud without an investigation. 
The failure to identify the manager’s $10,000 prize claim was not isolated.  Among store 
employees who were identified as suspects in Security Division case files from 2005 
through 2007, we found that at least 16 had previously claimed high-tier prizes.  The 
prize claims for 12 were not identified in the case file.  Some of those claims had been 
made just a few days or weeks before the report was filed. 
Among these cases, the most prominent involved a store manager who pled guilty to 
first-degree theft in connection with the theft of $45,204 worth of Pull-tab tickets and 
cash.  The manager had claimed 17 prior prizes, totaling $33,290.  Included was a 
$10,000 instant-ticket prize claim about one year before his employer filed a theft report 
with police and the Lottery.233 
We also found two store employees who claimed high-tier prizes shortly after being 
arrested and charged with internal theft of Lottery tickets.  Neither of these prize claims 
were noted in the case files. 
The first involved a store clerk who claimed a $1,000 Touch Play prize just three days 
after being arrested for stealing $130 worth of instant tickets.234  The other involved a 
store clerk who claimed a $1,000 Touch Play prize about two months after being arrested 
in connection with a $2,700 shortage in Touch Play machine revenue.235 
 
 
                                                 
231 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-101 (2006). 
232 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
233 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-114 (2007). 
234 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-078 (2005).  In addition, the clerk’s husband 
made a $1,000 Touch Play prize claim just two days after she pled guilty to Lottery theft. 
235 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-108 (2005). 
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In all cases of alleged theft or fraud, we believe it is reasonable to expect Lottery 
investigators to routinely check suspects’ prize claims – both before and after the alleged 
impropriety – and to review any high-tier prize claims that are discovered.  “It’s pretty 
easy to do a search,” Validations Manager Therese Spaulding told us.  “You can train just 
about anybody to do it.”236 
Retired Vice President for Security Braafhart conceded it would be wrong to assume that 
a suspect’s past prize claims were legitimate: 
Ombudsman investigator: Would you agree that you 
wouldn’t know unless you looked into it? 
Braafhart: Yeah, I’d agree with that.237 
Then-Acting CEO Brickman agreed that investigators should review suspects’ previous 
high-tier prize claims.  “I think if I knew that I would want to look into it, yes,” Brickman 
told us.  “It doesn't necessarily mean that there's a problem but it would be something to 
look into.”238 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
27. The Lottery’s Security Division investigators should have direct access to the 
Lottery’s winner database and should be adequately trained to use it.   
28. The Lottery’s Security Division should develop and implement a policy requiring 
its investigators to routinely check and document the prize claim history of all 
identified suspects.  The policy should encourage investigators to review previous 
high-tier prize claims when circumstances warrant. 
29. The Lottery should develop a method to flag the names of all theft or fraud 
suspects so that any subsequent prize claims they submit will be brought to the 
attention of the Security Division for possible investigation. 
F. FAILURE TO PURSUE ALLEGATION THAT $250,000 JACKPOT TICKET WAS 
PURCHASED ILLEGALLY 
We found seven case files involving allegedly fraudulent purchases of Lottery tickets.  In 
six of the cases, the investigator worked them as theft cases: 
• Three involved stolen credit cards.239 
• One involved stolen gift cards.240 
• One involved a stolen check.241 
                                                 
236 Sworn Interview of Therese Spaulding at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
237 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
238 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
239 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-025 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 06-008 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-125 (2006). 
240 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-051 (2006). 
241 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-071 (2005). 
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• One involved a bad or fraudulent check.242 
In the seventh case, the investigator did not work it as a theft case, even though one of the 
tickets was a $250,000 jackpot winner.  That case was triggered by a letter claiming that 
an individual “had bragged about writing a forged bad check” to purchase instant scratch 
tickets.243 
The investigator interviewed the letter’s author, who said an acquaintance had been 
bragging about writing a bad check to purchase a ticket which turned out to be a 
$250,000 jackpot winner.  The check-writer later gave the winning ticket to his mother, 
for her to claim the jackpot. 
The investigator’s notes show he identified the check-writer’s mother and confirmed that 
the Lottery had paid her for a $250,000 prize claim four months prior.  The investigator 
wrote that he subsequently contacted local police to see if they had received any reports 
of bad checks from the store where the ticket had been purchased.  The file does not 
indicate how the police department responded. 
Under the circumstances, the investigator had several viable options, including: 
• Trying to interview the check-writer and his mother 
• Seeking direction from the Lottery’s legal counsel or prosecutors 
But the investigator pursued neither option.  Instead, he took no further action and ruled 
out fraud by the woman who claimed the jackpot.  But that was irrelevant to the central 
question: Was the ticket purchased illegally? 
Determining whether the ticket was purchased fraudulently should matter to the Iowa 
Lottery.  If it was purchased fraudulently, as alleged, the man who obtained the ticket, in 
particular, may have benefitted from a criminal act if he shared in or was given part of the 
prize money. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
30. The Lottery’s Security Division should reopen case file 07-020 to determine 
whether the ticket was purchased illegally, and proceed accordingly. 
31. The Lottery should propose amending Iowa Code section 99G.31 to establish that 
any prizes accruing from tickets purchased unlawfully shall not be paid or shall be 
forfeited.  This would be similar to the provision in Iowa Code section 99G.30 
dealing with underage players. 
                                                 
242 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-047 (2007). 
243 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-020 (2007). 
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G. LOTTERY HAS PROVIDED INADEQUATE EXPLANATION OF DUTIES TO 
INVESTIGATORS 
I was never told how to do my job by anyone. 
— Former Lottery Investigator Larry Steele  
in an interview with Ombudsman investigators 
 
Larry Steele, a former sheriff’s deputy and police officer for the U.S. Postal Inspection 
Service, was one of the Iowa Lottery’s first hires in 1985.  He was also the last of the 
Lottery’s original investigators to retire from the agency in July 2008. 
Steele was, in his latter years, the most prolific of the Lottery’s investigators.  As one of 
the Security Division’s four investigators, Steele handled nearly half of the Lottery’s 
theft- and fraud-related investigations we reviewed from 2005 to 2007. 
Yet, despite the countless times he was called upon to investigate customer complaints 
and protect the integrity of Lottery games, Steele said he was never given any practical 
instructions on how to fulfill that mission. 
“We hire investigators that have been in the field for many, many years,” explained 
Investigator Supervisor John Ellison.  “Pretty much are on their own on their cases and 
that's why we hire them with the amount of years that they have in.”244 
We found that the Security Division has no written policies on how to conduct 
investigations.  According to Ellison, the Security Division does have written policies for 
how to conduct drawings and what to look for when visiting facilities that print the 
Lottery’s tickets.  “Those kinds of policies and procedures are in place,” Ellison added.  
“It pretty much ends right there.” 
Steele’s first supervisor at the Lottery, recently retired Vice President for Security Harry 
Braafhart, agreed that written policies would help investigators, but acknowledged that he 
did not develop written policies.245 
When we asked how Lottery investigators could fulfill their responsibilities without 
written direction from their superiors, then-Acting CEO Ken Brickman responded: 
All these people have had police investigation background 
experience….  They don’t need specific directions to tell 
them the first thing you do is ‘X’ or the next one is ‘Y’.  
They know instinctively and by education and training 
what it is they’re expected to do.246 
However, each of the Lottery’s four veteran investigators told us they were uncertain how 
to handle various routine situations.  We found that this uncertainty brought down the 
quality of their work. 
                                                 
244 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
245 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
246 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
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For example, investigators were not in agreement about what they were supposed 
to check during their retailer compliance reviews.  If problems were discovered during 
those reviews, investigators told us they did not know how to ensure that potential license 
sanctions were considered. 
Similarly, investigators told us they were given no specific instructions on: 
• How to deal with uncooperative retailers. 
• What information to include in a case file. 
• When to check a suspect's background for previous prize claims. 
This is not to say that the Security Division lacks knowledge of good investigative 
techniques and practices.  In fact, the Lottery’s investigators have a wealth of law-
enforcement experience in such areas as homicide, sexual abuse, counterintelligence, 
mail fraud, internal affairs, patrol, undercover security and tort claims. 
During our interviews, it became clear that the Security Division’s two managers had 
reasonable expectations of what makes for a solid investigation.  However, their ideas 
about investigative approach and documentation were not communicated to their 
investigators in any formal sense.  Neither was investigators’ casework routinely 
supervised or critiqued. 
In the absence of written protocols, we found that Lottery investigators often fall back on 
word-of-mouth advice or embedded office culture to guide them in their work.  This 
reliance on office culture, rather than on written policy, has contributed to an 
enforcement model that leaves unsuspecting customers vulnerable and thieves virtually 
unaccountable. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
32. The Lottery’s Security Division should develop and implement written policies to 
help guide its staff when conducting investigations. 
33. The Lottery should more closely review the casework of the Security Division’s 
investigators.  This should include, but not be limited to, reviewing the 
completeness and accuracy of each closed investigative case file in a timely 
fashion, evaluating whether the case was resolved adequately, and communicating 
any concerns to investigators within a reasonable period of time. 
34. The Lottery should ensure that investigators are availed of adequate opportunities 
to receive professional training on proper investigative procedures and techniques, 
and should require additional training as appropriate. 
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H. THE TOUCH PLAY DEFENSE 
Security Division employees told us that their capacity to conduct effective and thorough 
investigations was challenged during the existence of Touch Play:247 
• “During this Touch Play thing we were running fast, feverish and hard,” 
Investigator Roger Mott said.248 
• “There was complete chaos,” Investigator Larry Steele said.249 
• Investigator Ken Moon said staff was “overstressed” from the additional 
licensing-related duties flowing from Touch Play.  “That could have led to me 
overlooking some of these situations to be quite honest with you,” Moon said, 
later adding, “It just was not us, it was the entire lottery.”250 
In our analysis, this defense of inadequate investigations is plausible – but only to a 
certain degree, and with several caveats: 
1. Inadequate casework was not confined to Touch Play period:  We found 
inadequate casework throughout 2005, 2006 and 2007.  Touch Play operated on a 
statewide basis from April 2004 to May 3, 2006.  We found no discernible 
improvement in how investigations were handled after May 3, 2006. 
2. Security Division was not inundated with customer complaints at the time:  
Two of the most egregious cases we found occurred in the fall of 2005, during the 
midst of Touch Play.251  But those two cases were the only complaints from 
customers that the Security Division investigated in all of 2005. 
3. Lottery made extra millions from Touch Play but did not hire additional 
Security Division staff: This is reinforced by the fact that the final report of the 
Governor’s Touch Play Task Force, issued March 6, 2006, included a consensus 
recommendation to hire ten new full-time DCI agents to monitor compliance with 
Touch Play retailer requirements. 
4. The Security Division did not request assistance from the Division of 
Criminal Investigation (DCI), as Iowa law allows:  Iowa Code section 99G.33 
(2009) states, “The department of public safety, division of criminal investigation, 
shall be the primary state agency responsible for investigating criminal violations 
under this chapter.” 
                                                 
247 Touch Play sales began in May 2003 under a limited marketing test and went statewide in April 2004. 
MARY NEUBAUER, IOWA LOTTERY, QUESTIONS ABOUT IOWA LOTTERY PRODUCTS (Feb. 20, 2006) 
(http://www4.legis.state.ia.us/lfb/subcom/oversight/lottery_2006/Lottery_Response_to_Questions_2-20-
06.pdf).  May 3, 2006, was the final day of Touch Play sales.  IOWA LOTTERY, IOWA LOTTERY REPORT ON 
OPERATIONS (June 2008) (on file with author). 
248 Sworn Interview of Roger Mott at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
249 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
250 Sworn Interview of Ken Moon at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008) (Moon 
made his comments about Touch Play after being asked to do so by Assistant Attorney General David Van 
Compernolle, who sat in on all interviews of Lottery officials). 
251 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-072 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-092 (2005); both discussed previously in this section. 
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I. MINIMAL COORDINATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
The Lottery’s investigators must be qualified by training and experience in law 
enforcement; however, they are not sworn peace officers.252  Although they are on the 
front lines in safeguarding the Lottery’s integrity, Iowa law provides for other law 
enforcement agencies to play an integral role when criminal activities are suspected. 
The Department of Public Safety’s Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) serves as 
“the primary state agency responsible for investigating criminal violations” under Iowa 
Code section 99G.33 (2009).  The Lottery has a written contract with the DCI for 
carrying out these responsibilities.  Under the agreement, the DCI is to “provide 
investigation services, including appropriate laboratory analysis, for investigating 
criminal violations of law under Iowa Code, Chapter 99G, as called for by the Lottery or 
in discharge of the [DCI’s] statutory authority.”253  
In addition, Lottery investigators are to report any suspected violations to the appropriate 
law enforcement agency and appropriate county attorney or the attorney general.254  
Coordination between the Lottery and law enforcement agencies is important for 
suspected violations to be fully investigated and, if appropriate, prosecuted.  The Lottery 
clearly has a role in initiating investigations into allegations it receives regarding internal 
thefts or fraudulent activities involving Lottery tickets.  Its investigators have statutory 
subpoena power and can administer oaths and take testimony related to an 
investigation.255   Investigative duties include gathering information, determining whether 
probable cause exists for further action by law enforcement agencies, and coordinating 
with those agencies.256  This means that Lottery investigators need to refer suspected 
violations to the DCI or other law enforcement agencies when cases warrant further 
investigation or prosecution. 
However, in the cases we examined from 2005-2007, we found little coordination or 
involvement by the Lottery with the DCI or other law enforcement agencies: 
• DCI: Of the hundreds of case files we reviewed, we only found a handful where 
DCI was involved.  Charis Paulson, Assistant Director of DCI’s Gaming Bureau, 
told us that DCI would help the Lottery with its investigations “whenever they 
request our assistance,” but that occurs rarely.  Paulson said DCI has 120 gaming 
agents around the state, including four agents devoted specifically to non-casino 
cases, any of whom could be available for Lottery-related cases.257 
 
 
 
                                                 
252 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.35(1) (2009). 
253 Agreement for Cooperative Action Between Public Safety and Iowa Lottery Authority (July 1, 2007) 
(on file with author). 
254 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.35(1)(c) (2009). 
255 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.6 (2009). 
256 Iowa Depart. of Admin. Services, Position Description Questionnaire (PDQ) (Oct. 10, 2001) (on file 
with author).  The Lottery investigators currently are classified as Investigator 3 positions. 
257 Telephone Interview of Charis Paulson by an Ombudsman investigator (June 18, 2008). 
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• Local law enforcement: From 2005 through 2007, 53 internal theft cases resulted 
in criminal charges.  However, we could find only two cases where the initial 
report to police was made by the Lottery.258  The other 51 cases were reported to 
police directly by the stores. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
35. The Lottery should develop protocols to improve coordination between the 
Security Division and law enforcement agencies (including the DCI, municipal 
police, and county sheriff’s departments) to ensure that alleged violations of law 
are properly investigated.  This could include, but not be limited to, legislative 
clarification of their respective roles and improvements to Iowa Code chapter 99G 
or other areas of state law as appropriate.  This could also include the concept of 
assigning regulatory oversight to a third-party agency independent of the Iowa 
Lottery, as has occurred with the provincial lottery in Ontario, Canada. 
J. CONCLUSION 
The Lottery’s security department has a strong record of 
investigation and apprehension in its cases. 
— Vice President for External Relations Neubauer,  
November 1, 2007, memo to Lottery Board 
 
Good investigators turn over rocks.  Not all of those rocks will reveal crimes.  But the 
time spent in turning them over should not be viewed as time wasted.   
In many of the cases we reviewed, the Iowa Lottery turned over few rocks.  Its files 
revealed an investigative approach that is often constrained by incuriosity and, at times, 
an indifference to getting to the bottom of a given situation. 
Internal theft cases were often closed once the investigator learned that the store had 
contacted police.  In those cases that did lead to apprehension, much of the work was 
done not by the Lottery, but by local law enforcement or store officials.  Lottery 
investigators rarely had any direct contact with internal theft suspects. 
Individual cases were typically worked in a vacuum.  The case files suggest that 
investigators generally only considered the information that was reported to them or 
directly related to what was reported.  There was little evidence that consideration was 
given to systemic abuses or connections to other incidents. 
This was particularly evident in cases where the only potential victim was a customer.  
We found numerous customer complaints where leads went unexplored and potential 
crimes were not pursued.  Many of these were the types of cases where the Lottery 
investigator would need to “make the case.”  Most of the time they didn’t even try. 
                                                 
258 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-085 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 07-025 (2007). 
 92
VI. VIOLATORS FREQUENTLY NOT HELD ACCOUNTABLE 
The lottery business is not regulatory in nature. 
— Then-Iowa Lottery CEO Dr. Edward Stanek,  
as quoted in 2003 in Public Gaming International 259 
 
A. LOTTERY HAS NEVER SANCTIONED A RETAILER FOR THEFT OR FRAUD 
The Lottery has procedures for imposing sanctions against retailers who commit theft or 
fraud.  In his November 5, 2007, letter of response to our notice of investigation, then-
Acting CEO Brickman wrote: 
When an investigation indicates retailer impropriety, we 
refer the case to a law enforcement agency and initiate an 
assessment of the retailer’s licensing status for imposition 
of sanctions, if appropriate. 
In her November 2007 memo to the Lottery Board, Vice President for External Relations 
Neubauer described how the Lottery decides to impose license sanctions: 
A first-time violation of the terms and conditions results in 
a one-week suspension of the retail license and therefore, 
the store’s ability to sell lottery products.  A second 
violation within a year results in a one-month suspension of 
the retail license; and a third violation within a year results 
in a one-year suspension of the retail license.  Any 
suspected criminal activity would be referred to law 
enforcement. 
From our review of Lottery records and sworn interviews, we found that the Lottery has 
never imposed a license sanction against a retailer for theft or fraud. 
This came as a surprise to Harry Braafhart, who was the agency’s first and only Vice 
President for Security before retiring in July 2008.  “I just can’t believe that it’s zero,” he 
told us.260 
1. LOTTERY HAS BROAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE LICENSE SANCTIONS 
State law mandates the Lottery to develop and maintain a statewide network of lottery 
retailers that will, among other things, ensure the Lottery’s integrity.261  When retailers 
violate that trust, Iowa Code section 99G.27 (2009) authorizes the Lottery to impose 
sanctions, up to and including license revocation. 
                                                 
259 Mary Neubauer, The Lottery Remakes Itself into a Corporate-Model Lottery, PUBLIC GAMING INT’L, 
Sept. 2003, at 9. 
260 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
261 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.24(1) (2009). 
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The section lists nine reasons why the Lottery may impose sanctions.  These include acts 
that would harm public confidence or the Lottery’s reputation.  Four are relevant to the 
issues that are the focus of this investigation: 
• “a.  A violation of this chapter, a regulation, or a policy or procedure of the 
authority.”   
 
This covers a multitude of areas, including but not limited to theft, fraud, or 
paying out prizes of more than $600. 
• “c.  Commission of any fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”  
 
Presumably this would include any Lottery-related dishonesty perpetrated on 
customers, including those incidents that do not result in criminal prosecution. 
• “e.  Conduct prejudicial to public confidence in the lottery.”  
 
The statute does not define what constitutes prejudicial conduct.  But it would 
seem reasonable to view the act of a retailer cheating a customer out of a ticket or 
prize money as being “prejudicial to public confidence” in the Lottery. 
• “i.  Other conduct likely to result in injury to the property, revenue, or 
reputation of the authority.”  
 
This open-ended provision would seem to give the Lottery wide discretion to 
protect its reputation. 
We found a number of cases where customers were victims of fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.  This includes two cases where store employees claimed the prize for a 
winning ticket that they knew had been lost by a customer; and three cases where 
retailers kept hundreds of dollars in winnings from customers under false pretenses.  We 
also found 88 cases involving internal theft of Lottery products and cash. 
But none of those cases resulted in a single penalty against any retailer. 
2. STORE OWNERS CAN BE RESPONSIBLE FOR EMPLOYEES’ ACTIONS 
Several Lottery officials told us they do not believe the Lottery can sanction a store 
owner for an employee’s improper or illegal actions.  Vice President for External 
Relations Neubauer told us: 
Well, I don't think that an individual person stealing the 
tickets is a violation of the lottery's Terms and Conditions.  
That was the action by the individual person.  The store 
certainly didn't sanction it, and in those instances the store 
would take action to likely have the clerk fired.  I don't 
think it's a violation on the part of the store.262 
                                                 
262 Sworn Interview of Mary Neubauer at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
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But we found other information which refutes that position.  First, the Lottery’s 
administrative rules state, “The retailer is responsible for the conduct of its employees 
and members that is within the scope of the retailer’s lottery license.”263 
Second, we found two cases where the Lottery did sanction an owner’s license because of 
an employee’s actions.  Both cases involved store employees who allowed a customer to 
pay for tickets with a credit card, which is prohibited by law.264  The Lottery suspended 
both stores’ licenses for a week because of violations committed by store employees.265 
3. OTHER ACTIONS THAT TRIGGERED LICENSE SANCTIONS 
As part of this investigation, we asked the Lottery for: 
Any and all records that document instances where 
suspensions, revocations, terminations, or cancellations of 
retailer licenses were imposed or considered. 
In response, the Lottery provided records documenting 16 such sanctions in its 23-year 
history.  Among the reasons for license sanctions were: 
• Improper signage that referred to Touch Play machines as “slot machines.” 
• Failure to notify the Lottery of a change in store ownership. 
• Failing to place Touch Play machines in an area where underage persons are 
restricted from entering. 
The fact that the Lottery has imposed sanctions for the above-mentioned violations makes 
its failure to have ever imposed a sanction for theft or fraud all the more remarkable. 
4. STAFF NOT FAMILIAR WITH PROCEDURES FOR SANCTIONING 
VIOLATORS 
Every investigator told us he had a working knowledge of the Licensing Terms and 
Conditions that govern retailer conduct.  But none – not even Investigator Supervisor 
John Ellison – knew how to hold retailers accountable when they violated that agreement: 
Ombudsman investigator:  [W]ho, precisely, polices 
compliance with Terms and Conditions? 
Ellison:  I don’t know.  I don’t.266 
                                                 
263 IOWA ADMIN. CODE 531-13.10 (2009).  A nearly identical provision is also in the Licensing Terms and 
Conditions (“The retailer is responsible for the conduct of its employees and members, which is within the 
scope of the retailer’s lottery license.”).  (See Appendix A.) 
264 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.30(5) (2009). 
265 The Lottery conveyed these two suspension notices in February 1, 2008, letters to a grocery store and a 
convenience store, both in the same southeastern Iowa town. 
266 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
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Ellison’s direct supervisor, Braafhart, acknowledged there is no “actual written procedure 
or mechanism” to direct investigators how to report retail violations for consideration of 
license sanctions: 
Ombudsman investigator:  Is that to mean that your 
expectation of your investigative guys would be that you'd 
be informed of any [violations]? 
 
Braafhart:  Yes.267 
But some investigators told us they thought their supervisors were reading their case files 
and identifying license violations on their own.  Said Investigator Ken Moon:  
 I'm assuming that there is a review process from the 
supervisors who … if they see a problem, would take it 
before a committee to discuss that licensing issue.268 
This misunderstanding between investigators and their superiors may help explain why 
the Lottery has never imposed sanctions against a retailer for fraud or theft. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
36. The Lottery should develop and implement an internal system designed to ensure 
that the licensing status of retailers is assessed when a violation is found. 
B. SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS NOT REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
PROSECUTORS, CONTRARY TO LAW 
The lottery security office shall perform all of the following 
activities in support of the authority mission: 
 
… c.  Report any suspected violations of this chapter to the 
appropriate county attorney or the attorney general and to any law 
enforcement agencies having jurisdiction over the violation. 
— Iowa Code section 99G.35(1)(c) (2009) 
 
Toward the beginning of our investigation, then-Acting CEO Brickman wrote, “When an 
investigation indicates retailer impropriety, we refer the case to a law enforcement 
agency.”269  And in her 2007 Memo to the Lottery Board, Vice President for External 
Relations Neubauer wrote, “Any suspected criminal activity would be referred to law 
enforcement.” 
Those statements seemed to be consistent with Code section 99G.35(1)(c) (2009).  Later 
in the investigation, however, we found that the Lottery’s practices are in fact different 
than those suggested in management’s initial written descriptions.   
                                                 
267 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
268 Sworn Interview of Ken Moon at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
269 See Appendix E. 
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As an example, consider the following interview exchange: 
Ombudsman investigator: How much influence should a 
retailer have over whether you pursue a theft allegation 
against one of their clerks? 
 
Lottery investigator: It’s totally up to him.270 
We also spoke with a store official who told us, “They [the Lottery] leave it up to us 
as to the way we want it handled, in the long run.”271 
1. SUSPECTED THEFTS NOT REPORTED TO POLICE BECAUSE OF 
RETAILER’S WISHES 
We found that Lottery investigators almost always allowed stores to decide whether 
police reports should be filed in cases of internal theft.  The Lottery followed this practice 
even when there was a suspected violation of Lottery laws, in which case section 
99G.35(1)(c) (2009) mandated the Lottery to report suspected violations to police.  The 
Lottery also followed this practice in cases where it had not identified the suspect 
(including cases where the suspect could have been the store owner). 
We also found approximately 18 cases from 2005 through 2007 where the Lottery 
investigator suspected internal theft of Lottery tickets, but did not report their suspicions 
to police and prosecutors because of the retailer’s wishes.  These included the following 
cases: 
• A grocery store reported that an employee “admitted taking and scratching off 
lottery scratch off tickets several times in the last few months,” according to the 
case notes.  The store fired the employee, a high school student whom the case 
file did not identify. The investigator closed the case without finding out the name 
of the employee.272 
• A grocery store reported that a female bakery employee had stolen $300 worth of 
instant tickets and cashed the winners at another store.  “The employee has 
admitted to the theft, and [the store] prefers to handle this case internally,” the 
investigator wrote.  “They [store management] were told that we could send them 
information that pertains to this case, but they were not interested at this time.  
They refused to give the name of the suspect.”  The investigator closed the case 
without finding out the name of the employee.273 
• A convenience store reported that $600 worth of instant tickets had been stolen, 
and the manager suspected a clerk.  The case notes state that a store supervisor 
“has watched the video surveillance and saw the female clerk take two pack [sic] 
of tickets.”  The file indicates at least 18 of those stolen tickets were winners and 
redeemed for $76 in prize money. 
 
 
 
                                                 
270 Sworn Interview of Roger Mott at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
271 Telephone Interview of a store official by an Ombudsman investigator (Apr. 3, 2008). 
272 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-100 (2005). 
273 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-137 (2007). 
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In the end, the store chose to handle the matter internally and the Lottery obliged.  
Regarding the identity of the clerk (a 17- or 18-year old female), the investigator 
wrote, “Store keeping name confidential” – apparently even from the Lottery 
itself.274 
2. SUSPECTED THEFTS NOT FULLY INVESTIGATED BECAUSE OF 
RETAILER’S WISHES 
A Lottery sales representative discovered that nine instant tickets were missing from a 
central Iowa liquor store in August 2007.  The missing tickets were reported to the 
Security Division as a “theft problem.” 
The investigator’s case notes stated: 
During my visit with the owner of this store, [she] said she 
has not, nor will she contact the … Police Department.  
[The owner] said she knows who the individual was that 
took the tickets.  [The owner] said that the individual that 
took the tickets has paid for them and she does not wish to 
pursue this issue any further.  This situation will be closed 
with the problem being taken care of by the store owner. 275 
The Lottery’s case file suggests that someone may have been stealing tickets but the 
investigator did not find out who.  When we asked about this case, the Lottery 
investigator acknowledged that the thief could have been anyone, even the owner.276 
The Lottery’s Licensing Terms and Conditions state in part, “Retailers shall cooperate 
fully with the Lottery in the investigation of any missing, lost, or stolen tickets.”  Instead 
of allowing the owner to rebuff his inquiry, the investigator should have asserted the 
Lottery’s authority to investigate the matter further. 
If the owner had cooperated, the investigator could have developed information necessary 
to pursue the matter to its logical conclusion.  The investigator then could report any 
suspected violations to police and prosecutors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
274 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-035 (2007).  While this case involved $600 in 
stolen tickets and was not pursued further, we found several cases where clerks were prosecuted for 
stealing much smaller amounts of tickets: Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-142 
(2006) ($40 worth of tickets); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-106 (2005) ($36 
worth of tickets); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-085 (2005) ($26 worth of 
tickets).  The only difference: The stores in those three cases reported the incidents to police, whereas the 
store in Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-035 (2007) did not. 
275 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-091 (2007). 
276 Sworn Interview of Ken Moon at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
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If, on the other hand, the owner still refused to cooperate, the Lottery could have 
threatened, and if necessary, imposed a license sanction.277  The Lottery can pursue an 
investigation without a store’s cooperation and has the authority to subpoena witnesses 
and records.278  The Lottery can also request assistance from the Iowa Division of 
Criminal Investigation or local police to execute search warrants, question suspects, and 
make arrests. 
But when we asked Lottery investigators how they have dealt with uncooperative 
retailers, they expressed strong reservations about requiring retailers to cooperate.  “If 
they don't want to cooperate, you know, they didn't cooperate,” recently retired 
Investigator Larry Steele told us.  “There's nothing I could do. I'm not a police officer.”279 
3. REASONS WHY LOTTERY SHOULD PURSUE INTERNAL THEFT CASES 
TO THEIR LOGICAL CONCLUSION 
During our investigation, Lottery officials acknowledged that the law mandates the 
Security Division to report suspected violations of Iowa Code chapter 99G to police and 
prosecutors.  But they argued that it makes little sense to file a police report if the retailer 
declines to pursue criminal charges.280 
We believe that the Lottery’s practice on this issue is fundamentally flawed.  We see a 
number of reasons why the Lottery should pursue internal theft cases to their logical 
conclusion, regardless of the store owner’s wishes: 
1. The Lottery and its customers are harmed whenever prize money is obtained from 
stolen tickets. (This point is discussed in detail later in this section.) 
2. Customers can also be victims any time a retailer or store employee lightly 
scratches instant tickets, “picks out” the winners, and sells the non-winners. 
3. The failure to prosecute thieving store employees, even if they are fired, creates 
an incentive for them to continue their activity at other licensed stores without a 
criminal record that can be considered by store owners. 
4. An investigation may yield information that causes the Lottery to consider license 
sanctions, even when no criminal charges are filed.  A documented record of 
those investigations would also be useful for investigators who receive future 
complaints about the same store or individual. 
5. Lottery officials acknowledged to us that clerks who steal tickets from their 
employers may not be shy about stealing from customers as well.  “I think a thief 
will steal from anybody, any way, any how,” Investigator Supervisor Ellison told 
us. 
                                                 
277 The Lottery, by comparison, imposed sanctions in other cases where stores had signs describing Touch 
Play machines as “slots.”  In one such case, the Lottery temporarily deactivated a store’s Touch Play 
machines because the owner failed to change a sign within ten hours of the Lottery’s first request.  Iowa 
Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-052 (2005). 
278 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.6 (2009). 
279 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
280 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008); Sworn 
Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
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We conclude, therefore, that the Lottery has the authority – and a fiduciary responsibility 
– to ensure that allegations of internal theft are always fully investigated. 
4. LOTTERY OFFICIALS: NO SUCH THING AS A STORE OWNER STEALING 
TICKETS FROM THEIR OWN STORE 
During interviews with Lottery officials, we suggested an additional reason why all 
internal theft cases should be pursued to their logical conclusion: Until a suspect is 
identified, it is possible that the thief could be the store owner.  We noted that the practice 
of allowing store owners to decide how far cases are pursued means there may have been 
theft cases where a store owner called a halt to the investigation of his own crime. 
In response, several Lottery officials told us that it is impossible for store owners to steal 
Lottery tickets from their own stores.  Consider the following exchange with recently 
retired Vice President for Security Harry Braafhart: 
Ombudsman investigator: But what if the retailer is the 
thief of those tickets. Would you treat that any differently? 
 
Braafhart: I don't know how the retailer can be the thief of 
the tickets. I'm not following where you guys are going 
with this. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: Well, let's be clear then. I'm just 
going to ask you point-blank. So if I own a store, I'm the 
retailer and I have lottery tickets at my disposal and I just 
take the tickets and scratch them off, dozens at a time, I'm 
looking for a winner, and if I find a winner for $250,000 
and I go to the lottery and I get my money, I'm asking you 
is there any problem with that. It's a yes or a no. 
 
Braafhart: No, there's no problem with that. If you've 
already paid for that ticket, that book of tickets, you can do 
with it whatever you want. I mean as far as yourself. As 
long as you're not doing something fraudulent by trying to 
alter them or nothing. But you've paid for the book of 
tickets.281 
Braafhart’s position is not supported by the Lottery’s own administrative rules.  Chapter 
13 of those rules deals with the disposition of instant tickets after a retailer obtains them 
from the Lottery.  It states in part: 
• “Tickets shall be sold at the price designated by the lottery.  Retailers shall not 
sell tickets for a price other than that specified by the lottery.”282 
• “No retailer or any employee or member of a retailer shall attempt to identify a 
winning ticket prior to the sale of the ticket.”283 
                                                 
281 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
282 IOWA ADMIN. CODE 531-13.2(2) (2009).  These same provisions are also included in Licensing Terms 
and Conditions. (See Appendix A.) 
283 IOWA ADMIN. CODE 531-13.2(3) (2009).  Regarding this issue, Licensing Terms and Conditions states in 
part, “Retailers shall not attempt to identify winning tickets until a signed ticket is presented for validation 
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The Lottery’s position also ignores the fact that, because of Lottery commissions, 
retailers pay up to seven percent less for instant tickets than the general public. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
37. The Lottery’s Security Division should commit to investigate all reports that it 
receives involving thefts or alleged thefts of Lottery tickets to their logical 
conclusion, regardless of a retailer’s wishes, unless it determines that a law 
enforcement agency will investigate.  If a retailer refuses to fully cooperate with 
such an investigation, the Security Division should consider exercising its 
authority to issue a subpoena for the records and should consider referring the 
matter for suspension or revocation of the retailer’s Lottery license. 
C. LOTTERY MORE CONCERNED WITH UNDERAGE PERSONS BUYING TICKETS 
THAN STEALING THEM 
We found that complaints of underage persons illegally buying tickets have been 
aggressively pursued by the Lottery, as they should be.  Iowa Code section 99G.30(3) 
(2009) states: 
A ticket or share shall not be sold to a person who has not 
reached the age of twenty-one….  A prize won by a person 
who has not reached the age of twenty-one but who 
purchases a winning ticket or share in violation of this 
subsection shall be forfeited. 
A recent Lottery report284 shows that the agency received seven complaints about 
purchases by underage customers from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2007.  The 
Lottery substantiated two of those complaints and suspended both stores’ licenses. 
By contrast, we found that 29 underage store clerks were substantiated to have stolen 
Lottery tickets during the same period.  This means that the number of instances where 
Lottery investigators substantiated internal theft by an underage employee was 14 times 
higher than the number of substantiated cases of underage sales from fiscal year 2005 
through fiscal year 2007. 
When considering all files that we reviewed from 2005 through 2007 (calendar years), 
we found that 33 underage clerks were substantiated to have stolen Lottery tickets.  
Those 33 underage persons accounted for approximately one-third of the 103 individuals 
prosecuted for, or suspected of, internal theft during the three-year period. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
by a player.” (See Appendix A.) 
284 The governor’s office administers a website, “Results Iowa: Accountability for Iowa,” which has 
performance reports of executive departments, including the Iowa Lottery.  See 
http://www.resultsiowa.org/lottery.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). 
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Those numbers suggest that the Lottery should be addressing the phenomenon of 
underage internal theft at least as aggressively as its approach to underage sales.  But we 
found that has not been the case.  In response to the 33 substantiated cases of underage 
internal theft, the Lottery did not impose license sanctions against any of the stores where 
the thefts occurred.285  It also did not try to recover any of the prize money obtained from 
tickets stolen by the 33 underage individuals. 
Moreover, we found no indication that the Lottery was even aware of this phenomenon or 
its pervasiveness.  Of the 33 individuals we identified as being underage at the time of the 
thefts, many were not identified as such in the Lottery’s case files.  We made those 
identifications through non-Lottery records. 
The 33 underage theft suspects fell in two groups: Those who were prosecuted, and those 
who were suspected but not prosecuted. 
1. UNDERAGE THEFT SUSPECTS WHO WERE PROSECUTED 
We found that 22 underage clerks were prosecuted for internal theft from 2005 through 
2007.  The most prominent example involved five employees who pled guilty to stealing 
$36,680 worth of Lottery tickets from a small grocery store in northwest Iowa.  Four of 
the employees were underage, including a 17-year old and a 16-year old.286 
2. UNDERAGE THEFT SUSPECTS WHO WERE NOT PROSECUTED 
We found that 11 underage persons were suspected to have committed internal theft, 
either by their employer and/or by the Lottery investigator, but were not prosecuted.  
Three were discussed in previous sections of this report: 
• A high-school-aged employee admitted taking and scratching instant Lottery 
tickets several times over a few months.287 
• An underage store employee had been tampering with $69 worth of instant 
tickets at two stores in a chain.288 
• A 17- or 18-year old employee stole two entire packs of instant tickets with a 
retail value of $600.  The file indicates at least 18 winners were redeemed for 
prize money totaling $76.289 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
38. The Lottery should consider proposing an amendment to Iowa Code chapter 99G 
to provide that Lottery products shall not be sold by any person who has not 
reached the age of twenty-one, because the statute already provides that Lottery 
products shall not be sold to any person who has not reached the age of twenty-
one. 
                                                 
285 As previously noted, the Lottery’s rules say that retailers are responsible for the Lottery-related conduct 
of their employees. 
286 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-106 (2006). 
287 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-100 (2005). 
288 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-115 (2006). 
289 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-035 (2007). 
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D. INVESTIGATORS ROUTINELY FAILING TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH PRIZE 
MONEY IS OBTAINED FROM STOLEN TICKETS 
A woman’s desire to support a casino-gambling habit triggered the biggest Lottery theft 
case of the three years we reviewed.  The 70-year-old, part-time pharmacy employee pled 
guilty in August 2007 to first-degree theft in connection with the theft of at least 
$107,138 worth of instant Lottery tickets.  Actual losses may have been higher – the case 
file indicates she was suspected to have been stealing tickets since 1997.290 
The Lottery’s case file included a police report that showed the woman redeemed 97 
winning tickets over a three-week period at just one store.  The report showed that the 
investigating officer suspected that the woman had cashed many more stolen tickets. 
But the Lottery investigator did not attempt to learn how much prize money the woman 
had collected from the stolen tickets that she redeemed for prize money.  We found that 
she also claimed a $1,600 prize that was paid out directly by the Lottery; this was not 
mentioned in the case file. 
So while the woman was ordered to pay restitution for the retail value of the tickets she 
stole, she was able to keep any prize money that she obtained from those stolen tickets –
in part because the Lottery did not attempt to determine the amount of prize money 
obtained. 
This was not an isolated case.  We found a number of internal theft cases – involving 
store employees who were prosecuted – where Lottery investigators did not attempt to 
determine the total amount of prize money obtained from tickets that had been stolen. 
Other examples include: 
• A store clerk stole 507 tickets.  Information about stolen tickets being redeemed 
for the prize money is scattered throughout the case file, but there is no indication 
of an attempt to calculate the total.291 
• A store clerk stole $3,828 worth of tickets.  The file shows 41 were redeemed, 
but the prize amounts are not listed.292 
• Two store clerks were suspected to have stolen between $14,000 and $15,000 
worth of tickets from their employer.  The case file suggests that approximately 
$2,000 in prize money may have been obtained from stolen instant tickets.  But 
the file includes no indication of an attempt by the investigator to calculate the 
total.293 
This raises a critical question: How can the Lottery hold thieves accountable if 
investigators do not determine how much prize money those thieves obtained from the 
stolen tickets? 
 
                                                 
290 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-140 (2006). 
291 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-003 (2007). 
292 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-011 (2005). 
293 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-023 (2005). 
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We asked Investigator Roger Mott about a case in which a store reported that a clerk had 
scratched at least $69 worth of instant tickets through pickouts activity:294 
Ombudsman investigator: Did you find out how much that 
suspect got in stolen money? 
 
Mott: No, I did not. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: Why not? 
 
Mott: I don’t know. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: … Do you have any idea 
whether he may have had some prize money that he got 
through those stolen tickets? 
 
Mott: I have no clue. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: It’s possible that he won a bit of 
money. 
 
Mott: Well, he could have, I reckon.295 
The clerk in that case was not prosecuted because the store declined to file a police 
report.   
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
39. The Lottery should develop and implement a policy requiring investigators to 
attempt to determine, in all theft cases and to the best of their ability, the amount 
of any prize money redeemed from the stolen tickets, and by whom. 
                                                 
294 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-115 (2006). 
295 Sworn Interview of Roger Mott at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
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E. LOTTERY DOES NOT TRY TO RECOUP PRIZE MONEY IN INTERNAL THEFT 
CASES 
Ombudsman investigator: Most of the folks who have been 
prosecuted for internal theft, any prize money they got, they got to 
keep it. Does that surprise you? 
Harry Braafhart: Yeah, it does. And I believe that ideally that they 
should not get to keep it. 
— Exchange during October 8, 2008,  
interview of recently retired  
Vice President for Security Braafhart  
 
In criminal cases, payment of restitution to the victim can be an effective way of holding 
an offender accountable.296  Our investigation revealed, however, that most store 
employees who stole Lottery tickets were able to keep any prize money obtained from the 
tickets they stole. 
From 2005 through 2007, we found 45 internal theft cases where prize money was 
obtained from stolen tickets and the suspects were later prosecuted for the thefts.  Most of 
those employees were ordered to pay restitution to the stores for the retail value of the 
stolen tickets.297  But only two of the 45 employees were ordered to pay restitution to the 
Lottery for the prize money they obtained from the stolen tickets. 
In those two cases: 
• One defendant was ordered to pay restitution of $395 to the store (for the retail 
value of the stolen tickets) and $206 to the Lottery (for the prize money obtained 
from the stolen tickets).298 
• Another defendant was ordered to pay $4,176 in restitution to the store (for the 
retail value of the stolen tickets) and $3,596 in restitution to the Lottery (for prizes 
claimed from the stolen tickets).299 
The Lottery did not pursue restitution from the other 43 internal-theft defendants 
mentioned above – even though we found that all 43 used stolen tickets to obtain prize 
money from the Lottery.  (Prize payouts for winning tickets are generally made by the 
Lottery.  The Lottery either pays out prizes directly, to any individual who redeems a 
winning ticket directly from the Lottery; or it pays out prizes indirectly, by crediting the 
account of any store that pays out a prize; this credit occurs regardless of whether the 
ticket was sold by that store.)300 
                                                 
296 Restitution means payment of pecuniary damages to the victim of the crime.  IOWA CODE SECTION 910.1 
(2009). 
297 Due to the manner in which stores obtain instant tickets from the Lottery, the store is usually the victim 
for the retail value of any unsold instant tickets that are stolen from that store. 
298 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-108 (2006). 
299 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-046 (2006). 
300 The two exceptions involve Pull-tab prizes and any prize that a store pays out in contradiction of a 
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Because Lottery investigators routinely fail to determine how much prize money is 
obtained from stolen tickets, there was no way for us to calculate the total amount of 
prize money obtained by the 43 internal-theft defendants mentioned above. 
1. SUSPECTS KEEP PRIZE MONEY EVEN WHEN EVIDENCE IS STRONG 
a. Cases where suspect was prosecuted 
One case involved the theft of several hundred instant tickets by a convenience store 
clerk.  The file shows that the Lottery investigator spoke with a local police detective.  In 
recounting that conversation, the Lottery investigator wrote that the clerk admitted “she 
stole 300 to 400 lottery scratch off tickets and did not pay for them, and to redeeming the 
winners from these tickets at four [local] lottery retailers.”301 
Court records show that the clerk later pled guilty and was ordered to pay $287 in 
restitution to the store for the value of the stolen tickets.  She was not ordered to pay 
restitution for any of the prize money she obtained from the stolen tickets. 
That case was not an isolated example.  Of the 45 internal theft cases in which prize 
money was obtained and the suspect(s) was prosecuted, we found that: 
• The suspects in 11 cases admitted to redeeming the winning tickets for the prize 
money, or to giving the winning tickets to others for that purpose.302 
• An additional 14 case files documented the existence of a store surveillance 
video showing stolen tickets being redeemed for prize money at a time and place 
that corresponded with Lottery prize-payout records.303 
                                                                                                                                                 
terminal message specifically directing the store to refer the customer to the Lottery (the system allows the 
Lottery to “flag” tickets that have been reported as stolen). 
301 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-025 (2007).  There is no indication in the file 
that the investigator tried to determine the amount of prize money that the suspect obtained from the stolen 
tickets. 
302 We found these admissions in either the police file or in the Lottery investigators’ case notes (i.e., 
referencing information provided to the Lottery by local police).  Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-011 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-023 (2005); Iowa 
Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-035 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, 
Case No. 06-106 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-127 (2006); Iowa Lottery 
Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-142 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 
07-025 (2007); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-028 (2007); Iowa Lottery Security 
Investigator Report, Case No. 07-067 (2007); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-079 
(2007); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-097 (2007). 
303 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-018 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 05-029 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-053 (2005); Iowa 
Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-085 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, 
Case No. 06-051 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-099 (2006); Iowa Lottery 
Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-118 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 
06-140 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-001 (2007); Iowa Lottery Security 
Investigator Report, Case No. 07-060 (2007); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-062 
(2007); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-095 (2007); Iowa Lottery Security 
Investigator Report, Case No. 07-097 (2007); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-139 
(2007).  We also found several cases where there was no video available because the store did not have a 
surveillance video camera or it was not working properly at the time. 
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• Three cases had admissions from suspects, corroborating surveillance video, and 
corresponding prize-payout records.304 
The clerks in all 25 cases subsequently pled guilty, and most were required to pay 
restitution to the stores for the value of the stolen tickets.  But none of those clerks was 
required to pay restitution for the prize money obtained from stolen tickets. 
b. Cases where theft was suspected but no charges filed 
A hospital gift shop found that a number of its unsold instant tickets were missing.  In the 
case file, the Lottery investigator wrote that a hospital security officer had watched video 
surveillance tapes and reported that: 
… a female employee is seen removing Iowa Lottery 
instant scratch tickets from the dispenser when she opens 
the store.  The employee hides the tickets and whenever she 
is not busy she scratches the latex from the tickets and 
redeems them.305 
The hospital security officer later reported that the employee “had won one thousand 
dollars a week or two ago,” the Lottery investigator wrote.  The investigator subsequently 
confirmed that the employee had recently claimed a $1,000 instant ticket prize from the 
Lottery. 
No charges were filed, as the hospital opted against filing a police report.  This case was 
among 26 additional internal theft cases where the Lottery investigator and/or the retailer 
found that prize money was obtained from stolen tickets but the employee(s) was not 
prosecuted. 
As a result, the suspects in these 26 cases were not ordered to pay restitution for either the 
retail value of the stolen tickets or for any prize money obtained from those tickets.  
Among these cases: 
• Seven case files documented the existence of a store surveillance video showing 
the suspect redeeming stolen tickets for prize money at a time and place that 
corresponded with Lottery prize-payout records.306 
• One case file documented that a store employee was “cashing Iowa Lottery 
instant tickets without paying for them,” the investigator wrote.  “A customer 
noticed the employee doing this in front of the manager.  The customer informed 
the manager, and the manager terminated the employee.”307 
 
                                                 
304 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-011 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 06-106 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-127 (2006). 
305 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-109 (2006). 
306 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-079 (2005); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator 
Report, Case No. 06-045 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-102 (2006); Iowa 
Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-109 (2006); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, 
Case No. 07-055 (2007); Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-107 (2007); Iowa Lottery 
Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-118 (2007). 
307 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-138 (2007). 
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2. WHY THE LOTTERY DOES NOT PURSUE RESTITUTION 
When we asked Lottery officials if people who steal Lottery tickets should get to keep 
prize money from those stolen tickets, the universal answer was “no.”  “I don’t think they 
should be able to keep the fruits of their crime,” recently retired Investigator Larry Steele 
told us.308 
However, Lottery officials are less certain about what role they should play in holding 
thieves accountable.  Some told us that they do not consider the Lottery as a victim in 
cases where prize money is obtained from stolen tickets, while others were uncertain or 
had a different view.  We asked seven Lottery officials this basic question: Who is the 
victim when prize money is paid out on stolen tickets?  Our question generated five 
different answers: 
• The store is the victim. 
• The Lottery is the victim. 
• The store and the Lottery are both victims. 
• Sometimes the store is the victim, and sometimes the Lottery is the victim. 
• There is no victim. 
Several Lottery officials told us that whether winning tickets were stolen or purchased is 
of no legal consequence with regard to prize payouts.  “We aren’t out money so we aren’t 
entitled to get it back,” then-Acting CEO Brickman told us.  He later added, “The reality 
of the transaction is that it’s exactly the same as if the clerk had sold rather than stole the 
ticket.”309 
Even in the two cases where prize-money restitution was ordered to the Lottery, 
prosecutors told us that the Lottery initially resisted pursuing restitution.  “At first, they 
[Lottery staff] said, ‘We don’t ever ask for restitution,’” one prosecutor told us.  “They 
were reluctant at first.”  But she persisted because “it looked like they [Lottery] had been 
harmed by the theft.”310 
Investigator Supervisor John Ellison confirmed that the Security Division routinely turns 
down prosecutors offering to pursue restitution for the Lottery.  Ellison said he generally 
responds to such inquiries by saying, “I’m sorry, we’re not a victim.”311 
The only exception, Ellison said, would be cases where tickets are stolen directly from 
the Lottery, before they are provided to a retailer.  However, the Lottery had such a theft 
case in 2007 and did not pursue restitution for the prize money obtained from the stolen 
tickets.312 
                                                 
308 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
309 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
310 Telephone Interview of assistant county attorney by an Ombudsman investigator (May 27, 2008). 
311 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
312 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-062 (2007).  The file shows that the suspect 
stole $167 worth of instant tickets from the Lottery’s regional office in Mason City and obtained $66 in 
prize money from the stolen tickets.  The defendant was ordered to pay restitution to the Lottery for the 
value of the tickets ($167), but no restitution was ordered for the prize money. 
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We found a different opinion among the Security Division’s three investigators – Ken 
Moon, Roger Mott, and Larry Steele.  Each agreed that the Lottery can itself be a victim 
in “prize money by theft” scenarios.  Asked to explain why the Lottery received 
restitution in one of the two cases previously referenced, Mott told us, “Because in my 
determination we were out that money.  We lost that money.”313 
We found that the lack of consensus among Lottery staff may help explain why the 
agency did not recoup prize money in most internal theft cases prosecuted between 2005 
and 2007. 
3. OMBUDSMAN’S PERSPECTIVE 
It is true the Lottery has already planned to pay out the prize money on tickets that are 
subsequently stolen.  However, for restitution purposes, we believe that the Lottery is a 
victim. 
Under Iowa law, prize money from tickets that is unpaid, unused, unclaimed, or forfeited 
is retained or delivered to the Lottery.  Iowa Code section 99G.31(2)(b) (2009) states that 
a prize: 
[S]hall not be paid arising from claimed tickets that are 
stolen, counterfeit, altered, fraudulent, unissued, produced 
or issued in error, unreadable, not received, or not recorded 
by the authority within applicable deadlines. 
Thus, prize money not yet paid out on stolen tickets remains with or still belongs to the 
Lottery.  This affirms that the Lottery possesses a right to that money.  The fact that it 
was paid out due to the illegal actions of the claimant should not extinguish that right. 
The Lottery’s right to seek restitution or to recoup prizes paid on stolen tickets is 
reinforced by other analogous provisions of law.  Unclaimed prize money becomes part 
of the Lottery’s pool from which future prizes are to be awarded or used for special prize 
promotions.314  Furthermore, prizes on a ticket purchased or sold in violation of chapter 
99G are treated as unclaimed prizes.315 
Another provision states that a prize won by a person under 21 years of age shall be 
forfeited.316  While that law does not state what happens to the forfeited money, as it does 
for unclaimed prizes, then-Acting CEO Brickman told us the following: 
As with any other unclaimed prizes, funds attributable to 
forfeiture would be available to the Lottery for use in future 
prize pools or, if not needed for that purpose, as with other 
funds excess to the Lottery’s operations needs, the amount 
of the forfeited prize ultimately would be included with 
funds certified for transfer to the General Fund.317 
                                                 
313 Sworn Interview of Roger Mott at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
314 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.31(d) (2009). 
315 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.31(e) (2009). 
316 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.30(3) (2009). 
317 Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, Iowa Lottery, to Ombudsman (Jan. 23, 2009) (on file 
with author). 
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We see no reason why prizes from stolen tickets should not be treated in a similar 
manner.  If store employees who steal tickets were ordered to pay restitution to the 
Lottery for any prize money obtained, that money would go back to the “prize pool” for 
future prizes or promotions.  This in turn means the State presumably could stand to gain 
financially if the Lottery were to recoup prize money obtained from stolen tickets. 
It is our opinion, therefore, that the Lottery can and should seek restitution for the value 
of prize money paid out from stolen tickets.  And, as previously noted, Iowa courts have 
ordered such restitution in at least two cases. 
Obtaining restitution would serve at least two important purposes: 
• It would financially benefit the Lottery and the public who play and are served by 
the Lottery. 
• It would also convey the message that “crime does not pay,” thus helping to 
preserve the Lottery’s integrity and dignity, which is mandated by Iowa Code 
section 99G.2(3) (2009). 
Otherwise, the deterrent effect of the criminal prosecution is diminished, especially for 
individuals willing to risk stealing tickets on the belief that they can profit from it. 
For these reasons, we believe the Lottery should find a way to recoup prize winnings 
from stolen tickets, even if the Lottery should encounter legal challenges to its status as a 
victim in seeking restitution.  This may require amending Iowa law or adopting rules that 
grant or clarify the Lottery’s authority to recoup the money or to obtain it through 
forfeiture procedures. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
40. The Lottery should adopt a policy requiring it to take the necessary steps to 
pursue restitution from any individual who obtains prize money from stolen 
tickets and who is prosecuted for that theft.  In the event a court determines the 
Lottery is not a victim for restitution purposes, the Lottery should seek authority, 
if necessary, and establish a civil process to recoup the prize money from such 
individuals.  In circumstances where an individual, other than the person who 
stole a ticket, claims the prize money, the Lottery should determine whether it 
should initiate a criminal or civil proceeding to recoup the prize money. 
41. The Lottery’s Security Division should devise and maintain a standardized form 
for calculating and reporting prize payouts in connection with stolen tickets.  
Lottery investigators should transmit this form to prosecutors as a routine means 
of pursuing restitution from Lottery ticket thieves. 
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VII. INADEQUATE CUSTOMER EDUCATION AND PROTECTION EFFORTS 
[T]he Iowa Lottery has taken many proactive steps through the 
years to remind consumers about the security tips they can follow 
to be fully informed when they play lottery games. 
 
… The lottery offers its players a plethora of information they can 
use to determine the outcome of their tickets. However, we have 
felt that there is no substitute for player responsibility and player 
diligence, despite all the assistance that we can provide. 
— Vice President for External Relations Neubauer,  
November 1, 2007, memo to Lottery Board 
 
The Lottery has made broad proclamations that it has taken many steps to educate and 
protect its customers.  Has the Lottery taken adequate steps to educate and protect its 
customers?  That question is examined in this section. 
A. “SIGN IT” PROGRAM AND RECEIPTS 
At the urging of the Iowa Legislature’s Government Oversight Committee, the Lottery in 
2008 implemented two new procedures designed to help safeguard customers from 
possible fraud.  In March 2008 the Lottery began a new program called, “Sign It. It’s 
Yours.”  Under the program, retailers and the Lottery are required to verify that a 
signature appears on all tickets submitted for checking or for a prize payout.318 
The Lottery then reprogrammed its terminals to automatically generate a customer receipt 
for every instant-scratch or lotto ticket that is checked or cashed.  Both changes were in 
response to concerns expressed by members of the Government Oversight Committee 
during its January 30, 2008, meeting.319 
1. LOTTERY SUGGESTS NEED FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS 
FORESTALLED 
Lottery officials have suggested that these two improvements significantly reduce the 
possibility of fraud and in turn forestall the need for other improvements.   
“This is an expensive undertaking.  We understand that,” Vice President for External 
Relations Neubauer was quoted as saying in a newspaper article about the changes.320  
“But if this is what people want us to be doing to protect us from even the possibility of 
fraud, we are happy to do that.” 
 
                                                 
318 IOWA ADMIN. CODE 531-11.1(5) (2009). 
319 The members’ concerns followed presentations by the Ombudsman and the Lottery, which the 
Committee had requested after learning that our office had initiated this investigation. 
320 William Petroski, For Safety, Lottery Asks Buyers to Sign Tickets, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 21, 2008, at 
1A. 
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During a subsequent discussion about a proposal to install self-serve ticket-checkers321 at 
retail outlets, then-Acting CEO Brickman told the Lottery Board that “there was no need 
to rush forward with ticket checking technology at the present time because of the steps 
already taken to protect the Lottery’s retailers and players through the ticket signing 
requirement and the issuing of ticket receipts.”322 
Brickman made a similar comment when we asked whether the Lottery should require all 
stores to have customer display units (CDUs).323  “It's not as important now as it was 
before we had the ticket receipts,” Brickman told us.324 
2. “SIGN IT” AND RECEIPTS: GOOD IMPROVEMENTS, BUT HAVE 
LIMITATIONS 
Both the signature requirement and the receipts are good steps.  But we found that both 
also have limitations. 
a. Limitations of “Sign It” program 
The Lottery and its licensed retailers are now required to verify the presence of a 
signature on any ticket submitted for checking or validation.  However, they are not 
required to ensure that the signature on a ticket matches the identity of the person 
presenting it.  Under these rules, a thief can claim the prize for a winning ticket, even if 
the signature on that ticket is from the victim. 
We also found no indication that the Lottery has been actively and routinely checking to 
make sure its licensed retailers are complying with the new signature requirement.  In late 
2008 we presented unsigned tickets to clerks at ten central Iowa stores.  When we asked 
them to check our tickets, five required us to sign our tickets, while five did not. 
b. Limitations of receipts 
When it introduced the new customer receipts, the Lottery suggested they would prevent 
fraud.  “When a player wins a prize, the receipt will show the amount won, eliminating 
any possibility of confusion over the winnings that should be paid out,” the Lottery’s 
press release said.325 
In a newspaper article about the receipts, Neubauer was quoted as saying, “Both the 
retailer and the customers have receipts available showing the outcome of the play.  
There is no question in anybody’s mind what the outcome of the play was because it is 
shown right there on that piece of paper.”326 
                                                 
321 Many lotteries allow customers the option of checking their own tickets by offering ticket-checker 
devices at licensed retailers.  These devices allow customers to determine the results of a ticket without 
needing to hand the ticket over to a retailer. 
322 Meeting Minutes of Lottery Board (July 17, 2008) (on file with author). 
323 The customer display unit is an electronic screen that shows whether a ticket scanned through a terminal 
is a winner. 
324 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
325 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, Iowa Lottery Implements Receipts Phase of Player Security Program (May 
2, 2008) (on file with author). 
326 William Petroski, For Safety, Lottery Asks Buyers to Sign Tickets, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 21, 2008, at 
1A. 
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Contrary to its public suggestions, we found that the Lottery is not requiring retailers to 
provide or offer receipts to customers.  “Retailers are encouraged but not required to offer 
the receipts to customers,” then-Acting CEO Brickman acknowledged.327 
We question the effectiveness of the new receipts if the Lottery does not require retailers 
to offer them to customers.  To illustrate the problem, when we asked clerks at ten central 
Iowa stores to check our tickets in late 2008, only four offered us a receipt. 
As a state enterprise, the Lottery holds the burden of ensuring that receipts are offered to 
its customers, on whom the Lottery depends for generating tens of millions of dollars in 
profits for state government every year. 
In addition, the Lottery website includes a video that advises customers how to use the 
receipts.328  In the video, Vice President for External Relations Neubauer suggests that 
customers compare the serial numbers on the receipt with those on the ticket, to make 
sure that they match.  But later in the video, she notes that winning tickets are not 
returned to customers.  This raises the question: How can customers compare the serial 
numbers if winning tickets are not returned to them? 
c. Overall limitations 
Most importantly, customers who sign their tickets and ask for receipts could still be 
susceptible to various potential retailer scams, such as “partial win payment” and 
“palming”: 
• Partial Win Payment: A clerk tells customers that they have won a smaller 
amount than the actual prize, i.e., telling a customer he has won $50 when it was 
actually $250, and then pockets the difference after the customer leaves. 
• Palming: A dishonest clerk keeps a few losing tickets near the terminal.  When 
any unsuspecting customer hands over a ticket to see if it is a winner, the clerk 
uses his palm to discreetly swap that ticket with one of the known losing tickets.  
The clerk then enters the non-winning ticket into the terminal scanner, which 
produces a “Not a Winner” receipt to be handed to the customer.  Unless the 
customer is on top of the situation, they would leave the store, and the clerk could 
later check the customer’s original ticket and claim any prize for himself. 
These potential scams arise from the fact that store employees take temporary control of 
customers’ tickets during the validation process, and also control the payout process for 
most prizes of $600 or less.  These procedures can allow a scam artist to trick customers 
without their knowledge – even those who sign their tickets and ask for receipts.  This 
includes any customer who hands a ticket to a store employee without knowing whether 
it is a winning ticket, and if so, the prize amount.  This also includes any customer who 
suspects something is amiss during the validation process but does not retrieve the ticket 
back from the store employee. 
 
                                                 
327 Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, Iowa Lottery, to Ombudsman (Jan. 27, 2009) (on file 
with author). 
328 See Iowa Lottery, Videos & More, http://www.ialottery.com/VideosAndMore/Videos/Video_Player.asp 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009) (follow “Player Mail: Receipts” hyperlink). 
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OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
42. The Lottery should amend its Licensing Terms and Conditions to require that 
retailers must offer receipts to customers for every ticket that is checked or 
cashed. 
B. THE NEED FOR RETAILERS TO RETURN ALL TICKETS TO CUSTOMERS 
The Lottery instructed retailers, in a 2008 newsletter, to offer all non-winning tickets 
back to customers.329  But that directive did not apply to winning tickets.  In fact, 
whenever Iowa retailers pay out a Lottery prize to a customer who presents a winning 
instant ticket, the retailer is required to destroy the winning ticket.330 
In Canada, the British Columbia Ombudsman found that the provincial lottery there was 
aware that requiring retailers to destroy winning tickets “could make it easier for retailers 
to ‘defraud the player.’”331 
The British Columbia Ombudsman’s report then stated: 
[B]y not having the original ticket returned, players are put 
at a serious disadvantage when the player suspects that they 
were not paid the correct amount and takes their complaint 
to BCLC [British Columbia Lottery Corporation].  
 
In brief, BCLC is generally unable to investigate this type 
of complaint thoroughly unless the player can provide the 
exact details of the validation transaction. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
43. The Lottery should devise and implement a procedure whereby retailers would 
return all tickets to customers with appropriate markings to identify whether the 
ticket is not a winner; has been validated but not paid out; or is a winner and has 
been paid out.  The procedure should specifically require retailers to return all 
tickets to customers with the appropriate markings. 
                                                 
329 Retailers: After you Check a Nonwinning Ticket, LOTTERY ACTION (Iowa Lottery, Des Moines, Iowa), 
Jan. 28 – Feb. 10, 2008, at 3. 
330 See Appendix A.  (“SECTION B – INSTANT/SCRATCH GAMES … Retailers shall obtain and 
mutilate each ticket paid to prevent double payment.”). 
331 OMBUDSMAN BRITISH COLUMBIA, WINNING FAIR AND SQUARE: A REPORT ON THE BRITISH COLUMBIA 
LOTTERY CORPORATION’S PRIZE PAYOUT PROCESS (2007), 
http://www.ombud.gov.bc.ca/resources/reports/Special_Reports/Special%20Report%20No%20-
%2031.pdf. 
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C. THE NEED TO EDUCATE CUSTOMERS TO KNOW THE RESULTS BEFORE 
HANDING TICKETS TO RETAILERS 
He is sure this terminal has cheated him and other people out of 
money before he started keeping track. 
— Investigator’s notes describing a conversation  
with the customer who filed the complaint 332 
 
1. TERMINAL MALFUNCTIONS 
A Carlisle man was in a group of ten co-workers who pooled their money to buy 100 
Powerball tickets every week.  The man commonly checked the tickets at a local 
convenience store.  Like many customers, he would hand the tickets to a store clerk who 
ran them through the Lottery terminal to see if any were winners. 
Over time, the man began to realize the terminal had a problem.  “I used to never look at 
the numbers,” he told us.  “Then they'd say, ‘No winner’ but I knew there was [a 
winner].”333 
When he mentioned the problem to the clerks, he said they told him, “It happens all the 
time.”  It came to a head one day when he checked and found one ticket was a $3 winner.  
He took the tickets to the same store, where a clerk ran the tickets through the terminal.  
Once again it mistakenly indicated that none was a winner.  But when the clerk ran the 
tickets through a second time, the terminal correctly identified the $3 winner. 
That is when the man reported the problem to the Lottery.  “He is sure this terminal has 
cheated him and other people out of money before he started keeping track,” the 
investigator wrote.  The investigator told the man that someone would go to the store to 
check the terminal. 
From the investigator’s notes, there is no indication that he ever followed-up with the 
man.334  “That’s the last I ever heard, that I can recollect, from anybody,” the man told us.  
“I don’t believe the Lottery ever called me back or let me know what was going on.” 
As for the terminal, a technician checked it and found that the document scanner needed 
to be cleaned.  The Lottery told us that no further problems involving that terminal have 
been reported or discovered since that time. 
This man was not alone.  In reviewing Lottery records, we found several other examples 
of customers reporting that a terminal mistakenly identified a winning ticket as a non-
winner.335 
 
                                                 
332 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-109 (2007). 
333 Telephone Interview of the customer by an Ombudsman investigator (Apr. 10, 2008). 
334 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-109 (2007). 
335 Other similar reports were made.  E-mail from a northeastern Iowa customer (Dec. 24, 2006) (on file 
with author); E-mail from an eastern Iowa customer (June 29, 2007) (on file with author); E-mail from a 
southern Iowa customer (Aug. 22, 2007) (on file with author). 
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2. LOTTERY CONFIRMS: TERMINALS CAN MALFUNCTION, OTHER 
SOURCES ALSO IMPERFECT 
The man might have been able to avoid these problems if only he knew what Lottery 
management has known for years. 
“There can be malfunctions with individual terminals just as there can be malfunctions 
with any electrical or mechanical device in existence,” then-Acting CEO Brickman wrote 
in his November 5, 2007, letter of response to our notice of investigation.  Then-CEO Dr. 
Ed Stanek made a similar statement to our office in response to a previous 
investigation.336 
While customers “have a wide array of sources available,” he indicated that no one 
source is guaranteed against error.  His letter noted that the media can make a mistake 
when it reports winning online-game numbers. 
Store employees could also make a mistake when validating a ticket.  In addition, the 
Lottery website has a disclaimer stating that the Lottery does not guarantee the accuracy 
of information on its website, which would include winning numbers for online games 
like Powerball or Hot Lotto.337 
3. LOTTERY ADVISES THAT CUSTOMERS SHOULD KNOW THE RESULTS 
BEFORE HANDING TICKETS TO RETAILERS 
Brickman’s November 5, 2007, letter also indicated it is acceptable for customers to rely 
on terminals, but only if they already know whether their ticket is a winner.  
“[C]ustomers should not rely solely on any one source of information to determine the 
winning or nonwinning status of lottery tickets,” Brickman wrote. 
Vice President for External Relations Neubauer told us that the Lottery has historically 
stressed that customers: 
… should never be relying upon one single device or one 
single entity as the be-all end-all of the information about 
your lottery ticket.  You should have tried to figure out if 
your ticket was a winner before you got to the store and 
you should be looking at many different sources for 
information.338 
That seems like excellent advice, the kind of information that Lottery customers could 
use to protect their interests. 
 
 
 
                                                 
336 Letter from Dr. Ed Stanek, then-CEO, Iowa Lottery, to Ombudsman (Apr. 4, 1995) (on file with author)  
(“As with any mechanical or electronic device, errors can occasionally occur.”). 
337 Iowa Lottery, Legal Requirements, http://www.ialottery.com/LegalRequirements/disclaimer.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
338 Sworn Interview of Mary Neubauer at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
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4. LOTTERY HAS NOT SHARED THIS ADVICE WITH ITS CUSTOMERS 
We could not find any publicly disseminated information from the Lottery comparable to 
Neubauer’s statement to us: “You should have tried to figure out if your ticket was a 
winner before you got to the store and you should be looking at many different sources 
for information.” 
a. Information on the backs of tickets and Lottery website 
The back of all online tickets includes the following information (actual size): 
 
In referring to that information, then-Acting CEO Brickman told us, “And unfortunately I 
don’t have a magnifying glass so I can’t read all the print.”339 
The Lottery’s website includes a section titled, “Security Tips at the Retail Level,”340 
which has the following information: 
The first line of defense in consumer protection is always 
for players to arm themselves with the information they 
need to determine whether their tickets have won a prize. 
That’s much the same thing we all should be doing to 
ensure, for example, that a clerk has given us the proper 
change or that the milk we bought at the local store rang up 
for the right price. 
 
There are lots of ways that you as a lottery player can check 
the results of your tickets: 
 
● Watch the televised drawings in lotto games. 
 
● Check the information here on the lottery Web site. 
                                                 
339 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
340 Iowa Lottery, Player Security, http://www.ialottery.com/Player_Security/PS_RetailTips.html (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2009). 
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● Ask retailers to print out winning numbers from the 
lottery terminal. 
 
● Call one of the lottery’s five regional offices around the 
state for information. 
 
● Listen to lottery results on local radio stations. 
 
● And check lottery results in local newspapers. 
 
However, we believe there is no substitute for player 
responsibility and player diligence, despite all the 
assistance that we can provide.  
While the information on the backs of tickets and on the Lottery website is somewhat 
helpful, it does not specifically caution customers against relying solely on terminals or 
any other source of information to determine whether a ticket is a winner; nor does it 
specifically encourage them to employ more than one source. 
b. Lottery press releases 
We also found that the Lottery’s own press releases are replete with stories of winning 
customers who rely exclusively on store clerks to check their tickets.  These press 
releases, written by Lottery staffers, give no indication that these customers were 
engaging in a practice that is discouraged by top management. 
Here are excerpts from two such Lottery press releases: 
• [A Grinnell man] won $10,000 in the Sept. 20 Powerball drawing….  [The man] 
said he always has the store clerk check his tickets for him. He had no idea that he 
held a big winning ticket the day after the drawing when he had it checked! 
 
“It was quite a surprise,” he laughed. “When this particular ticket came up, they 
said, ‘You won some money and you've got to go to Des Moines.’”341 
• [A Cedar Rapids man] claimed the jackpot for the July 5 $100,000 Cash Game 
drawing…. 
 
When [the man] had his winning ticket checked, the store clerk seemed more 
shocked than he was! 
 
“She was a nervous wreck. She’d never seen [a winning ticket] that big before,” 
[the man] said. “I just didn’t believe it at first. I thought it was some kind of 
mistake. I thought maybe she was playing a joke on me.”342 
 
                                                 
341 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, [Man] Wins $100,000 in Sept. 20 Powerball Drawing (Sept. 23, 2006) (on 
file with author). 
342 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, Cedar Rapids Man Wins $100,000 Prize (July 18, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
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In the context of potential retailer fraud and terminal malfunctions, we find the 
prevalence of customers who rely exclusively on handing tickets to store employees (who 
could make a mistake or try to trick them) to run through a terminal (which could make a 
mistake) is a significant problem which the Lottery has not addressed. 
5. SOURCE ERRORS COULD BE CAUSE OF SOME UNCLAIMED PRIZES 
In the fiscal year ending June 30, 2006, the Iowa Lottery reported unclaimed prizes of 
nearly $1.2 million.343  The figure jumped to nearly $1.8 million for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 2007.344 
Just in calendar year 2007, for example, the following significant prizes went unclaimed: 
• A $100,000 winner from the $100,000 Cash Game that was sold in Davenport and 
expired in May. 
• A $100,000 winner from the $100,000 Cash Game that was sold in Altoona and 
expired in October. 
• A $200,000 winning Powerball ticket sold in Des Moines that expired in March. 
• A $200,000 winning Powerball ticket sold in Marion that expired in July. 
In addition, a $30 million Powerball jackpot sold in Indiana went unclaimed in 2003.  
The money reverted back to the individual states where the tickets had been sold.  The 
Iowa Lottery received about $1.2 million in one-time income, and those funds were 
subsequently transferred to the state’s general fund. 
Is it possible that the owners of those tickets relied on terminals or other sources that 
made a mistake?  No one likely knows the answer, but it is reasonable to wonder. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
44. The Lottery should advise its customers, in simple, clear, and unambiguous terms 
that all sources, including the terminals, can err.  In addition, the Lottery should 
advise that it would be wise for customers to: 
 
– Rely on multiple sources before concluding a ticket is not a winner. 
 
– Never hand a ticket to a store employee without knowing whether it is a winner. 
 
                                                 
343 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.31(2)(d) (2009) defines “unclaimed prizes” as those for which a valid claim is 
not made for the prize money within an applicable period to be determined by the Lottery.  According to 
the Lottery website, Powerball and Hot Lotto tickets are valid for 365 days after the drawing in which the 
prize was won; tickets for the other online games ($100,000 Cash Game, Pick 3 and Pick 4) are valid for 90 
days after the drawing; and instant-scratch tickets are valid within 90 days of the end of the game.  See 
Iowa Lottery, Games, http://www.ialottery.com/Games/unclaimed.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). 
344 OFFICE OF AUDITOR OF STATE, STATE OF IOWA, IOWA LOTTERY AUTHORITY- INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S 
REPORTS BASIC FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION SCHEDULE OF FINDINGS 
(2007), http://publications.iowa.gov/6017/1/0860-6270-B000.pdf. 
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45. The Lottery should educate its customers about the various Lottery-related scams, 
including but not limited to “palming” and “partial win payment.”  The purpose 
would be to educate customers about the scams so that they can understand how 
to reduce the risk of falling victim to such scams. 
 
For an example of how this could be written, see the newspaper article sub-
headlined “Four Ways Retailers Can Steal Your Winning Ticket,” published by 
the Vancouver Sun on May 30, 2007.345 
46. The Lottery should take immediate steps to bolster the customer-education 
information on its website and in its literature, as well as ensuring that the 
improved literature is distributed to all licensed retailers.   
 
The information should clearly emphasize simple steps that all customers can 
follow to protect their interests.   Based on our review of advice on other lottery 
websites, here is an example of how the new information could be presented: 
 
SIMPLE STEPS FOR THE SMART LOTTERY CUSTOMER 
Don’t become a victim of a scam artist!  Here are three simple steps: 
 
1. Know the results of all tickets before handing them to a retailer.  Treat each 
ticket you purchase as a winning ticket until proven otherwise. 
 
2. Sign all tickets as soon as possible after purchase, and definitely before 
handing them to a retailer.  For winning tickets, it might also be a good idea to 
make a copy of both sides of the ticket, especially if you consider the prize 
amount to be significant. 
 
3. Obtain all tickets back from retailers, as well as the accompanying receipts.  
This will allow you to review the results of the transaction, especially if the 
results differed from what you had determined, or if you observe a retailer acting 
suspiciously while validating a ticket (in which case you are encouraged to report 
the matter to the Lottery immediately).   
 
You can always redeem tickets directly through the Lottery.  If you mail a 
winning ticket to Lottery offices, we suggest that you make a copy of the front 
and back of your ticket for your records. 
47. The Lottery should propose amending Iowa Code chapter 99G to include the 
protection of the interests of Lottery customers as a specific objective. 
                                                 
345 This article appears to have been based on a section titled “Potential Scams – Under $10,000” (found on 
pages 38-41) in OMBUDSMAN BRITISH COLUMBIA, WINNING FAIR AND SQUARE: A REPORT ON THE BRITISH 
COLUMBIA LOTTERY CORPORATION’S PRIZE PAYOUT PROCESS (2007), 
http://www.ombud.gov.bc.ca/resources/reports/Special_Reports/Special%20Report%20No%20-
%2031.pdf.  The Vancouver Sun article is attached as Appendix J. 
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D. THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT ADDITIONAL CUSTOMER PROTECTION TOOLS 
1. SELF-SERVE TICKET CHECKERS 
a. Customers have asked for ticket checkers 
“Why doesn’t the iowa lottery [sic] get those ticket checkers like illinois [sic] has?” a 
customer wrote in a March 13, 2007, e-mail to the Lottery Web Master.  “That way 
people could check their own tickets to see if they are winners and not have to tie up the 
clerks at the stores.” 
“Thanks for contacting us,” the Web Master replied.  “We may consider purchasing these 
in the future; however, the price has been prohibitive in the past.  We appreciate your 
input.” 
We found that the Lottery has occasionally received requests from customers asking for 
self-serve ticket checkers to be installed, usually noting that lotteries in adjacent states 
have them.346  The Lottery has typically responded by saying that the cost of adding ticket 
checkers would be prohibitive. 
b. Lottery rejected 2008 offer for ticket checkers 
In her written presentation to the Government Oversight Committee at its January 30, 
2008, meeting, Vice President for External Relations Neubauer explained why the 
Lottery had not installed ticket checkers: 
The Lottery is nearing the end of its current equipment 
contract and based upon 2,250 locations that sell instant-
scratch and lotto games in the state, it would cost 
approximately $30 million annually to provide the self-
check devices today. 
One week after Neubauer presented that information to the Government Oversight 
Committee, then-Acting CEO Brickman received a letter from Scientific Games 
International, Inc. (SGI), the Lottery’s vendor for online games.  The February 8, 2008, 
letter presented three proposals for what SGI would offer if the Lottery agreed to exercise 
the last one-year option on the contract that was then in place.347 
Under the first proposal, SGI offered three items: 
• Installation of up to 2,000 ticket checkers at no charge, an estimated $1.3 million 
proposition.348 
                                                 
346 The lotteries in Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Illinois, and Missouri all offer ticket checkers for their 
customers. 
347 Lottery records show that SGI faxed the same letter to then-Board Chairman Tim Clausen on February 
19, 2008. 
348 Under the offer, the Lottery would have had to pay approximately $162,500 to install ticket checkers in 
all 2,250 locations that sell instant-scratch and lotto games in the state.  SGI’s offer also said the Lottery 
“would need to modify its instant-ticket design to include a barcode under the latex,” but did not provide an 
estimated cost for that modification. 
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• A 17 percent reduction in contract fee rates, an additional estimated $1.3 million 
proposition. 
• An additional $100,000 for the Lottery to purchase new computer equipment for 
sales staff. 
The Lottery Board, at its July 17, 2008, meeting, declined SGI’s offer for ticket checkers.  
The Board instead agreed to a different SGI offer, a 34 percent reduction in contract fee 
rates which would lead to an estimated $2.6 million in savings for the Lottery, according 
to SGI’s February 8, 2008, letter.349 
The Lottery Board’s decision came after then-Acting CEO Brickman told the Board that 
“there was no need to rush forward with ticket checking technology at the present time 
because of the steps already taken to protect the Lottery’s retailers and players through 
the ticket signing requirement and the issuing of ticket receipts.”350 
According to the minutes, had the Board agreed to pursue the offer of ticket checkers, it 
would have taken up to a year for the devices to be operational. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
48. The Lottery should act to ensure that ticket checker devices are installed, as soon 
as practical and at a reasonable cost, at the outlets that sell instant-scratch and 
lotto games. 
2. CUSTOMER DISPLAY UNITS (CDUs) 
The Iowa Lottery’s website includes this statement: 
The Iowa Lottery has customer display units along with its 
sales and validations terminals in retail locations that sell 
lotto tickets. The customer display unit shows the results of 
a particular transaction, and players can see the information 
on the screen.351 
We found complaints from some customers who mentioned, as a secondary concern, that 
the CDU at a particular store was turned away from customers.352  We also found that one 
entire chain, does not have a CDU at any of its 24 Lottery-licensed outlets.353 
 
 
 
                                                 
349 That proposal also included “at no additional cost, the licensing and printing of SGI’s proprietary bar 
code technology,” according to the minutes of the Board’s July 17 meeting. 
350 Meeting Minutes of Lottery Board (July 17, 2008) (on file with author). 
351 Iowa Lottery, Player Security, http://www.ialottery.com/Player_Security/PS_RetailTips.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
352 See, e.g,, Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-036 (2007). 
353 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
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During interviews, employees and managers of the Security Division all agreed that the 
CDUs are an important customer-protection tool.354  But they also said that they did not 
know why an entire chain was apparently allowed to “opt out” of having the CDUs. 
We found the answer from Vice President for Sales Larry Loss.  He told us that the retail 
chain had recently redesigned its stores, and apparently decided that it no longer wanted 
the CDUs.  Loss said he determined the retain chain’s decision was acceptable.355  Asked 
for his reasoning, Loss told us, “We don’t have anything that requires them to absolutely 
use [CDUs].”356 
An attachment referenced by the Licensing Terms and Conditions states that retailers 
licensed to sell online games are required to “[a]llow placement of a CDU sign within six 
feet of the lottery terminal.”357  That language does not actually require stores to have a 
CDU, Lottery managers told us.  Stores are “required to allow it.  If we see that we need 
it,” then-Acting CEO Brickman said.358 
A recent forensic audit of the Ontario lottery found that activity associated with palming 
has decreased significantly since the lottery increased the visibility of CDUs.359 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
49. The Lottery should amend its Licensing Terms and Conditions to specifically 
require that all licensees which sell online games must have a CDU. 
50. The Lottery should work immediately to ensure that CDUs are installed and 
operating properly at all retailers licensed to sell online games. 
51. The Lottery should work to develop a mechanism to lock CDUs permanently in 
place so that the devices always face customers. 
                                                 
354 Sworn interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008); Sworn 
Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008); Sworn Interview of 
Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008); Sworn Interview of Ken Moon at 
the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008); Sworn Interview of Roger Mott at the Office of 
Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
355 In reaching his decision, Loss told us that he had no communications with the retail chain, nor with 
anyone else in the Lottery management team. 
356 Telephone Interview of Larry Loss by an Ombudsman investigator (Oct. 23, 2008). 
357 See Terminal Specification Sheet, Iowa Lottery (on file with author). 
358 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
359 DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP ONTARIO LOTTERY AND GAMING CORPORATION: A DATA ANALYTIC REVIEW 
OF LOTTERY TRANSACTIONS (2009). 
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3. “BIG WIN” TERMINAL FREEZE 
This procedure is triggered any time a terminal validates a winning ticket worth $10,000 
and above in British Columbia, and $5,000 and above in Ontario.  Under this procedure, 
the terminal stops working and the retailer is required to call the lottery to “unfreeze” the 
terminal.  A lottery representative then speaks directly with the customer and provides 
instructions on how to redeem the prize. 
The Ontario lottery recently learned that the number of incidents involving the “partial 
win payment” scam has apparently declined since it implemented the “big win” terminal 
freeze procedure.360  The Iowa Lottery does not have a terminal freeze procedure. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
52. The Lottery should adopt and implement a “big win” terminal freeze procedure 
any time a terminal validates a winning ticket worth $10,000 or more. 
4. MUSICAL JINGLES 
Many lotteries have programmed their terminals to play a musical tune or “jingle” 
whenever a winning ticket is validated.  This helps cue customers that their ticket is a 
winner, and would presumably make it more difficult for retailer scam artists to trick a 
customer out of prize money or even the ticket itself.  “Winning tickets scanned through a 
lottery terminal will play a musical tune,” says a statement on the Kansas Lottery 
website.  “Players should always be alert for a musical tune.”361 
The Iowa Lottery has elected not to have such a jingle.  In her November 2007 memo to 
the Lottery Board, Vice President for External Relations Neubauer wrote: 
Our terminals are capable of that change and we’ve 
discussed that idea in the past. But we’ve chosen not to use 
it because of concerns over public safety. A winning jingle 
might tip off stalkers to a particular player’s good fortune, 
leaving that person vulnerable to attack once they left the 
retail establishment. 
Neubauer later claimed that safety concerns about the jingles have “been expressed by 
players.”362  We subsequently asked the Lottery for examples of customers expressing 
concerns about a musical jingle.  In response, the Lottery provided e-mails from two 
customers.  Contrary to Neubauer’s claim, neither e-mail expressed safety concerns about 
adding a musical jingle.363 
                                                 
360 DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP ONTARIO LOTTERY AND GAMING CORPORATION: A DATA ANALYTIC REVIEW 
OF LOTTERY TRANSACTIONS (2009). 
361 Kansas Lottery, Warning! Protect Your Winnings, 
http://www.kslottery.com/lotteryinfo/ticketsecuritytips.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2009) (“[P]layers should 
always be alert for a musical tune…). 
362 This statement was in Neubauer’s written presentation to the Government Oversight Committee on 
January 30, 2008. 
363 A November 4, 2007, e-mail to the Lottery from a southeast Iowa customer suggested that the Lottery 
“should institute an alarm going off each time a winning ticket is scanned.”  A February 20, 2008, e-mail to 
the Lottery from a central Iowa customer suggested adding a light that would turn on whenever a terminal 
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OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
53. The Lottery should develop and install a musical jingle to help cue customers that 
their ticket is a winner, and to make it more difficult for a retailer to trick a 
customer out of prize money or even the ticket itself. 
5. TOLL-FREE TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR CUSTOMERS 
A number of lotteries offer toll-free telephone numbers for customers.  The website of the 
British Columbia lottery includes a “Player First” section which states in part: 
We Want To Hear From You 
 
If you have comments or concerns please call toll free: 
 
Consumer Services 
1-866-815-0222364 
The Iowa Lottery, by contrast, does not offer a toll-free telephone number for customers.  
However, the Iowa Lottery does offer a toll-free number for licensed retailers.  The 
website of the Iowa Lottery includes a “Retailers” section which states in part: 
800 number is for retailers only 
 
The Iowa Lottery’s 800 number is for retailer use only. It 
should not be given out to the public because the extra 
volume of calls can prevent us from responding as quickly 
to retail issues.365 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATION 
54. The Lottery should offer a toll-free phone number dedicated to customers who 
have a complaint, question or comment. 
                                                                                                                                                 
scans a winning ticket. 
364 British Columbia Lottery Corp., Improving the Lottery: Improving Customer Support, 
http://www.bclc.com/cm/AboutBCLC/PlayerFirst/CustomerSupport.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). 
365 Iowa Lottery, Retailer FAQs & Tips, http://www.ialottery.com/retailers/RetailerFAQs.html (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2009). 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The other thing that I think is just a general statement about the 
self-checkers is that you shouldn't be looking at any device as 
being the perfect panacea as the solution to an issue for people 
checking their tickets.  
— Vice President for External Relations Neubauer, 
in her sworn interview 
 
We could not agree more with the above statement by Neubauer.  Of the various possible 
procedures for educating and protecting customers, none offers the perfect solution. 
Taken together, however, the checks and balances discussed in this section could 
significantly improve the level of protection for customers of the Iowa Lottery. 
The 2008 addition of the “Sign It” program and customer receipts were good steps in the 
right direction.  But as this section has demonstrated, those improvements alone still 
leave customers inadequately protected.  Based on this information, we conclude that the 
Lottery has not taken adequate steps to educate and protect its customers. 
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VIII. LOTTERY HAS PROVIDED INADEQUATE DIRECTIVES TO RETAILERS 
It isn’t rocket science to be a retailer and sell. 
— Then-Acting Lottery CEO Brickman in  
September 17, 2008, interview  
with Ombudsman investigators 
 
Lottery customers depend on store clerks to be knowledgeable and honest brokers.  That 
is especially true when customers do not understand all the rules, and when the Lottery 
itself falls short on policing retailers. 
With that in mind, we examined whether the Lottery has ensured that store clerks know 
what is expected of them, and what penalties may befall them for betraying customers’ 
trust. 
A. INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERKS ARE VAGUE, INCONSISTENT AND NOT EASILY 
ACCESSIBLE 
When an Iowa retailer wants to apply for a license to sell Lottery tickets, the Lottery 
provides him with a Retailer Application Kit.  A cover letter informs the retailer that he 
must read an enclosed copy of Licensing Terms and Conditions and agree to its 
provisions before he can be licensed to sell tickets.  By signing an enclosed application, 
the retailer certifies that he has read and understood the Terms and Conditions and agrees 
to comply with them. 
Lottery officials told us that retailers are required to follow additional provisions in Iowa 
Code chapter 99G and the Lottery’s administrative rules.366  However, the Retailer 
Application Kit does not include copies of the Lottery’s laws or rules, and the few 
references made to them are inconspicuous and vague.  Moreover, the Lottery provides 
none of these documents directly to retail clerks.  This is despite the fact that clerks – not 
licensed retailers – handle the bulk of many stores’ Lottery transactions. 
Even after we reviewed these three technical and fairly lengthy documents – chapter 99G, 
administrative rules, and Licensing Terms and Conditions – we had many unanswered 
questions about clerks’ responsibilities to customers.  Questions such as what to do with 
losing tickets, how to spot and handle an altered ticket, or whether it is acceptable to 
charge a fee to cash tickets are not explicitly addressed. 
A “retailer manual” referenced in Licensing Terms and Conditions appeared to be a 
document that might provide further guidance for clerks.  When we asked the Lottery for 
the manual, we received four versions of the document, the newest of which the Lottery 
said it last distributed in 2001.  While there are some useful directives in the manuals, we 
found inconsistencies when we compared them to provisions in Licensing Terms and 
Conditions, Iowa law, and other Lottery materials. 
                                                 
366 Sworn Interview of Mary Neubauer at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008); Sworn 
Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept.17, 2008). 
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Here are two examples of those inconsistencies: 
Determining the winner of a ticket 
• “The person in physical possession of the ticket is the owner of the ticket and is 
entitled to prize payment, regardless of any signature or other writing that may be 
found on the ticket after purchase.” 
– Instant Ticket & Pull Tab Retailer Reference Manual (2001) 
 
• “The person who signs the ticket is thereafter considered the owner of the ticket.” 
– Iowa Admin. Code 531–11.4 (2009) 
 
• “The prize shall be given to the person who presents a winning ticket.” 
– Iowa Code section 99G.31(2)(a) (2009) 
 
Prize payouts 
• “Retailers are required by Iowa Lottery Terms and Conditions to pay prizes up to 
$100.” 
– Instant Ticket & Pull Tab Retailer Reference Manual (2001) 
 
• “Prizes up to $100 may be redeemed at any retail location.” 
– “Sign It. It’s Yours.” leaflet (2008) 
 
• “Retailers must pay all prizes of $25 or less and may pay prizes of $600 or less.” 
– Licensing Terms and Conditions (2008) 
 
Regardless of these discrepancies, the Lottery told us that none of the four retailer 
manuals was technically still “in force.”367  We have no indication that the Lottery ever 
informed its licensed retailers and clerks of this fact. 
The Lottery told us that an electronic training mode on store terminals now serves as the 
retailer manual.368  But when we reviewed the electronic material, we found it was less 
substantive than the information contained in the outdated paper manuals. 
 
                                                 
367 Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, to Ombudsman investigator (Aug. 6, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
368 Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, to Ombudsman (May 19, 2008) (on file with author). 
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Lottery newsletters, another potential source of information for retailers, have generally 
lacked useful directions for clerks on conducting Lottery transactions.  We reviewed 
several years’ worth of the periodic newsletters and found that they have primarily served 
as a vehicle for game announcements, features on winning customers, and the like.  The 
newsletter has contained occasional tips on proper security procedures. But, according to 
one store manager we interviewed, those tips “might be lost in there, just like the written 
correction might be lost in the local newspaper.”369  Furthermore, the newsletters are not 
required reading for retailers or clerks. 
The Lottery says it prefers to deliver its guidance in person through its sales 
representatives, who visit stores weekly and are available to offer any verbal advice that 
stores need.  Then-Acting CEO Brickman told us this is “the best way to ensure that 
information is disseminated and understood” by retailers.370 
However, we discovered that best practices in the area of player security are not widely 
known or followed by retailers.  In late 2008, we asked clerks at ten central Iowa retailers 
to check our tickets and found only four that required us to sign our tickets and offered us 
receipts.371  The signature requirement and the printing of customer receipts were 
introduced by the Lottery just months before our audit and were touted publicly in 
advertising campaigns as part of a new Lottery “Player Security” initiative.372 
B. CLERKS NOT HELD TO SPECIFIC STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 
We also found that the Lottery has no retailer “code of conduct” that might dissuade 
dishonest behavior.  Several Canadian lotteries have implemented a code of conduct that 
applies to all retailers and any retail employee who handles lottery tickets. 
One such code of conduct adopted by the British Columbia lottery373 states in part: 
• “As an authorized lottery retailer or lottery retailer employee, I understand the 
integral role I play in instilling player and public confidence in BCLC’s [British 
Columbia Lottery Corporation] products and services and, therefore, I pledge to 
safeguard BCLC’s commitment to integrity, respect and social responsibility by 
committing to the following conduct, rules and practices.” 
• “I acknowledge that failure to comply with the above conduct, rules and practices 
will result in progressive disciplinary action, up to and including termination of 
the Lottery Operations Agreement.” 
 
                                                 
369 Telephone Interview of store manager by an Ombudsman investigator (Apr. 10, 2008). 
370 Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, Iowa Lottery, to Ombudsman (Nov. 6, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
371 We asked one retail clerk who checked our winning Hot Lotto ticket to apply $1 of our $3 in winnings 
toward the purchase of a new ticket.  The clerk issued us a new ticket and concluded the transaction 
without paying us the difference.  After a momentary pause, the clerk “remembered” our winnings and re-
opened the cash register to pay us.  The clerk did not require a signature or offer us a receipt. 
372 As noted in a previous section, we also found that the Lottery is not requiring retailers to provide or 
offer receipts to customers. 
373 British Columbia Lottery Corporation, Lottery Retailer Code of Conduct, 
http://www.bclc.com/documents/PlayerFirst/LotteryRetailerCodeofConduct.pdf (last visited March 4, 
2009). 
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A cover letter sent to retailers by the British Columbia includes this: 
Q: Why is BCLC making Lottery Retailers follow a 
Retailer Code of Conduct? 
 
A: It is important for all Lottery Retailers to understand the 
contract obligations of their Lottery Operation Agreement 
(LOA) to make certain they understand the expectations 
BCLC has of Lottery Retailers….  By following the 
Retailer Code of Conduct, Lottery Retailers will operate 
their lottery business with a high level of integrity.374 
Although the Iowa Lottery has the authority to suspend or revoke a retailer’s license for 
behaviors that are “prejudicial to public confidence”375 or “inimical to the proper 
operation”376 of the Lottery, those provisions are not well-defined.  Furthermore, it does 
not appear the Lottery has ever cited those provisions as a basis for issuing a sanction 
against a retailer. 
C. NO STANDARDS OF CONDUCT CAN YIELD QUESTIONABLE BEHAVIOR 
The failure of the Iowa Lottery to be explicit about its retailer expectations and vigilant in 
its enforcement can have far-reaching effects.  Take, for instance, the store owner in 
northeast Iowa who told us he has paid out several major prizes that, due to their size, 
normally must be claimed directly from the Lottery.  This retailer agreed to “buy” several 
customers’ winning tickets at a fraction of their value, presumably, he said, because the 
customers wanted to avoid paying back taxes or child support from Lottery prize 
winnings.  The retailer then claimed those prizes from the Lottery as his own.377   
The Lottery’s winner database shows that this store owner and his business claimed 12 
high-tier prizes over an eight-month period, for a total of more than $10,000.  We found 
no indication that the Lottery noticed or investigated this retailer’s spate of prize claims, 
or had any awareness of this phenomenon. 
The retailer did not seem troubled by his involvement in this scheme.  “I know others are 
doing it, so I figured it was legal,” the retailer told us.  We are not certain that this retailer 
practice is illegal, but, at a minimum, we find it to be objectionable, since it circumvents 
established government processes to collect debts. 
                                                 
374 Letter from Jim Lightbody, Lottery Gaming V.P., British Columbia Lottery Corp., to Lottery Retailer 
(July 17, 2007), available at http://www.bclc.com/documents/PlayerFirst/LotteryRetailer6Directives.pdf. 
375 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.27(1)(e) (2009). 
376 IOWA ADMIN. CODE 531-12.12(1)(l). 
377 Telephone Interview of retailer by an Ombudsman investigator (Aug. 11, 2008). 
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D. OTHER LOTTERIES, STORES SEE A NEED FOR SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS 
One manager with a regional retail chain told us that, in comparison to the written 
guidelines of other state lotteries, “There’s really not a lot from the state of Iowa.”378  
Indeed, we discovered that the Nebraska Lottery disseminates two retailer manuals with 
well-organized, easy-to-read instructions on most questions a clerk might have.379  One 
Nebraska Lottery official told us the agency is in the process of condensing and 
combining the two manuals for easier reference. 
We found that some larger retail chains in Iowa produce their own written training 
manuals in place of those not provided by the Lottery.  Predictably, however, we noticed 
that one such manual is partly based on the Lottery’s incomplete and outdated directives. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Overall, we found that the Lottery’s directives are incomplete and are not assembled for 
easy reference by store clerks who are likely to be busy and may need the information at 
a moment’s notice.  We also found no formal, comprehensive retailer training program.  
These shortcomings foster misunderstandings and bad practices among retailers, and also 
limit the ability of Lottery investigators to hold violators accountable. 
Making the Lottery’s ground rules clear for retailers and clerks alike is not only good 
business – it might also help to deter fraud and theft.  The clerk who realizes it is a felony 
to steal a single $1 Lottery ticket may be less inclined to engage in theft than the clerk 
who lacks that knowledge. 
OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDATIONS 
55. The Lottery should develop and implement a program of mandatory e-training for 
all Iowa retailers and their clerks, similar to the programs already developed by 
the lotteries in Ontario and Québec.  This training should incorporate a Retailer 
Code of Conduct similar to those in Québec and British Columbia, which require 
sellers to act in the public interest and abide by general principles of integrity.  
The successful completion of this training should be documented by the Lottery 
and kept on file for reference and investigation purposes.380 
56. The Lottery should consolidate all of its retailer directives and guidelines into a 
single electronic manual that can be quickly and easily referenced by clerks.  The 
Lottery should regularly update the manual as necessary and communicate these 
updates to retailers. 
57. The Lottery should void all outdated versions of the retailer manual and should 
notify all retailers and clerks of this action. 
 
                                                 
378 Telephone Interview of retail chain manager by an Ombudsman investigator (Dec. 15, 2008). 
379 NEBRASKA LOTTERY, RETAILER MANUAL (2007); NEBRASKA LOTTERY, SCRATCH PASS-THROUGH 
MANUAL (2007). 
380 Section IV of this report includes a recommendation that the Security Division should develop and 
implement a program of mandatory e-registration for all Iowa retailers. 
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58. The Lottery should add easy-to-find links to Iowa Code chapter 99G, Lottery 
administrative rules, Licensing Terms and Conditions, and the new Retailer Code 
of Conduct on its website.  The Lottery should direct all current and prospective 
retailers and clerks how to find these laws and rules, and emphasize that failure to 
comply will result in progressive disciplinary action, up to and including 
termination of the store’s license.  Additionally, the Lottery should post 
conspicuous warnings to all retailers and clerks that stealing, altering or 
counterfeiting a single Lottery ticket with an intent to defraud is a felony under 
Iowa Code section 99G.36. 
59. The Lottery should propose legislation to bring Iowa Code chapter 99G in 
conformity with Iowa Administrative Rules 531-11.1 and 531-11.4, which it 
amended in 2008 as part of “Sign It. It’s Yours.”  Additionally, the Lottery should 
reconcile inconsistent directives among its Licensing Terms and Conditions, 
retailer manual, and other documents. 
60. The Lottery should propose legislation or promulgate a rule that would prohibit 
retailers and their employees from obtaining Lottery tickets from customers for 
financial or other considerations. 
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IX. OPPORTUNITY IGNORED: LOTTERY INDIFFERENT TO THE LESSONS OF 
THE CANADIAN SCANDAL 
We will continue to pursue every opportunity to enhance the 
honesty and integrity of our lottery systems. We are committed to 
put the customer first, and have begun the cultural transformation 
to entrench this fundamental philosophy into what is now our new 
way of doing business….  In all, the Ombudsman and KPMG381 
made 60 individual recommendations. OLG382 accepted and 
committed to complete all of them. 
— From the Ontario lottery’s “Summary Report  
to the Ombudsman,”  September 2008 383 
 
I think we should seriously consider hiring a consultant to look 
over these issues for us.  Or, we could implement the 
recommendations from KPMG…. 
— Vice President for External Relations Neubauer  
in an October 26, 2007, e-mail to other managers 
 
We know more than KPMG ever will know about lotteries.  But an 
outside look appears objective. 
— Then-Iowa Lottery CEO Dr. Ed Stanek’s  
October 26, 2007, e-mail reply to Neubauer 
 
In late 2006, Canadians learned that lottery retailers had been claiming significantly more 
major prizes than one would expect given the odds.  It would have been only natural to 
wonder if Iowa had a similar phenomenon. 
The Iowa Lottery showed no such curiosity. 
The previous five sections of this report diagnosed the Lottery’s shortcomings in key 
areas that are crucial to minimizing fraud and protecting customers.  The Canadian 
scandal, which highlighted similar shortcomings, presented an opportunity for the Iowa 
Lottery to evaluate and improve its operations and security practices.  But we found that 
the Iowa Lottery did not take meaningful advantage of it. 
 
                                                 
381 KPMG is an international auditing firm which was hired as a paid consultant by the Ontario lottery 
when the scandal first emerged to conduct a review of all its lottery-related operations and practices. 
382 Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation. 
383 ONTARIO LOTTERY & GAMING CORP., SUMMARY REPORT TO THE OMBUDSMAN (2008), 
http://www.olg.ca/assets/documents/olg_commitment/summary_report_to_the_ombudsman.pdf. 
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A. IOWA LOTTERY WAS MONITORING THE CANADIAN SCANDAL 
Internal Iowa Lottery e-mails show that management monitored the developments out of 
Canada from the moment the scandal began to emerge in October 2006.  Attached to a 
number of those e-mails were Canadian media reports about investigations of major 
prizes that had been claimed by retail employees. 
Included was one newspaper article from Ontario which stated: 
The odds that the 214 insiders who claimed major prizes … 
won as a result of pure luck, is one in a trillion, trillion, 
trillion, trillion, said University of Toronto professor 
Jeffrey Rosenthal, who conducted the analysis. 
 
The program airing Wednesday night suggests this may be 
a problem across Canada and the United States.384 
If the Iowa Lottery had gone back and reviewed its own press releases about major prize 
winners – as we did – they would have found dozens of high-tier prizes claimed by 
retailers and their employees. 
The Iowa Lottery’s internal e-mails included a Canadian media report that some store 
employees had claimed major prizes while having court-related financial problems, 
including bankruptcy.385  We found that at least two Iowa store employees had court-
related financial problems just before they claimed major prizes.  (These individuals and 
their prize claims are discussed in Section I of this report.) 
In addition, a few months after the Canadian scandal emerged, a northwest Iowa 
convenience store clerk claimed a prize of $10,000.  One month later, that same clerk 
claimed a prize of $250,000.  Both prizes were awarded from instant tickets that had 
come from the store where she worked.  That information was included in press releases 
issued by the Iowa Lottery, but we found that neither prize claim was investigated. 
A few months later, an Iowa store owner claimed a $250,000 prize.  Her prize came from 
an instant ticket that came from the store she owned with her husband.  The Lottery’s 
press release said her husband handed her the ticket and told her, “Here, why don’t you 
just scratch some lottery tickets?”386 
By the time of that $250,000 prize claim, the Iowa Lottery already knew about the two 
Canadian investigations, including the Ontario Ombudsman’s report that was highly 
critical of that lottery for failing to adequately review major prize claims by retailers. 387  
According to that same report, a professor of statistics concluded that the rate of Ontario 
retailers winning major prizes for instant games was about 15 times more than expected; 
while the rate of retailers winning major prizes for online games about 3.5 times more 
than expected. 
                                                 
384 Shannon Kari, Lottery “Insiders” Win Big Bucks, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 25, 2006, available 
at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070326.wlotterynew25/BNStory/National/. 
385 Chad Skelton, Lucky Lottery Retailers Also Bankrupt, VANCOUVER SUN, June 1, 2007, available at 
http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=5215c7ba-3b2c-453d-95c3-499946d0545b. 
386 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, Sibley Woman Wins $250,000 (Apr. 9, 2007) (on file with author). 
387 The Ontario Ombudsman’s report was released in March 2007, and the British Columbia Ombudsman’s 
report was released in May 2007. 
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Despite its knowledge of those developments, the Iowa Lottery paid out the store owner’s 
$250,000 instant-ticket prize claim without first reviewing it. 
The two Canadian reports made devastating findings and issued dozens of 
recommendations to improve the lotteries’ enforcement systems.  In response, the chief 
executives of both lotteries were fired, and both lotteries accepted all of the ombudsmen’s 
recommendations. 
Those reports did not hurt Canadian lottery ticket sales.  A May 27, 2007, e-mail 
circulated among Iowa Lottery managers included a media report that quoted an Ontario 
lottery official as saying, “We’ve had a better year this year than last year.”388 
The British Columbia Ombudsman’s report triggered a May 30, 2007, e-mail from then-
Executive Vice President Ken Brickman to other members of the Iowa Lottery 
management team: 
We have our player reporting system and we have no 
known retailer prize theft problem.  However, as part of our 
ongoing introspection, this excerpt from an article on the 
perceived problem in BC and the lottery’s action plan for 
addressing the problem presents an opportunity for us to 
see if we can identify anything that we can do to improve 
our procedures.  Please give this some thought and at our 
next Meeting of the Minds, we will discuss these suggested 
vulnerabilities and responses raised in BC. 
That e-mail seemed to represent a sign that Iowa Lottery management might have been 
carefully studying the Canadian improvements.  But Brickman subsequently told us that 
the Lottery has no record of whether the management discussion suggested in his May 
30, 2007, e-mail even occurred.389 
B. TIP OF THE ICEBERG: IOWA LOTTERY POLICIES COMPARED WITH CANADIAN 
LOTTERY POLICIES 
After we issued our October 5, 2007, notice of investigation, the Iowa Lottery conveyed a 
message that its enforcement policies compared favorably with those being implemented 
by the Canadian lotteries.  The key vehicle for this message was a November 1, 2007, 
memo to the Lottery Board from Vice President of External Relations Neubauer.390   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
388 Teresa Roncon, Ontario lottery spokeswoman [Antonella Artuso, Lottery Dream Lives on, SUN MEDIA 
(Canada), May 26, 2007, available at 
http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Lotteries/LotteryNews/2007/05/26/4210512-sun.html]. 
389 Letter from Ken Brickman, then-Acting CEO, Iowa Lottery, to Ombudsman (Nov. 6, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
390 See Appendix D. 
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After writing that “there may be improvements that can be made,” Neubauer added: 
After consumer complaints in Ontario and Quebec, the 
lotteries there each have spent hundreds of thousands of 
dollars on consultants’ evaluations of their systems. They 
are now in the process of implementing many of the 
consultants’ suggestions for improvements, which have 
turned out to be some of the things we already have been 
doing for years. 
In response to Neubauer’s memo, the Iowa Lottery Board voted against hiring a 
consultant to conduct a review of its operations and practices. 
We have found, however, that the Iowa Lottery at that time had not adopted the vast 
majority of the improvements that the Canadian lotteries were implementing. 
1. CANADIAN LOTTERY POLICIES ADOPTED BEFORE THE SCANDAL 
EMERGED 
Even before their scandal, the Canadian lotteries already had a number of proactive 
enforcement policies that were intended to reduce the inherent retailer advantages.  None 
of these policies was in place at the Iowa Lottery at the time Neubauer presented her 
memo to the Iowa Lottery Board. 
a. British Columbia lottery policies before scandal 391 
Anyone claiming a prize of $10,000 or more in British Columbia was subjected to an 
interview before the prize was paid.  The main purpose of the interview was to ask the 
prize claimant when and where the winning ticket was purchased.  The responses were 
checked to ensure that the claimant’s answers were accurate.  If the claimant was 
identified as a retailer or store employee, there would also be a review by the security 
unit. 
If the lottery was not satisfied that the claim was valid, it could withhold the prize payout 
for a year, after which the issue could have gone to the courts. 
Before the scandal, the British Columbia lottery had several other policies and procedures 
that the Iowa Lottery did not have.  These included: 
• A musical jingle at the terminal where winning tickets were validated. 
• A requirement that retailers provide a receipt for every ticket that was checked.392 
• A prohibition on retailers and store employees from playing lottery games while 
on duty. 
                                                 
391 These policies are based on our review of OMBUDSMAN BRITISH COLUMBIA, WINNING FAIR AND 
SQUARE: A REPORT ON THE BRITISH COLUMBIA LOTTERY CORPORATION’S PRIZE PAYOUT PROCESS (2007), 
http://www.ombud.gov.bc.ca/resources/reports/Special_Reports/Special%20Report%20No%20-
%2031.pdf. 
392 The Iowa Lottery subsequently introduced receipts in May 2008 in response to concerns expressed by 
members of the Government Oversight Committee during its January 30, 2008, meeting. 
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• Self-serve ticket checkers at nearly half of participating outlets. 
b. Ontario lottery policies before scandal 393 
Anyone claiming a prize of $50,000 or more in Ontario was subjected to a prize payout 
interview with three primary questions: Is this your ticket?  Are you sharing this prize?  
Are you affiliated with the lottery in any way? 
If the claimant was identified as a retailer or store employee, there would be additional 
questions on ticket purchase and validation history, as well as the insider’s own playing 
patterns. The purpose was to confirm that the ticket was purchased by the individual 
presenting it. 
As the prize amount grew in size, more senior lottery officials would be required to 
approve payment.  In cases where details were still in dispute, players would be asked to 
sign a declaration asserting their prize claim, and payment could be delayed until the 
ticket expired (generally one year). 
Before the scandal, the Ontario lottery also had: 
• A musical jingle when winning tickets were validated.   
• A procedure that involved the freezing of terminals when a prize of $50,000 or 
more was validated.  With this initiative, when a major winning ticket was 
validated, a “Big Winner” jingle and video message were displayed on the 
customer display unit.  During the freeze, lottery terminal activity was suspended 
and the retailer was prompted to call the lottery so that a representative could 
confirm ticket details with the customer. 
• A policy requiring that all customer complaints regarding retailer theft, fraud, and 
dishonesty would be logged in a single database. 
2. ONTARIO LOTTERY IMPROVEMENTS IN RESPONSE TO SCANDAL 
The Ontario lottery has implemented dozens of improvements since the scandal emerged 
in October 2006.  Most resulted from recommendations by either the Ontario 
Ombudsman or the Ontario lottery’s hired consultant, KPMG. 
The Ontario lottery accepted all of the 60 recommendations made by KPMG and the 
Ontario Ombudsman – and in several cases the lottery went beyond what was 
recommended. 
Among the dozens of improvements that were made, we could only find one that had 
already been adopted by the Iowa Lottery before Neubauer’s November 1, 2007, memo 
to the Board.  (Criminal background checks of retailers applying for a license to sell 
lottery products.)394 
 
                                                 
393 These policies are based on our review of OMBUDSMAN ONTARIO, A GAME OF TRUST (2007), 
http://www.ombudsman.on.ca/media/3268/a_game_of_trust_20070326.pdf. 
394 For an overview of the improvements that have been made just by the Ontario lottery, see Appendix L, 
“Ontario Case Study.” 
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3. ONTARIO LOTTERY THANKFUL FOR OMBUDSMAN’S INVESTIGATION 
The past two years has seen the Ontario lottery move out from the middle of a scandal to 
a dynamic process of introspection and improvement. 
In its September 2008 “Summary Report to the Ombudsman,” the Ontario lottery wrote 
in part:395 
• “Guided by your report and recommendations, meaningful and widespread 
changes have been implemented at OLG [Ontario Lottery and Gaming 
Corporation]. A culture devoted to player protection has been fostered. Our 
collective commitment to fairness and integrity has been renewed.” 
• “The central theme of the Ombudsman’s report was putting customers first. We 
responded to this theme by creating the Player Protection Program.” 
• “In response to the Ombudsman, we were able to quickly implement an extensive 
array of customer-focused changes that were extremely simple and effective.” 
• “While no system is 100 per cent foolproof, we believe our new series of 
overlapping controls has significantly mitigated any inherent risk. The cumulative 
impact of the changes makes any retailer impropriety more difficult and riskier to 
undertake.” 
• “Lottery retailers are valued business partners of OLG, but they are not our 
customers.” 
In the same report to the Ontario Ombudsman, the Ontario lottery also wrote: 
One of the most significant findings of the Ombudsman 
related to the manner in which OLG delivered on its 
mandate.  He said that, over time, OLG became overly 
focused on the creation of revenues for the Government of 
Ontario at the expense of other important aspects of its 
mandate…. 
 
The Board of Directors and OLG’s senior management 
team accepted this finding as honest and accurate and they 
committed to change the strategic focus and management 
culture of the organization accordingly. 
                                                 
395 ONTARIO LOTTERY & GAMING CORP., SUMMARY REPORT TO THE OMBUDSMAN (2008), 
http://www.olg.ca/assets/documents/olg_commitment/summary_report_to_the_ombudsman.pdf. 
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C. IOWA LOTTERY TOP MANAGERS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT CANADIAN 
LOTTERY PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT POLICIES 
Iowa Lottery management should have been studying the Canadian investigations and 
implementing improvements as appropriate if for no other reason than the fact that Iowa 
law required it: 
The chief executive officer shall conduct an ongoing study 
of the operation and administration of lottery laws similar 
to this chapter in other states or countries, of available 
literature on the subject, of federal laws and regulations 
which may affect the operation of the lottery and of the 
reaction of citizens of this state to existing or proposed 
features of lottery games with a view toward 
implementing improvements that will tend to serve the 
purposes of this chapter. [emphasis added]396 
Members of the Lottery’s upper management team told us that they had read the 
Canadian investigative reports.  “We wanted to review what had occurred up there and to 
make sure that if we had any of the same situations, that we would attempt to remedy that 
and change any procedures that we had so that we would not be in the same situation as 
what was found in Canada,” recently retired Vice President for Security Harry Braafhart 
told us.397 
Braafhart added that he and the other vice presidents went through the reports “point by 
point” and “if we had a problem in that area, we would certainly fix it.” 
But during interviews, the Iowa Lottery’s top managers had difficulty identifying and 
explaining the Canadian lotteries’ key proactive enforcement policies, which were 
scrutinized in those reports: 
Ombudsman investigator: Now, you’ve read the Canadian 
reports. Do you know, do they have any mechanisms up 
there that are designed to increase the chances that a scam 
is detected by the lottery? 
 
Braafhart: I don’t know, I don't remember. 
1. REQUIRING RETAILERS TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WHEN CLAIMING 
PRIZES 
Before retiring in July 2008, Braafhart had been the only Vice President for Security in 
the history of the Iowa Lottery.  Beginning in 2001, Braafhart delegated the unit’s 
supervisory duties to John Ellison, who before that had himself been a Lottery 
investigator since 1988. 
When we asked about the practice of requiring retailers and their employees to identify 
themselves when claiming a major prize, Braafhart described it as “a good idea,” then 
added, “If I would have thought about that back then I could have pursued it.” 
                                                 
396 IOWA CODE SECTION 99G.7(2) (2009). 
397 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
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We responded by noting that we learned about that practice by reading the same 
Canadian investigative reports that had already been reviewed by Iowa Lottery 
management.  “Well, I must have missed it then,” Braafhart responded. 
Asked about the same policy, Ellison replied, “It is a good idea.  I just didn’t think of 
it.”398 
2. INVESTIGATING MAJOR PRIZE CLAIMS BY RETAILERS 
We received similar responses when we asked about adopting a policy to investigate 
major prize claims by retailers and their employees.  “I don’t see any problem with that,” 
Braafhart told us. 
But when we asked whether the Iowa Lottery had ever considered such a policy, he 
replied, “Not that I’m aware of.” 
3. POSSIBLE FRAUD INVOLVING ONLINE TICKETS 
Ellison told us that online tickets cannot be susceptible to fraud by retailers.  “How are 
you going to do that?” he asked us. 
But online ticket fraud was the genesis of the Canadian scandal.  This was underscored 
by an infamous case highlighted in the Ontario Ombudsman’s report.  That case involved 
Bob Edmonds, a 78-year-old man who was defrauded out of a $250,000 winning ticket 
when a retailer told him he had only won a free ticket.  The retailer kept the winning 
ticket for herself. 
In a separate case, an Ontario retailer was arrested in December 2007 and charged with 
stealing a $5.7 million winning online ticket from a customer.399 
4. THEN-ACTING CEO HAS NOT EVALUATED CANADIAN POLICY 
MEASURES 
Then-Acting CEO Brickman expressed concerns about several key proactive policies 
adopted by the Canadian lotteries.  But it also became clear that he had not evaluated 
those policies.  During one exchange, we pointed out that the Iowa Lottery does not have 
protocols that would allow it to become aware of instances of fraud or theft in which the 
customer victim doesn’t realize it. 
Brickman responded, “Can you give me an example of how a protocol can be 
accomplished of that nature?  I’m kind of interested to hear.”400 
We responded by noting the possibility of requiring retailers and their employees to 
identify themselves as “insiders” when claiming major prizes.  Brickman objected, saying 
that the Lottery would have no way of detecting individuals who fail to identify 
themselves as retailers or store employees when claiming a major prize. 
 
                                                 
398 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
399 Shannon Kari, Jackpot Awarded Without Insider Probe, NAT’L PROBE (Toronto), Dec. 21, 2007, at A6. 
400 Sworn Interview of Ken Brickman at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 17, 2008). 
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“How do they do it up in Canada then?” we replied.  “I have no idea,” Brickman 
responded.  He later clarified his remarks by adding, “I don't know every detail about 
how they're doing it [in Canada], I don't know what they use for registration purposes and 
all that, but I do know they've got a database of some kind in Ontario.” 
The discussion culminated in this exchange: 
Brickman: [W]e're certainly open to suggestions on things 
that we might do to improve the system, but there is a point 
where every one of the suggestions there is not necessarily 
the optimum solution. And you have to weigh these things. 
You have to weigh these things. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: Cost? 
 
Brickman: To some extent.  Practicality as to whether it's 
really effective.  Is it – what's the cost-benefit. Cost-benefit.  
 
Ombudsman investigator: So what have you done, Ken 
Brickman, to see what the cost-benefit analysis is on this 
type of a step? 
 
Brickman: I'm waiting to see what you have to say in your 
report to see just exactly what you found. 
D. IOWA LOTTERY MANAGEMENT HAS NOT REVIEWED ITS CASE FILES 
When we interviewed then-Acting CEO Brickman – nearly two years after the Canadian 
scandal first emerged – it became clear that he did not realize there have been cases of 
Iowa Lottery customers being victimized by retailers and store employees.  “You have 
cases where someone has defrauded a customer,” Brickman at one point asked us.  He 
later acknowledged, “I’m not familiar with the cases.” 
Harry Braafhart, who was Vice President for Security before retiring in July 2008, 
admitted that he also had not reviewed his unit’s case files: 
Ombudsman investigator: Has anybody at the lottery in the 
last year reviewed the case files from a quality control 
perspective? 
 
Braafhart: I don't know what a quality control perspective 
would mean. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: Well, to see if they were up to 
snuff, to see what's actually in the files. 
 
Braafhart: No. 
 
Ombudsman investigator: Has anybody done that? 
 
Braafhart: No. 
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Ombudsman investigator: … Do you think somebody, 
whether you or somebody else, should have sat down and 
reviewed the case files or maybe not? 
 
Braafhart: I guess I don't understand what you'd be looking 
for.  What would we be looking for?401 
Had Iowa Lottery upper management conducted an internal review of the Security 
Division’s case files and acted accordingly, it is possible that the Lottery may have 
discovered these shortcomings. 
                                                 
401 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
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Conclusions 
The Iowa Lottery takes great pride in the work done by its security 
department and believes those efforts are integral to maintaining 
the integrity of the lottery. 
— December 2007 operations report  
by the Iowa Lottery to the Iowa Legislature’s  
Government Oversight Committee 
 
A. THE NEED FOR A PROACTIVE SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES 
The Iowa Lottery and the state government it serves have a self interest in ensuring that 
customers are reasonably protected from potential risks.  A lottery that does not 
adequately protect its customers risks losing their confidence, potentially harming the 
lottery and, in turn, the government that depends on its profits. 
Among people who are inclined to steal Lottery tickets, those who sell them have several 
inherent advantages.  These advantages include direct access to unsold tickets, control 
over the process of validating tickets for customers, and payouts of most prizes. 
This does not mean that a retailer or store employee who claims a major prize should be 
presumed guilty of fraud or theft.  But it does mean that there are good reasons for the 
Lottery to build a proactive system of checks and balances that will neutralize the 
inherent retailer advantages; and then it must apply those checks and balances with 
vigilant oversight.  Such a system can help ensure that customers’ interests are reasonably 
secure and that thieves are routinely held accountable, thereby promoting the Lottery’s 
integrity and dignity, as mandated by Iowa Code section 99G.2(3) (2009). 
B. IOWA LOTTERY LACKS A PROACTIVE SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES 
We identified four integral components that are necessary for a lottery enforcement 
system to effectively neutralize the inherent retailer advantages.  We then examined the 
Lottery’s performance in establishing these four components: 
 
Enforcement (what is needed)  Iowa Lottery performance (what we found) 
Proactive enforcement procedures → Weak, reactive enforcement procedures 
Effective complaint-handling practices → Significant shortfalls with complaint-handling practices 
Holding violators accountable → Violators frequently not held accountable 
Customer education and protection → Inadequate customer education and protection efforts 
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1. WEAK, REACTIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
Lottery officials acknowledged that their current enforcement procedures – which largely 
depend on complaints from customers – miss virtually all incidents where customers are 
unaware that they have been tricked out of a winning ticket or prize money.  This means 
that there likely have been instances of fraud, possibly involving significant prizes, that 
have gone undetected.  The Lottery must work to correct this fundamental shortcoming. 
2. SIGNIFICANT SHORTFALLS WITH COMPLAINT-HANDLING PRACTICES 
Our review of the Lottery’s files revealed an investigative approach that is often 
constrained by incuriosity and, at times, an indifference to getting to the bottom of a 
given situation. 
The Security Division has no written policies on how to conduct investigations.  In the 
absence of written protocols, Lottery investigators often fall back on word-of-mouth 
advice or embedded office culture to guide them in their work. 
This was particularly evident in cases where the only potential victim was a customer.  
We found numerous customer complaints where leads went unexplored and potential 
crimes were not pursued.  Many of these were the types of cases where the Lottery 
investigator would need to “make the case.”  Most of the time they didn’t even try. 
3. VIOLATORS OFTEN NOT HELD ACCOUNTABLE 
We found that the Lottery has never sanctioned a retailer for theft or fraud. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of store employees accused of stealing Lottery tickets 
have been allowed to keep any prize money obtained from those stolen tickets.  This is 
because the Lottery does not try to recoup prize money in stolen-ticket cases.  By 
neglecting to recover prizes obtained through theft, the Lottery has unwittingly created 
incentives to steal tickets.  The Lottery must take immediate steps to ensure that crime 
never pays. 
In addition, the Lottery rarely reports suspected violations to police and prosecutors, even 
though it is required to do so by law.  Suspected violations are often not fully investigated 
or reported to law enforcement specifically because of retailers’ wishes. 
4. INADEQUATE CUSTOMER EDUCATION AND PROTECTION EFFORTS 
At the urging of the Iowa Legislature’s Government Oversight Committee, the Lottery in 
2008 implemented two new procedures designed to help safeguard customers from 
possible fraud.   
In March 2008 the Lottery began a new program called, “Sign It. It’s Yours.”  The 
program requires retailers and the Lottery to verify that a signature appears on all tickets 
submitted for checking or for a prize payout.  The Lottery then reprogrammed its 
terminals to automatically generate a customer receipt for every instant-scratch or lotto 
ticket that is checked or cashed. 
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The addition of the “Sign It” program and customer receipts in 2008 were good first 
steps.  But we found that both procedures have limitations and are not being fully 
complied with.  As a result, customers are not adequately protected and additional 
customer-protection measures are needed. 
C. THE DESIRE TO IMPROVE 
Several Lottery employees acknowledged the need to improve the agency’s performance 
in these areas.  “We are always wanting to improve. I mean we do,” Investigator 
Supervisor John Ellison told us.  “And I think given the chance you'll see a huge 
difference a year from now.”402 
Recently retired Vice President for Security Braafhart said, “I think that you folks have 
some very valid points and some good ideas, and hopefully some of the changes will be 
made over there and it will be a better lottery.”403 
Several Lottery employees told us that they now have a heightened awareness of the need 
to handle customer complaints with care.  Comments like “I’m more diligent” were 
common.  “And now since your investigation has started we do follow up on all those 
different things,” then-Public Affairs Manager Tina Potthoff told us.  “We do follow up 
to make sure, ‘Hey, was it handled. Hey, do you need any other information.’”404 
In discussing the need to keep records related to a customer’s complaint, Vice President 
for Marketing Joe Hrdlicka said, “I think the investigation has given me a bigger and 
better and brighter understanding for how important that is.” 
Asked where the impetus for the change came from, Hrdlicka replied, “It came from me.  
I want to do my job well.” 
D. CLOSING 
The Lottery has made proclamations that maintaining its integrity is its top priority: 
• “The Lottery’s first priority is to operate with integrity,” states the Lottery’s 
Records Retention and Open Records Policy.405 
• “The Iowa Lottery wants to do everything it can to prevent even the slightest 
possibility of fraud,” then-Acting CEO Brickman was quoted as saying in a May 
2008 Lottery press release. 
However, when we pressed Brickman about what steps top management had taken to 
reduce the instances of fraud, he replied, “We may not agree with every remedy that you 
suggest as being another thing and yet another thing and yet another thing that can be 
done to make nirvana because I don’t think we can get there.” 
                                                 
402 Sworn Interview of John Ellison at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
403 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
404 Sworn Interview of Tina Potthoff at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 15, 2008). 
405 IOWA LOTTERY AUTHORITY RECORDS RETENTION AND OPEN RECORD POLICY (2008), 
http://www.ialottery.com/contactus/ILAOpenRecordsPolicy.pdf. 
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Similarly, Vice President for External Relations Neubauer told us, “I don’t think there’s 
going to be any perfect system anywhere in the world as long as human beings are 
involved.” 
But taking reasonable steps to establish a proactive Lottery enforcement system is not a 
pursuit of “nirvana” or “perfection.”  The purpose instead is to promote the Lottery’s 
integrity and dignity, which is mandated under Iowa Code section 99G.2(3) (2009). 
Consider the definitions:406 
• Integrity is defined as “firm adherence to a code of [especially] moral or artistic 
values: incorruptibility.” 
• Dignity is defined as “the quality or state of being worthy, honored or esteemed.” 
During our interview of Brickman, it became clear that he did not realize there have been 
cases of Iowa Lottery customers being victimized by retailers and store employees.  After 
we told him about several such cases, Brickman proclaimed: 
You haven’t demonstrated that anybody is on any 
appreciable level – out of the millions of transactions, 
you’ve got a handful of cases that you say weren’t properly 
handled and we still haven't seen one where anybody got 
really rooked.  I haven’t seen it. 
We believe this perspective misses the point: The Lottery has a weak, reactive 
enforcement system where large-scale fraud may be occurring without customers or the 
Lottery realizing it.  The fact that we did not uncover a case of large-scale fraud in our 
review of three years of Lottery activity should not be viewed as a vindication of the 
Lottery’s deficiencies. 
Moreover, the Lottery does not meet its mandate to operate with integrity and dignity by 
waiting for customers to report large-scale fraud before establishing a proactive 
enforcement system. 
Based on our investigation, we conclude: 
1. The Iowa Lottery has not been operating with the degree of integrity and dignity 
that it could and should, as required by Iowa Code chapter 99G. 
2. The Iowa Lottery has not acted reasonably in ensuring that retailers and retailer 
employees do not take advantage of customers who entrust them with a ticket. 
Throughout this report, we have presented recommendations designed to aid the Lottery 
in correcting these shortcomings.  These recommendations are consolidated in the 
following “Recommendations” section. 
 
                                                 
406 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, ELEVENTH EDITION, principal copyright 2003. 
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Recommendations 
1. The Lottery should take whatever action is necessary to enable the Security 
Division to implement, as soon as practically possible, a searchable database for 
the purpose of recording information related to investigations.  The database 
should include a mechanism for storing and searching the names and methods of 
individuals suspected of violating Iowa Code chapter 99G. 
2. The Lottery’s Security Division should devise and implement a standardized case-
file report for its investigators to log information pertaining to suspects, victims, 
stores and store employees.   
3. The Lottery’s Security Division should devise and implement specific 
investigative documentation standards and guidelines.  A more disciplined 
approach to investigative recordkeeping would improve the integrity of the 
Lottery’s investigations.  Lottery investigators should also receive instructions on: 
 
▪ Retaining any handwritten notes in their case files.   
 
▪ Using a word-processing program for narratives in order to alert them to 
spelling, punctuation and grammar mistakes. 
 
▪ What information must be included and in what specific format.   
4. The Lottery should adopt and implement a policy requiring prize-payout 
interviews by Security Division investigators of all significant prize claims above 
an appropriate threshold.  The interview should focus on the origins of the 
winning ticket, how the customer validated it, and whether the prize claimant is a 
retailer, or associated with any retailer or retailer employee. 
5. The Lottery should explore the merits of amending Iowa Code chapter 99G to 
prohibit retailers and store employees from purchasing and redeeming Lottery 
products at their place of employment.  The purpose is to offset the inherent 
retailer advantages. 
6. The Lottery should develop and implement a program of mandatory e-registration 
for all Iowa retailers and store employees, similar to the programs already 
developed by the lotteries in Ontario and Québec.  The program should require 
retailers and employees to electronically register their names and other pertinent 
information before they can obtain a confidential access code necessary for 
operating an Iowa Lottery terminal. 
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7. The Lottery should modify its administrative rules to adopt the following terms, 
definitions and insider win procedures: 
 
A ‘‘related party’’ is someone with a connection to an Iowa Lottery retailer. 
‘‘Related parties’’ include any directors, officers, partners, owners, and 
employees of licensed retailers, and their immediate family members, including 
spouse (whether married or common law relationship), children, parents, siblings 
and any other relatives who reside with them. 
 
‘‘Insiders’’ are a subset of ‘‘related parties’’ and include, among others, lottery 
retailers, their employees who sell and redeem lottery products, and their 
immediate families. 
 
Individuals falling into either of these two classifications and who claim a prize 
will be subject to insider win procedures to be defined by the Iowa Lottery.  It is 
the responsibility of the related party/insider to advise the Iowa Lottery of their 
relationship to a licensed retailer upon claiming their prize. 
 
A “suspicious claim” is defined as a prize claim whereby the Iowa Lottery is not 
satisfied that the claimant is a legitimate winner and there exists a perceived or 
apparent criminal activity. All suspicious claims will be referred to law 
enforcement for investigation.  
8. The Lottery should modify its “Winner Claim Form” to include a question about 
whether the claimant is a “related party.”407  The “Winner Claim Form” already 
requires claimants to declare, under penalty of perjury, that the information 
supplied is true and correct. 
9. The Lottery’s Security Division should begin tracking and analyzing high-tier 
prize claims by “related parties.”  This includes the number of claims, the size of 
the claims, the frequency of the claims, and how those claims compare with 
specific game odds. 
10. The Lottery’s Security Division should investigate any prize claim above an 
appropriate threshold when the claimant is identified as a “related party.”  The 
primary purpose would be to determine whether the ticket was obtained 
legitimately. 
11. The Lottery should explore procedures and practices to improve its ability to 
detect laundering of tickets obtained by theft or fraud. 
12. The Lottery should devise and implement a new policy requiring that press 
releases will be issued for all prize claims of $10,000 or more, except in 
extenuating circumstances.  The policy should require that prize claimants who 
are retailers or employees must be identified as such in the press release. 
13. The Lottery should establish a new administrative rule declaring that, except in 
extenuating circumstances, claimants of prizes $10,000 or more must consent to 
the Iowa Lottery publishing the claimant’s name and a current photograph. 
                                                 
407 A copy of the Lottery’s current “Winner Claim Form” is attached as Appendix H. 
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14. The Lottery’s Security Division should consider adopting a formal integrity 
testing or “mystery shoppers” program. 
15. The Lottery should develop an incentive program for retailers and store 
employees to make suggestions to the Lottery for improving security procedures 
and policies. 
16. The Lottery’s Security Division should conduct random and comprehensive 
security compliance audits of retail outlets to ensure compliance with the 
Lottery’s rules and impose sanctions for any violations, as appropriate. 
17. Security compliance audits should be confined to security-related issues and 
should include checks for proper positioning of the Customer Display Units 
(CDUs), Ombudsman stickers, and evidence of “pickouts” and other fraud or 
theft.  All items to be checked should be included on a single form and 
investigators should document problems observed.  Any noncompliance with 
Licensing Terms and Conditions should be communicated to management for 
consideration of appropriate license sanctions. 
18. The Lottery should propose amending Iowa Code section 99G.24(7)(b) to add 
convictions for theft to the list of disqualifying criteria for retail license 
applicants, allowing for appropriate exceptions. 
19. The Lottery should consider proposing an amendment to Iowa Code chapter 99G 
to prohibit any individual convicted of violating chapter 99G from handling 
Lottery products for any licensee. 
20. The Lottery’s Security Division should review its “activity concerns” and 
“suspicious validations” procedures to determine the feasibility of improvements 
that would enable these procedures to proactively and reliably alert the Division 
to possible criminal activity. 
21. The Lottery should adopt a policy requiring that any customer contacts 
concerning potential retailer fraud or theft must be immediately forwarded to the 
Security Division. 
22. In order to impress upon staff the scope of fraud and theft that can occur, the 
Lottery should provide training for all relevant employees concerning the various 
means and methods of known Lottery crimes. 
23. The Lottery should adopt a policy requiring that the Lottery’s investigative 
actions involving theft or fraud must be performed by Security Division 
investigators. 
24. The Lottery should amend its Licensing Terms and Conditions to specifically 
prohibit licensed retailers from charging a fee, withholding a portion of the prize 
payout, or making any kind of a profit, in the process of validating and redeeming 
tickets for customers. 
25. The Lottery’s Security Division should implement methods and procedures to 
ensure that reports of alleged “pickout” activity receive priority treatment. 
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26. The Lottery should amend its administrative rules to require licensed retailers to 
have functional surveillance video cameras and to grant the Lottery access to 
video recordings upon request. 
27. The Lottery’s Security Division investigators should have direct access to the 
Lottery’s winner database and should be adequately trained to use it.   
28. The Lottery’s Security Division should develop and implement a policy requiring 
its investigators to routinely check and document the prize claim history of all 
identified suspects.  The policy should encourage investigators to review previous 
high-tier prize claims when circumstances warrant. 
29. The Lottery should develop a method to flag the names of all theft or fraud 
suspects so that any subsequent prize claims they submit will be brought to the 
attention of the Security Division for possible investigation. 
30. The Lottery’s Security Division should reopen case file 07-020 to determine 
whether the ticket was purchased illegally, and proceed accordingly. 
31. The Lottery should propose amending Iowa Code section 99G.31 to establish that 
any prizes accruing from tickets purchased unlawfully shall not be paid or shall be 
forfeited.  This would be similar to the provision in Iowa Code section 99G.30 
dealing with underage players. 
32. The Lottery’s Security Division should develop and implement written policies to 
help guide its staff when conducting investigations. 
33. The Lottery should more closely review the casework of the Security Division’s 
investigators.  This should include, but not be limited to, reviewing the 
completeness and accuracy of each closed investigative case file in a timely 
fashion, evaluating whether the case was resolved adequately, and communicating 
any concerns to investigators within a reasonable period of time. 
34. The Lottery should ensure that investigators are availed of adequate opportunities 
to receive professional training on proper investigative procedures and techniques, 
and should require additional training as appropriate. 
35. The Lottery should develop protocols to improve coordination between the 
Security Division and law enforcement agencies (including the DCI, municipal 
police, and county sheriff’s departments) to ensure that alleged violations of law 
are properly investigated.  This could include, but not be limited to, legislative 
clarification of their respective roles and improvements to Iowa Code chapter 99G 
or other areas of state law as appropriate.  This could also include the concept of 
assigning regulatory oversight to a third-party agency independent of the Iowa 
Lottery, as has occurred with the provincial lottery in Ontario, Canada. 
36. The Lottery should develop and implement an internal system designed to ensure 
that the licensing status of retailers is assessed when a violation is found. 
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37. The Lottery’s Security Division should commit to investigate all reports that it 
receives involving thefts or alleged thefts of Lottery tickets to their logical 
conclusion, regardless of a retailer’s wishes, unless it determines that a law 
enforcement agency will investigate.  If a retailer refuses to fully cooperate with 
such an investigation, the Security Division should consider exercising its 
authority to issue a subpoena for the records and should consider referring the 
matter for suspension or revocation of the retailer’s Lottery license. 
38. The Lottery should consider proposing an amendment to Iowa Code chapter 99G 
to provide that Lottery products shall not be sold by any person who has not 
reached the age of twenty-one, because the statute already provides that Lottery 
products shall not be sold to any person who has not reached the age of twenty-
one. 
39. The Lottery should develop and implement a policy requiring investigators to 
attempt to determine, in all theft cases and to the best of their ability, the amount 
of any prize money redeemed from the stolen tickets, and by whom. 
40. The Lottery should adopt a policy requiring that it will pursue restitution from any 
individual who obtains prize money from stolen tickets and who is subsequently 
prosecuted for that theft.  The Lottery should also seek restitution for prize money 
claimed by individuals who received a stolen ticket from a person who is 
subsequently prosecuted in connection with that stolen ticket. 
41. The Lottery’s Security Division should devise and maintain a standardized form 
for calculating and reporting prize payouts in connection with stolen tickets.  
Lottery investigators should transmit this form to prosecutors as a routine means 
of pursuing restitution from Lottery ticket thieves. 
42. The Lottery should amend its Licensing Terms and Conditions to require that 
retailers must offer receipts to customers for every ticket that is checked or 
cashed. 
43. The Lottery should devise and implement a procedure whereby retailers would 
return all tickets to customers with appropriate markings to identify whether the 
ticket is not a winner; has been validated but not paid out; or is a winner and has 
been paid out.  The procedure should specifically require retailers to return all 
tickets to customers with the appropriate markings. 
44. The Lottery should advise its customers, in simple, clear, and unambiguous terms 
that all sources, including the terminals, can err.  In addition, the Lottery should 
advise that it would be wise for customers to: 
 
– Rely on multiple sources before concluding a ticket is not a winner. 
 
– Never hand a ticket to a store employee without knowing whether it is a winner. 
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45. The Lottery should educate its customers about the various Lottery-related scams, 
including but not limited to “palming” and “partial win payment.”  The purpose 
would be to educate customers about the scams so that they can understand how 
to reduce the risk of falling victim to such scams. 
 
For an example of how this could be written, see the newspaper article sub-
headlined “Four Ways Retailers Can Steal Your Winning Ticket,” published by 
the Vancouver Sun on May 30, 2007. 
46. The Lottery should take immediate steps to bolster the customer-education 
information on its website and in its literature, as well as ensuring that the 
improved literature is distributed to all licensed retailers.   
 
The information should clearly emphasize simple steps that all customers can 
follow to protect their interests.   Based on our review of advice on other lottery 
websites, here is an example of how the new information could be presented: 
 
SIMPLE STEPS FOR THE SMART LOTTERY CUSTOMER 
Don’t become a victim of a scam artist!  Here are three simple steps: 
 
1. Know the results of all tickets before handing them to a retailer.  Treat each 
ticket you purchase as a winning ticket until proven otherwise. 
 
2. Sign all tickets as soon as possible after purchase, and definitely before 
handing them to a retailer.  For winning tickets, it might also be a good idea to 
make a copy of both sides of the ticket, especially if you consider the prize 
amount to be significant. 
 
3. Obtain all tickets back from retailers, as well as the accompanying receipts.  
This will allow you to review the results of the transaction, especially if the 
results differed from what you had determined, or if you observe a retailer acting 
suspiciously while validating a ticket (in which case you are encouraged to report 
the matter to the Lottery immediately).   
 
You can always redeem tickets directly through the Lottery.  If you mail a 
winning ticket to Lottery offices, we suggest that you make a copy of the front 
and back of your ticket for your records. 
47. The Lottery should propose amending Iowa Code chapter 99G to include the 
protection of the interests of Lottery customers as a specific objective. 
48. The Lottery should act to ensure that ticket checker devices are installed, as soon 
as practical and at a reasonable cost, at the outlets that sell instant-scratch and 
lotto games. 
49. The Lottery should amend its Licensing Terms and Conditions to specifically 
require that all licensees which sell online games must have a CDU. 
50. The Lottery should work immediately to ensure that CDUs are installed and 
operating properly at all retailers licensed to sell online games. 
51. The Lottery should work to develop a mechanism to lock CDUs permanently in 
place so that the devices always face customers. 
 152
52. The Lottery should adopt and implement a “big win” terminal freeze procedure 
any time a terminal validates a winning ticket worth $10,000 or more. 
53. The Lottery should develop and install a musical jingle to help cue customers that 
their ticket is a winner, and to make it more difficult for a retailer to trick a 
customer out of prize money or even the ticket itself. 
54. The Lottery should offer a toll-free phone number dedicated to customers who 
have a complaint, question or comment. 
55. The Lottery should develop and implement a program of mandatory e-training for 
all Iowa retailers and their clerks, similar to the programs already developed by 
the lotteries in Ontario and Québec.  This training should incorporate a Retailer 
Code of Conduct similar to those in Quebec and British Columbia, which require 
sellers to act in the public interest and abide by general principles of integrity.  
The successful completion of this training should be documented by the Lottery 
and kept on file for reference and investigation purposes. 
56. The Lottery should consolidate all of its retailer directives and guidelines into a 
single electronic manual that can be quickly and easily referenced by clerks.  The 
Lottery should regularly update the manual as necessary and communicate these 
updates to retailers. 
57. The Lottery should void all outdated versions of the retailer manual and should 
notify all retailers and clerks of this action. 
58. The Lottery should add easy-to-find links to Iowa Code chapter 99G, Lottery 
administrative rules, Licensing Terms and Conditions, and the new Retailer Code 
of Conduct on its website.  The Lottery should direct all current and prospective 
retailers and clerks how to find these laws and rules, and emphasize that failure to 
comply will result in progressive disciplinary action, up to and including 
termination of the store’s license.  Additionally, the Lottery should post 
conspicuous warnings to all retailers and clerks that stealing, altering or 
counterfeiting a single Lottery ticket with an intent to defraud is a felony under 
Iowa Code section 99G.36. 
59. The Lottery should propose legislation to bring Iowa Code chapter 99G in 
conformity with Iowa Administrative Rules 531-11.1 and 531-11.4, which it 
amended in 2008 as part of “Sign It. It’s Yours.”  Additionally, the Lottery should 
reconcile inconsistent directives among its Licensing Terms and Conditions, 
retailer manual, and other documents. 
60. The Lottery should propose legislation or promulgate a rule that would prohibit 
retailers and their employees from obtaining Lottery tickets from customers for 
financial or other considerations. 
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Appendix A: Iowa Lottery  
Licensing Terms and Conditions 
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Appendix B: Ombudsman’s  
October 5, 2007, Letter to Lottery 
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Appendix C: Then-Executive Vice President 
Brickman’s October 15, 2007,  
Letter to Ombudsman 
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Appendix D: Vice President Neubauer’s 
November 1, 2007, Memo to Lottery Board 
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Appendix E: Then-Acting CEO Brickman’s 
November 5, 2007, Letter to Ombudsman 
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Appendix F: Representative Samples  
From Internal Theft Cases 
I have an addiction to lottery tickets. 
— Clerk prosecuted for stealing Lottery tickets,  
as quoted in police report 408 
 
You could see that? 
— A separate clerk prosecuted for stealing Lottery tickets,  
as quoted in police report, upon learning that  
a surveillance camera had recorded his actions 409 
 
Store clerks who have been prosecuted for stealing Lottery tickets were motivated by 
everything from boredom (07-089) to needing to buy diapers for their baby (07-025) to 
the lure of the “easy buck” (07-097). 
To illustrate what internal theft typically involves, here are excerpts from four separate 
cases: 
1. “On all three videotapes a female on duty clerk … is shown removing and not 
paying for instant lottery tickets from the store ticket dispenser.  Sometimes this 
female clerk would scratch off removed tickets, and throw away losers, and 
remove cash from cash register for winning tickets.  Sometimes she would place 
tickets in her pocket, which she removed from ticket dispenser without paying for 
them.” 
— Investigator’s notes from case file 06-108 
 
2. “[A]n employee … is shown on store surveillance video tape scratching off 
lottery instant tickets while on duty.  According to [owner], this employee was 
using her fingernail to scratch off a portion of latex on instant scratch off ticket, 
apparently looking for winning tickets.  She would then place losers back in the 
dispenser to sell to customers and cash winning tickets.”410 
— Investigator’s notes from case file 05-109 
                                                 
408 This incident was also the subject of Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-023 
(2005). 
409 This incident was also the subject of Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-128 
(2006). 
410 That practice is sometimes referred to as “pick outs,” where a clerk lightly scratches instant tickets, 
“picks out” the winners, and then sells the losers to unsuspecting customers.  This is a scam that directly 
victimizes customers, although it stands to reason that many would not be aware of it. 
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3. “The first time I ever stole tickets from [the store] it was about 9 months ago and I 
would start out by taking 2 to 3 at a time while working the closing shift….  Then 
I would start taking more.  Every other week or so I would then take between 6 to 
8 tickets and then gratually [sic] start taking between 10 to 12 tickets each time I 
worked.  I would take 12 tickets from each kind of ticket and there were 12 
different tickets in each box.” 
— “Witness Statement Form” submitted by the store clerk  
who was the subject of case file 07-079 
 
4. “I asked [the clerk] if he had ever taken scratch tickets without paying for them.  
He advised that he had.  He said it all started out where he’d take a couple of 
tickets here and there.  He saw that no one noticed that there were tickets missing 
so he figured that they didn’t keep close track of them.  He started taking more 
and more.  He said it was like and [sic] “addiction” and got totally out of control.  
He said he really wanted to stop.  But couldn’t.  He described it as the ‘easy 
buck.’ 
 
“… [The clerk] said that he realizes that he was wrong and shouldn’t have stolen 
the tickets.  He believed that it was partly due to the easy access the employees 
had to them.” 
— Police report regarding store clerk  
who was the subject of case file 07-097 
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Appendix G: Major Winners 
This appendix focuses on individuals who have claimed relatively significant prizes over 
the history of the Iowa Lottery.  This is the first such review ever conducted regarding 
Iowa Lottery prize claimants. 
The first part of this appendix presents retailers and store employees with relatively 
significant prize claim histories.  The second part of this appendix presents other 
individuals with significant prize claim histories.   
Although some Lottery press releases identified prize winners as retail employees, many 
did not.  Since the Lottery does not require retail employees to identify themselves as 
such when they claim a prize, our list of significant retailer winners is likely incomplete. 
When reviewing this information, several important points should be kept in mind: 
1. The odds of winning a single major prize are extremely small.  On average, 
the odds of buying an Iowa Lottery ticket and winning a high-tier prize (worth 
more than $600) are one out of 94,216. 
 
When you eliminate the two games that do not produce high-tier prizes (Pick 3 
and Pull-tabs), one high-tier win would be expected, on average, for every 67,450 
tickets purchased.411 
2. It is likely that many of the individuals referenced in this appendix have 
claimed additional, lesser prizes.  The Lottery does not record the identity of 
anyone who claims prizes from a retailer (Lottery rules permit retailers to pay out 
any prize claims of $600 or less).  This means that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to determine the full extent of any one individual’s complete prize claim history. 
3. It is possible that some of the individuals referenced in this appendix have 
claimed additional high-tier prizes. This is due to a number of factors, including 
variations in claimant’s names and misspellings in the Lottery’s database of prize 
claimants.  We found a few such examples, but we suspect that we missed many 
others.412  In addition, nothing restricts third parties from legally claiming prizes 
from tickets they did not purchase. 
4. The vast majority of the prize claims identified in this appendix were not 
investigated by the Lottery. 
                                                 
411 We obtained these odds through our own calculations of Lottery data; we confirmed their accuracy with 
statisticians at Iowa State University. 
412 Numerous individuals listed in the database have multiple versions for spelling their names.  For 
example, “J. Customer,” “Jim Customer” and “James Customer” could all represent the same individual. 
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   A. RETAILERS AND STORE EMPLOYEES 
The Iowa Lottery’s retailers are our lifeblood.  They are on the 
front lines helping our players every day.  In fact, our retailers are 
also our customers. 
— From the Iowa Lottery Annual Report for fiscal year 2003 
 
1. INTERNAL THEFT SUSPECTS WHO PREVIOUSLY CLAIMED HIGH-TIER PRIZES 
Among the retailers and store employees who were subject of a Security Division 
investigative file from 2005 through 2007, we found that at least 16 had previously 
claimed high-tier prizes.  The timing of those prior claims varied; some occurred in the 
days or weeks before a report was made to the Security Division; others occurred months 
or, in some cases, years before Security was contacted. 
Of the 16 store employees, the three who had claimed the most prize money were: 
1. Manager of a northeast Iowa bowling alley: $10,000 from a single prize claim.413 
2. Manager of a northeast Iowa convenience store: 17 prize claims totaling 
$33,290.414 
3. Manager of an eastern Iowa casino gift shop: 6 high-tier prize claims totaling 
$60,000.415 
All three subsequently pled guilty to Lottery-related theft or fraud for incidents unrelated 
to these prize claims. 
2. OTHER RETAILERS WITH SIGNIFICANT PRIZE-CLAIM HISTORIES 
We found that several dozen other retailers and store employees have claimed high-tier 
prizes.  The most prolific include: 
• The owner of an eastern Iowa convenience store: 9 prize claims for a total of 
$25,950. 
• Husband and wife owners of a northwest Iowa store: 16 prize claims for a total of 
$263,501. 
• A northern Iowa retailer: 67 prize claims for a total of $100,626. 
 
 
 
                                                 
413 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-101 (2006). 
414 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-114 (2007). 
415 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-140 (2007). 
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The largest claim ever made by an Iowa retailer was in 1999.  An Urbandale convenience 
store clerk claimed a Powerball jackpot worth $15.9 million with a ticket that he said he 
had sold to himself while working at an Urbandale convenience store.416  The clerk was 
one of only six Iowans ever to have claimed a Powerball jackpot, according to 
information on the Lottery’s website.  His was the fourth largest Powerball prize in Iowa 
history. 
The clerk’s claim generated some public interest, particularly when it was reported that 
an underage co-worker claimed to have paid for half of the ticket and was therefore 
entitled to half of the jackpot.417  The article in The Des Moines Register reported: 
Iowa’s lottery chief believes that retail workers should still be able to 
sell themselves lottery tickets. 
 
“Something like this could have happened between two customers on 
the other side of the cash register,” said Iowa Lottery Commissioner Ed 
Stanek.  “It is inconsequential that employees were involved.” 
 
But Stanek acknowledged that to avoid any conflict of interests, a host 
of other people – including Iowa lottery employees and contractors plus 
their immediate families and household members – are banned from 
buying lottery tickets. 
In addition to the 1999 Powerball jackpot prize claim, we found 12 other claims by 
retailers and store employees for individual prizes of $100,000 or more: 
1. A northwest Iowa convenience store clerk: $250,000 instant-ticket prize, January 
23, 2007 
2. A northwest Iowa store owner: $250,000 instant-ticket prize, April 6, 2007 
3. A southwest Iowa convenience store clerk: $200,000 Powerball prize, August 3, 
2006 
4. An assistant manager of a central Iowa convenience store: $100,000 instant-ticket 
prize, February 3, 2006 
5. An employee of a northern Iowa grocery store: $100,000 instant-ticket prize, 
February 16, 2005 
6. A clerk at a northwest Iowa truck stop: Grand prize from the $100,000 Cash 
Game, January 21, 2004 
7. An employee of a northern Iowa grocery store: Grand prize from the $100,000 
Cash Game, December 1, 2003 
8. A clerk at a northern Iowa convenience store: Grand prize from the $100,000 
Cash Game, May 12, 2003 
 
                                                 
416 William Petroski, Clerk’s Ticket Purchase Defended, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 27, 1999, at 1M. 
417 The underage co-worker subsequently dropped her claim. 
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9. Husband-and-wife owners of an eastern Iowa grocery store: $100,000 Powerball 
prize, February 24, 2003418 
10. An employee of a northern Iowa convenience store: $100,000 instant-ticket prize, 
February 25, 2002 
11. A card dealer at an eastern Iowa riverboat casino: Grand prize from the $100,000 
Cash Game, May 8, 2001 
12. An employee of an eastern Iowa store: $100,000 instant-ticket prize, May 6, 1996 
   B. MAJOR PRIZE CLAIMANTS NOT IDENTIFIED AS RETAILERS 
We also found other individuals not identified as retailers or store employees with 
relatively significant prize-claim histories.  As previously noted, the fact that a prize 
claimant was not publicly identified as a retailer or store employee does not necessarily 
mean he was not a retailer or store employee. 
    1. PROLIFIC WINNERS (LARGEST NUMBER OF PRIZE CLAIMS) 
A Harlan man has been perhaps the most frequent Lottery prize claimant.  He has made 
3,489 prize claims totaling $23,067, according to our analysis of the Lottery’s database of 
prize claimants.  That is an average of less than $7 per prize claim. 
We found dozens more individuals with more than 100 prize claims.  This includes a Des 
Moines man who has claimed 273 prizes for $70,925, and a Mason City man who has 
claimed 110 prizes for $110,818. 
    2. BIGGEST WINNERS (TOTAL AMOUNT CLAIMED) 419 
In the fall of 2002, a central Iowa man won $100,000 in the $100,000 Cash Game.  His 
win was announced in “Lottery Action,” a periodic newsletter that the Lottery publishes 
for licensed retailers.  The article said the man “is probably one of the luckiest people one 
could ever meet because it was the second time he’s won the top prize in the game!  The 
first time was in 1992.” 
The man may have been lucky, but he is not alone.  At least 12 other individuals have 
claimed two prizes of at least $100,000, based on our analysis of the Lottery’s database 
of prize claimants. 
What separates the central Iowa man from others, however, is that his son won a third 
$100,000 prize a few years later.420  We could not find any other examples of one family 
winning three prizes of $100,000 or more.  This family’s feat is remarkable when 
considering that the odds of winning the $100,000 grand prize in the $100,000 Cash 
Game are 324,000 to 1, according to information on the Lottery website. 
 
                                                 
418 The man also claimed a $10,000 Powerball prize on December 27, 2006. 
419 This section does not include one-time jackpot winners from online games such as Powerball and Hot 
Lotto. 
420 Press Release, Iowa Lottery, [Customer] Wins Top Prize in Oct. 31 Cash Game Drawing (Nov. 1, 2006) 
(on file with author). 
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The other 12 individuals who have won two prizes of at least $100,000 includes: 
• Three people who also had other high-tier prize claims.  All three won the grand 
prize twice in the $100,000 Cash Game.421 
• Four people who won $100,000 twice in the same drawing (which can happen if 
an individual has more than one ticket with the winning set of numbers).422 
• A central Iowa man who won a $700,000 Iowa Lotto jackpot on January 25, 
1992; then won the grand prize in the $100,000 Cash Game on March 25, 1994. 
• A central Iowa man who won a $275,000 Super Cash Lotto prize on May 11, 
1995; then won a $100,000 Powerball prize on August 5, 1996. 
• Three people who won $100,000 in two separate drawings (and have had no 
additional prize claims).423 
    3. OTHER INDIVIDUALS WITH SIGNIFICANT PRIZE-CLAIM HISTORIES 
By most people’s standards, a Dubuque woman has had success playing the Lottery.  In 
May 2007, she claimed a $21,000 instant-ticket prize.  Eight months later, she claimed a 
$15,000 instant-ticket prize. 
In actuality, dozens of individuals have been even more successful playing the Lottery.  
Here are a few: 
1. Spencer man: 2 prize claims for $60,000 
2. Bouton woman: 2 for $60,000 
3. Ottumwa woman: 3 for $60,888 
4. Davenport man: 3 for $63,000 
5. Marion man: 2 for $66,666 
6. Perry man: 6 for $68,001 
7. Gowrie man: 5 for $71,300 
8. Newton woman: 10 for $74,200 
9. Urbandale man: 36 for $83,894 
                                                 
421 A Solon man (12 prize claims for $210,005); a central Iowa woman (13 prize claims for $213,956); and 
a Centerville woman (4 prize claims for $226,100). 
422 A Davenport woman (October 18, 2007), a Pleasant Valley woman (May 19, 2006), a Winterset man 
(August 29, 2001); and a Cedar Rapids man (March 29, 2001).  The Cedar Rapids man’s prize claims were 
for Powerball; the others were from the $100,000 Cash Game. 
423 A Glenwood woman (October 24, 2000 and April 10, 2007); a Denver man (August 21, 1995 and 
September 11, 2007); and a Dow City man (August 14, 1992 and July 10, 1995).  Of those six prize claims, 
all but one came from the $100,000 Cash Game. 
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10. Waterloo woman: 4 for $85,300 
11. Waterloo man: 8 for $93,000 
12. Fort Dodge man: 20 for $117,637 
13. Milford woman: 2 for $120,000 
14. Cedar Rapids man: 29 for $126,672 
15. Hartley man: 15 for $137,944 
16. Ottumwa man: 2 for $140,000 
17. Colo woman: 12 for $150,219 
18. Ottumwa man: 36 for $152,301 
19. Winterset man: 6 for $154,500 (the only individual we found with three claims of 
$50,000 or more, the last of which was made on March 4, 2008) 
20. West Branch man: 10 for $162,500 
21. Fort Dodge man: 8 for $163,658 
22. West Des Moines man: 3 for $1.96 million (including two major Hot Lotto prize 
claims.  The first, in October 2005, was for $79,762,  Then, seven months later, he 
won a $1.88 million jackpot.) 
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Appendix H: Lottery  
“Winner Claim Form” 
 
 189
Appendix I: Pickouts Case Studies 
EFFECTIVELY IGNORED 
1. A northwest Iowa customer e-mailed the Lottery about four instant scratch tickets 
he had purchased.  “I noticed all of them were printed wrong,” he wrote.  “The 
bottom of the puzzle looked as if someone had already scratched the last line of 
letters.”424 
In forwarding the complaint to another staff member, the Lottery’s Web Master 
wrote: 
Have you heard of this happening elsewhere?  Could this 
be fraud?  What should he do, bring them to an office? 
[emphasis added]425 
Any consideration that fraud may have occurred was apparently dismissed.  The 
Web Master subsequently wrote back to the customer, stating, “This could have 
been an isolated printing problem,” and offered four replacement tickets. 
Without an independent examination of the tickets in question, the Lottery should 
not have ruled out fraud.  When we presented this matter to recently retired Vice 
President for Security Harry Braafhart, he agreed that this complaint should have 
been forwarded to the Security Division.426 
 
2. A customer complained about three issues involving a northern Iowa convenience 
store: 
• A problem with redeeming a winning $3 Powerball ticket. 
• Employees commonly speaking in a foreign language. 
• “She also feel [sic] like some of the scratch games she has purchased have 
been compromised,” wrote Investigator Roger Mott.427 
Mott contacted the owner about the first issue and, understandably, declined to 
look into the second issue.  But Mott inexplicably made no inquiry about the 
allegation that instant tickets had been compromised. 
 
 
 
                                                 
424 E-mail from customer to Iowa Lottery Web Master (Dec. 7, 2006) (on file with author). 
425 E-mail from Iowa Lottery Web Master to Iowa Lottery employee (Dec. 8, 2006) (on file with author). 
426 Sworn Interview of Harry Braafhart at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
427 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-087 (2007). 
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INVESTIGATION DEFERRED 
3. A customer alleged that a central Iowa convenience store tried to sell him a ticket 
that had been sitting on the store counter, instead of one from the Lottery ticket 
dispenser.  The customer contacted the Lottery and reported his suspicion that 
store employees were scratching tickets, looking for winners, and selling the non-
winners to customers.428 
Lottery Investigator Mott contacted the chain’s district office.  Mott wrote that a 
supervisor promised “to stop at that store tonight and see if there are any instant 
scratch tickets on the counter.  I told him if he needed any further assistance to 
feel free to contact the Lottery.” 
There is no indication that Mott followed up with the customer, even though Mott 
wrote that the man had specifically asked that Mott “let him know what action 
was taken.”  We contacted the customer, who confirmed that Mott did not follow-
up with him as requested.  The customer remained convinced that a store 
employee had tried to cheat him.  “I’m not going to buy a losing ticket every 
time,” the customer told us.  “I felt like the biggest sucker alive.” 
We asked Mott about this case: 
Ombudsman investigator: Why did you defer this man's 
complaint to store management? 
Mott: Because that's the way we’ve always done it. You'll 
notice there that I ran that by the supervisor. 
Ombudsman investigator: Do you think that's a good way 
to get to the bottom of a complaint like that? 
Mott: I don’t know as I ... I don’t know.  I just know that's 
what I was told to do and that's what I did. 
Ombudsman investigator: What do you think of that 
practice? 
Mott: I have no thought.  That’s a deal where you follow 
the chain of command, and whatever he decides, that’s his 
decision, not mine.429 
 
4. A customer reported that a central Iowa convenience store sold her a ticket that 
she later noticed had a three-digit “security code” exposed.  A few days later she 
was in the same store and heard another customer complaining to the same 
employee about the same problem. 
 
                                                 
428 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-061 (2007). 
429 Sworn Interview of Roger Mott at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
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Lottery Investigator Mott contacted the chain’s district supervisor, who 
subsequently reported that another supervisor checked the store and reported that 
“the tickets appeared to be OK.”430  We found, however, that relying on store 
management is not an effective way for Lottery investigators to get to the bottom 
of a fraud or theft allegation. 
There is no information in the file indicating that Mott considered obtaining or 
reviewing the store’s surveillance video for the afternoon in question.  We 
contacted the chain, which confirmed that the store did have a surveillance 
camera at the time of this incident.  
When we asked Mott why he did not consider obtaining the store’s surveillance 
video, he responded, “Probably should have used it. Probably dropped the ball on 
it. I can tell you this: If I would have got another complaint from that store, it 
would have been fully investigated.”431 
 
5. An anonymous caller reported that a central Iowa convenience store was selling 
instant tickets that “appear to have scratch marks on the latex,” wrote Lottery 
Investigator Larry Steele.  “Caller concerned some one may be peeking under the 
latex for winning tickets.”432 
Steele contacted the Lottery’s regional manager, who said that “sometimes store 
clerks drag the ticket in a manner, that will leave scratch marks on the instant 
tickets while being removed from in store dispensers.” 
When we asked why he deferred the matter to a regional manager, Steele said he 
could not recall, but added, “That was not uncommon to have a regional manager 
check something.”433 
The regional manager called Steele the next day, reporting that he had inspected 
the store and “found no defects with the dispenser nor any marks on the latex of 
any tickets within the dispenser.”  Steele concluded that the complaint was 
unfounded. 
But the file does not contain sufficient information to support such a conclusion.  
Finding no defects with the ticket dispenser and no marks on the tickets actually 
reinforced the possibility of pickout activity.  Steele told us that it would have 
helped to see the tickets in question, but acknowledged that he did not pursue this 
with the caller. 
In addition, there is no information in the file indicating that Steele considered 
reviewing the store’s surveillance video for the afternoon in question.  We 
contacted the store, which confirmed that it did have a surveillance camera at the 
time of this incident. 
                                                 
430 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-066 (2007). 
431 Sworn Interview of Roger Mott at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
432 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-081 (2007). 
433 Sworn Interview of Larry Steele at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Oct. 8, 2008). 
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6. An eastern Iowa gas station reported a problem with an employee.  The case was 
assigned to Investigator Steele.  “On their store surveillance security video tape is 
an on duty store clerk … removing scratch off Instant tickets from the store 
dispenser, scratching off latex in the security code area keepimg [sic] winners and 
putting loosers [sic] back in dispenser,” Steele wrote.434 
His notes state that he advised the store manager to report the matter to local 
police.  Four months later, Steele wrote, “I have been advised the former clerk … 
has worked out a plea bargain arrangement with the county attorney’s office.  
Terms of the plea bargain, were not made public.”435 
However, the county attorney’s office told us they received no Lottery-related 
complaint involving the clerk.  While the case file indicates she was charged and 
entered into a plea bargain, the prosecutor’s office denies that either event 
occurred. 
 
INADEQUATE INVESTIGATIONS 
7. A customer bought two instant scratch tickets from a central Iowa convenience 
store.  When he began to scratch the first ticket, he noticed the security code had 
already been scratched off. 
The customer drove to Lottery headquarters and showed the tickets to Investigator 
Mott.  Both tickets were non-winners.  After discussing the complaint, Mott gave 
the man $20 worth of “Lottery Bucks,” coupons that can be used towards future 
Lottery purchases.436 
According to his notes, Mott contacted the store manager, who said that the 
employee in question “no longer works at her store.  She had discovered several 
tickets that had the validation code scratched off.” 
Mott wrote that another store supervisor told him that the clerk also worked at 
another store in the same chain and the manager of that store found some of their 
tickets had also been scratched.  Mott wrote that the same supervisor told him that 
“as near as she can tell fifty-one dollars in instant scratch tickets had been tamper  
with.” 
Mott then contacted the second store, where an assistant manager said the 
employee in question was no longer working there, but that management found 
$18 worth of instant tickets that had been tampered with. 
The store supervisor subsequently called Mott back and said “she did not think 
charges was going to filed on the suspect.  [The supervisor] told me the company 
has request he repay the money that was taken.  This case is closed.” 
 
                                                 
434 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-085 (2007). 
435 Steele’s typed note did not attribute this information. 
436 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 06-115 (2006). 
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This shows that the decision to not file a police report was made by the store.  
Mott simply recorded the store’s decision and closed the case, without even 
obtaining the clerk’s name.  Missing from the case file was any explanation as to 
why the store had not already reported to the Lottery that tickets had been 
tampered with.437 
We asked Mott about this case: 
Ombudsman investigator: Did you find out how much that 
suspect got in stolen prize money? 
Mott: No, I did not. 
Ombudsman investigator: Why not? 
Mott: I don’t know. 
… 
Ombudsman investigator: Do you think – do you have any 
idea whether he [the suspect employee] may have had some 
prize money that he got through those stolen tickets? 
Mott: I have no clue. 
Ombudsman investigator: It's possible that he won a bit of 
money. 
Mott: Well, he could have I reckon.438 
 
8. A woman went to Lottery headquarters one afternoon with three instant scratch 
tickets.  She explained that her daughter had purchased the tickets earlier that 
afternoon at a central Iowa convenience store. 
The woman said the clerk had removed the tickets from a box on the counter, and 
not from the Lottery ticket dispenser.  She also noticed the tickets were not in 
numerical order.  Investigator Steele confirmed that the tickets sold to the 
woman’s daughter were numbered 25, 27 and 28.439 
All three tickets were non-winners.  Steele found that the one ticket missing from 
the sequence had been cashed as a prize winner. 
                                                 
437 See Appendix A.  (“immediately notify the Security Department, if tickets or Lottery property are stolen, 
lost, or damaged.”) 
438 Sworn Interview of Roger Mott at the Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman (Sept. 19, 2008). 
439 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-145 (2007). 
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Steele then wrote: 
Upon, further investigation, I find that the facts given at the 
time by the complaint are not as factual has, she had stated.  
To much he said she said, store tells a different version of 
this transaction claim the pack was in the lottery dispenser 
and the customer bought FOUR tickets not three as stated, 
by complaint. 
 
There is a possibility that the tickets her daughter 
purchased did not come out of the lottery in counter 
display.  I can, not prove either way.  I can, not explain 
how tickets were out of numerical order, and no one seems 
to know who cashed ticket 026, from the pack in question. 
 
… I will not say this complaint is unfounded, but I have no 
evidence to prove other wise at this time. 
There is no information to suggest Steele: 
• Went to the store to inspect the instant tickets on hand or to discuss the 
complaint with the manager and employee involved. 
• Considered reviewing the store’s surveillance video for the afternoon in 
question.  We contacted the chain, which confirmed that the store did have 
a surveillance camera at the time of this incident. 
• Asked the complainant if she had a receipt from the transaction in 
question, since the store disputed how many tickets had been purchased. 
• Reviewed store records regarding Lottery sales transactions from the 
afternoon in question. 
• Realized that the store was part of the same chain and in the same city as a 
similar allegation involving pickout activity described in case file 07-066 
(discussed earlier in this appendix).  The clerk’s name was not 
memorialized in either case file.  So even if the two cases involved the 
same individual, it is unlikely the Lottery would have been able to 
recognize this. 
We find that this case should have received greater scrutiny, especially 
considering that Steele determined that the missing ticket had been cashed for the 
prize money. 
 
SUSPECT PROSECUTED, LOTTERY PLAYED NO MEANINGFUL ROLE 
9. A Lottery sales representative received a complaint that a northeast Iowa 
convenience store was selling instant tickets that had already been scratched.  He 
reported it to the Security Division and the complaint was assigned to Investigator 
Steele. 
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On the day he received the complaint, Steele wrote, “Someone should check this 
establishment on a weekend to see if there is merit to this complaint.”  The next 
day, Steele wrote that he had advised the chain’s headquarters of the complaint 
and also asked the Lottery’s regional office “to keep watching this retailer regards 
this complaint.”440 
About four hours later, Steele wrote that he had received a phone call from a local 
police officer, who reported that he was arresting a store clerk on charges of 
Lottery theft.  The clerk “is shown on store video tape putting LOOSE instant 
tickets back in display dispenser,” Steele wrote. 
Consider the contrast of how this complaint was investigated: 
• The Lottery investigator deferred the matter to store management and 
asked Lottery sales staff, who were not trained investigators, to monitor 
the store. 
• The police officer investigated the allegation and found probable cause to 
make an arrest. 
 
10. A Lottery regional manager notified the Security Division that a northwest Iowa 
convenience store had an internal problem.  “An employee … is shown on store 
surveillance video tape scratching off lottery instant tickets while on duty,” 
Investigator Steele wrote.441 
“According to [the owner], this employee was using her fingernail to scratch off a 
portion of latex on instant scratch off ticket, apparently looking for winning 
tickets,” Steele added.  “She would then place losers back in the dispenser to sell 
to customers and cash winning tickets.” 
The store reported finding 40 tickets with a total retail value of $230 that had been 
lightly scratched.  The file shows that about a week later, local police arrested the 
employee.442  The information in the Lottery file does not indicate that Steele 
played any meaningful role in terms of assisting the police investigation or doing 
any further analysis of the employee’s prize claims history. 
We found that two people associated with the employee made significant instant-
ticket prize claims around the time of her pickout activity: 
• A man identified in the police report as the employee’s boyfriend claimed 
a $25,000 instant ticket prize approximately six months before the 
employee was arrested. 
• Another employee at the same store, identified in court records as one of 
the first employee’s defense witnesses, claimed a $30,000 instant ticket 
prize about seven months after the arrest. 
                                                 
440 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 07-124 (2007). 
441 Iowa Lottery Security Investigator Report, Case No. 05-109 (2005). 
442 The clerk later pled guilty to one count of Lottery fraud, according to court records. 
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Appendix J: “Can Lottery Retailers Be 
Trusted?,” Published by The 
Vancouver Sun Newspaper 
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Appendix K: British Columbia 
“Lottery Retailer Code of Conduct” 
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Appendix L: Ontario Case Study 
This appendix presents an overview of the Ontario lottery’s policy improvements.  We 
are presenting this information in two sections: 
A. Ontario lottery policy improvements made before November 1, 2007, when Vice 
President Neubauer provided the Lottery Board with a memo implying that the 
Iowa Lottery had already adopted many of the improvements that were being 
implemented by the Canadian lotteries.443 
B. Ontario lottery improvements made after November 1, 2007. 
The Ontario policy improvements that follow are based on information from the 
following sources: 
• A page on the Ontario lottery website that chronicles the highlights of its “Lottery 
Prize Integrity Program” and is available at www.olg.ca/pip_history.jsp 
• The Ontario Lottery’s September 2008 “Summary Report to the Ombudsman”444 
• “A Game of Trust,” report issued in March 2007 by the Ombudsman of Ontario 
These lists are not exhaustive; they do not include other policy improvements that we did 
not find to be relevant for the purposes of this investigation. 
   A. ONTARIO LOTTERY IMPROVEMENTS IMPLEMENTED BEFORE NOVEMBER 1, 2007 445 
1. Tracking insider wins, including retailer wins, of $1,000 and more. 
2. A police review of all insider wins, including retailer wins, of $10,000 or more. 
3. Installation of ticket checkers at all lottery terminal locations. 
4. Providing customers with receipts for all ticket validation transactions at the 
lottery terminal.446 
5. Mandatory investigations for all prize claims of $10,000 or more447 and suspicious 
claims are referred to the provincial police for investigation. 
6. Printing “winner” or “non-winner” on online tickets that are checked by 
terminals. 
                                                 
443 See Appendix D. 
444 ONTARIO LOTTERY & GAMING CORP., SUMMARY REPORT TO THE OMBUDSMAN (2008), 
http://www.olg.ca/assets/documents/olg_commitment/summary_report_to_the_ombudsman.pdf. 
445 We found that none of these improvements had been implemented by the Iowa Lottery as of November 
1, 2007. 
446 The Iowa Lottery subsequently introduced customer receipts in May 2008 in response to concerns 
expressed by members of the Government Oversight Committee during its January 30, 2008, meeting.  
However, the Lottery does not require retailers to offer the receipts to customers. 
447 Prior to the scandal, the threshold for these investigations had been at $50,000. 
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7. Requiring the customer display screen to be visible to customers at all times and 
improving the on-screen information when a winning ticket is validated. 
8. Amended the retailer contract to include a “zero tolerance” policy for fraud, theft 
or dishonest behavior. 
9. Began an ongoing public awareness campaign, emphasizing the need for 
customers to sign their tickets and check them using the newly-installed ticket 
checker devices. 
10. Began routing all validation discrepancies to the lottery’s investigations unit. 
11. Removed lottery sales staff from enforcement issues involving retailers. 
12. Created a new “Office of Player Protection” which receives all calls regarding 
theft, fraud and dishonesty. 
13. Began conducting a five-step validation program that included retailer audits. 
14. Added a signature line to the front of online tickets. 
15. Implemented outreach and education audits to instruct retailers about their 
responsibilities. 
16. Maintain and analyze statistical information about insiders’ prize claims to 
determine unusual win patterns for possible investigation. 
17. Consult individual win history for all insider-win investigations through an 
enhanced “Insider Wins” database. 
18. Require retailers to keep virtually all surfaces around the terminal clear of tickets 
or lottery paper. 
19. Repositioned the CDUs (customer display units) to improve visibility to 
customers. 
20. Initiated a best-practice review with Canadian and international lottery 
jurisdictions regarding prize payout policies and procedures. 
21. Trained prize claims staff on procedures for identifying suspicious prize claims to 
be escalated for investigation. 
22. Refined and documented the procedures and guidelines for investigations. 
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   B. ONTARIO LOTTERY IMPROVEMENTS IMPLEMENTED AFTER NOVEMBER 1, 2007 448 
1. Required retailers to return all winning and non-winning tickets to customers. 
2. Required retailers to sign a declaration that they understand the obligations and 
expectations of being an insider and that they will communicate this to their 
employees. 
3. Asked an independent, external audit firm to conduct a comprehensive forensic 
audit of past prize claims. Any findings that suggest wrongful or criminal 
behavior will be reported to law enforcement and key findings will be made 
public. 
4. Regulatory oversight of the Ontario lottery was assumed by another agency, the 
Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO).449  The new regulations 
established inspections of the lottery system’s integrity and a process to deal with 
prize-claim disputes.  “Ontario is one of the first jurisdictions to develop 
comprehensive, independent third-party oversight of the lottery system and the 
regulation of retailers,” an AGCO press release stated. 
5. Established a secret shopper program, conducted by an independent retailer 
performance monitoring organization. The program includes anonymous visits to 
retailers by secret shoppers to assess retailer compliance with specific point-of-
sale procedures.  It also includes escalating penalties against retailers found to be 
in violation. 
6. Required that press releases for all prize claims for $10,000 or more be posted on 
the lottery’s website.  It also required that press releases for all such claims by 
“insiders” (including retailers) be posted on the website and publicized for 30 
days before the prize can be paid. 
7. Reduced the “terminal freeze” threshold for winning tickets from $10,000 to 
$5,000. 
8. Improved the information on customer receipts for winning tickets of $5,000 or 
more to include notification that the lottery will immediately call the customer at 
the store. 
9. Added a “Retail Play” button to lottery terminals to identify retailer personal play.  
This allows the lottery to “brand” tickets and resultant receipts as the personal 
transactions of retailers and their staff.  “Through the monitoring and analysis of 
the data, we are in a much stronger position today to know who is handling our 
products at the point of sale, and the playing habits and win trends of those 
individuals,” the Ontario lottery wrote in a September 2008 status report to the 
Ombudsman of Ontario. 
10. Established a program which can automatically suspend a terminal when there is 
unusual retailer activity. 
                                                 
448 We found that only one of these Ontario improvements had been implemented by the Iowa Lottery as of 
January 1, 2009. 
449 AGCO already regulated casinos, charitable gaming, and liquor licenses. 
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11. Required that customers must sign their tickets before a retailer can validate 
them.450 
12. Introduced new winning and non-winning musical tones with voice-over 
messages on lottery terminals. 
13. Added a signature box to the front of instant tickets. 
14. Adopted a new “Related Party/Insider Win” policy, which includes guidelines for 
prize claims found to be suspicious. 
15. Conducted a public awareness survey. 
                                                 
450 The Iowa Lottery introduced the ticket-signature requirement in March 2008 in response to concerns 
expressed by members of the Government Oversight Committee during its January 30, 2008, meeting. 
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Lottery CEO Terry Rich’s Reply 
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Former Lottery CEO Dr. Edward Stanek’s 
Reply 
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Ombudsman Comments 
The Ombudsman is required by law to consult with agencies and individuals that are 
criticized in an investigative report, and to attach their written replies to the report, 
unedited. 
The Ombudsman received two written replies to this report:451 
• An April 15, 2009, letter from Lottery CEO Terry Rich. 
• An April 14, 2009, letter from former Lottery CEO Dr. Edward J. Stanek. 
Ten other current and former Lottery employees were offered the opportunity to reply to 
the report but deferred their replies to CEO Rich. 
A. COMMENT TO CEO RICH’S REPLY 
Our investigation of the Lottery’s regulatory performance uncovered a wide range of 
systemic deficiencies.  Above all else we found a weak, reactive enforcement system 
where fraud may be occurring without customers or the Lottery realizing it.  These 
deficiencies can be corrected over time, but it will require commitment and strong 
managerial direction. 
I am encouraged by what I have seen as some positive developments since the 
confirmation of Rich as the new Lottery CEO.  The hiring of a new security director and 
the undertaking of field tests of retailers’ compliance are examples of this development. 
However, the Lottery’s written reply to my report minimizes the significance and range 
of the deficiencies and does not specifically address the 60 recommendations for 
improvement, while portraying my report as generally giving the Lottery a clean bill of 
health.  The facts that the Lottery’s investigative files did not reveal a case of “large-scale 
fraud” or that the Lottery did not have security-related inquiries on more than 99 percent 
of transactions do not necessarily mean more instances of fraud did not occur. 
In making its point, the Lottery takes a statement from my report and quotes it 
prominently – and, I believe, out of context.  Here is what my report actually says on this 
point, followed by the Lottery’s portrayal: 
• Ombudsman report: The Lottery has a weak, reactive enforcement system where 
large-scale fraud may be occurring without customers or the Lottery realizing it.  
The fact that we did not uncover a case of large-scale fraud in our review of three 
years of Lottery activity should not be viewed as a vindication of the Lottery’s 
deficiencies. 
• Lottery reply: The end result of your work is a report that admittedly “did not 
uncover a case of large-scale fraud” involving Iowa’s lottery, supporting your 
original assessment that “the vast majority of Iowa retailers and clerks are honest, 
reputable and do not engage in fraud or theft.”  All citizens of Iowa and anyone 
beyond our borders who has ever played an Iowa Lottery game can be heartened 
by that news. 
                                                 
451 Both replies are in my report immediately before this “Ombudsman Comment” section. 
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Another key theme to my report is that operating on a “complaint-only” basis is not 
sufficient for a modern lottery.  When scam artists succeed, their crime will be invisible 
to the customer, and in turn to a lottery which operates on a complaint-only model.  If a 
lottery is not proactively looking for incidents involving fraud and theft, it will miss a 
good share of such activity.  A prevention model of regulation is called for in Iowa. 
This fundamental point, however, is not reflected in the Lottery’s reply.  It states that out 
of approximately 148 million transactions in 2008, the Lottery received 182 inquiries.  
“In other words,” the letter goes on, “99.99999877 percent of those transactions had no 
security-related inquiry associated with them.” 
While technically accurate, that statement is misleading.  It omits the fact that the Lottery 
has been operating with a complaint-only enforcement model that will not detect 
incidents involving victims who do not realize that they were scammed – points which 
Lottery management conceded during the investigation. 
The Lottery’s reply also asserts, “There is nothing in your agency’s report we have not 
already discussed, considered or implemented at the Iowa Lottery.”  This could be read to 
suggest that my report did not address any issues that Lottery officials were not already 
aware of and responding to.  However, my report, when carefully read, presents a host of 
issues where that was not the case. 
Simply put, the findings in my report are far from a badge of honor for the Lottery. 
The opportunity to reply offered the Lottery a forum to articulate any concerns it has 
about my report, particularly the findings and conclusions.  The problems documented in 
my report are not acknowledged or specifically addressed in the Lottery’s reply.  As a 
consequence, it is unclear to what extent the Lottery recognizes any of the deficiencies. 
I requested the Lottery to inform me which of my 60 recommendations it accepts or does 
not accept and to explain the reasons for not accepting a recommendation.  On this, the 
Lottery’s reply is vague.  The letter states that the Lottery agrees with many of the 
“concepts in principle” behind our recommendations but reserves the right to challenge 
the basis for those at a later time.  The letter also says the Lottery disagrees with some of 
the 60 recommendations for various reasons, but does not provide specific explanations.  
There is little specificity as to what the Lottery intends to do with the recommendations. 
My office’s investigation found that Lottery officials have been taking chances with the 
agency’s integrity and dignity, which it is mandated by law to protect.  In reply, the 
Lottery asserts that integrity “is at the heart of our operations.” 
Life teaches that integrity is not attained through words alone.  Only time and action will 
tell whether Lottery officials have learned this most important lesson.  I hope that in the 
months ahead the Lottery will make additional changes to better meet its responsibilities. 
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B. COMMENT TO FORMER CEO STANEK’S REPLY 
Similar to the Lottery’s reply, Dr. Stanek’s reply mostly minimizes the significant 
deficiencies, does not specifically address the 60 recommendations for improvement, and 
mistakenly portrays my report as generally giving the Iowa Lottery a clean bill of health. 
In his reply, Dr. Stanek states that he disagrees with “some of the facts and analyses” in 
my report, but for the most part does not specify or elaborate what they are. 
Dr. Stanek makes another point which merits comment.  He wrote: 
Although years have passed, I somewhat remember 
reviewing the Ontario Ombudsman’s report and to go a 
step further I vaguely remember being privy to the report 
by the accounting firm hired to advise the Ontario 
Ombudsman.  I believe that in-spite of all the 
recommendations made, the accounting firm noted that the 
only way to prevent retailer fraud was to have on file the 
fingerprints and DNA samples of all retail clerks and to 
compare them to the fingerprints and DNA samples of 
everyone claiming a lottery prize and to further use gloves 
and tongs to handle every prize claim document and keep it 
in a plastic bag as evidence. 
Although this recommendation was not included in my report, we verified that a 
consulting firm (KPMG) did recommend in 2006 that the Ontario lottery consider 
preserving tickets as evidence for potential DNA and fingerprint examination.452  
However, contrary to Dr. Stanek’s recollection, the recommendation applied only to 
winning tickets worth $10,000 or more and did not involve the collection of DNA and 
fingerprints from retail clerks.  The Ontario lottery accepted the recommendation and 
now stores such tickets in clear plastic bags.453 
Dr. Stanek notes even this recommendation, along with other improvements I 
recommended, have limitations.  However, my recommendations are not necessarily 
aimed at pursuing perfection.  Rather, they offer an array of improvements to establish a 
proactive Lottery enforcement system, with the goal of promoting the Lottery’s integrity 
and protecting customers. 
                                                 
452 ONTARIO LOTTERY AND GAMING CORPORATION, PHASE II REPORT – LOTTERY REVIEW (2006), 
http://www.olg.ca/assets/documents/play_confidence/kpmg_report_phase_two.pdf. 
453 STATUS OF OLG ACTION IN RESPONSE TO KPMG RECOMMENDATIONS – PHASE I, II, III 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2006), 
http://www.olg.ca/assets/documents/olg_commitment/olg_response_kpmg_march2008.pdf. 
